

WALTER H. JUDD: SPOKESMAN FOR CHINA
IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

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PREFACE

Dr. Walter Henry Judd won the Republican nomination for the Fifth Congressional District in the Minnesota primaries of 1942. Winning the general election in November, he continued to occupy a seat in the United States House of Representatives for twenty years. In the House he soon emerged as the most vocal spokesman in Congress for Chiang Kai-shek and the importance of Asia in emerging world affairs. American foreign policy, particularly in Asia, served as the overriding interest of Judd's Congressional career. In 1947 Judd obtained a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee and at the time of his defeat in 1962 he was the senior Republican member of the Far East and the Pacific Subcommittee. Judd occupied a much more significant role in directing attention to East Asia and its many problems than any other single individual in Congress.

Prior to entering politics in 1942, Judd had served as a Congregationalist medical missionary to China for ten years. In 1938, during the initial invasion of Northern China, the Japanese took over the large mission hospital which he had supervised but allowed him to leave the country.

He returned to the United States, and that fall he began a two year lecture tour throughout the nation to warn Americans of the inherent danger of Japanese imperialism in Asia.

Later Judd commented that there was no other way for him to help China except to return home and carry on the fight in the United States. Although he spoke eloquently, the results proved discouraging. In January, 1941, convinced that his mission had failed, Judd moved to Minneapolis and began to practice medicine again. He continued to speak locally on Asian problems, and had just finished a talk on December 7, 1941, warning of imminent war with Japan when news came of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Suddenly the many addresses which he had made became tangible evidence to the people of Minnesota's Fifth District that indeed Judd was an expert on Asian affairs. Friends were convinced that Judd had the knowledge to be an effective war-time Congressman. The Cowles newspaper interest boomed him for Congress.

Because of the unique role he played in dramatizing the urgency of reassessing United States-Asian affairs, his significance is national rather than merely local. Irrespective of his prominence, historians of the most recent period in American history have either ignored Judd completely or have given him only brief mention even though he assumed a place of leadership within the Republican party for opposing

the Truman-Marshall-Acheson diplomacy regarding East Asia.

This study is limited in scope to certain aspects of Judd's public life, particularly to the significant role he occupied in shaping attitudes and winning converts to his objectives regarding United States-China relations. The author has elected to deal with four general problems. The first seeks to explain how and why Judd gained the title of "expert" on matters Asiatic, and to test the validity of this title. The second attempts to ascertain the role Judd assumed in formulating a "revised" attitude in Congress regarding racial restrictions which resulted in the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, and the passage of the Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. The third assesses Judd's role in formulating and disseminating the doctrines of the "new-isolationists" and "Asia-Firsters" whose impact on foreign affairs during the late 1940's and thereafter led to important modification in the Truman-Marshall-Acheson diplomacy. Fourthly, the author attempts to judge Judd's influence during the early months of the Republican Administration which came to power in 1953.

This study has been based primarily upon a systematic examination of the Congressional Record, Senate and House hearings, reports, and miscellaneous documents, for the years 1939-1964. The speeches of Judd's appearing in Vital

Speeches of the Day, his addresses and writing reported and reproduced in the press, and references in general works were investigated in great detail. The Minneapolis press, especially the Tribune and Star, and the New York Times were most valuable sources of information. Due consideration was given to the nature and authors of articles, speeches, and comments which Judd read into the Congressional Record, and this consideration aided in evaluating Judd's position on contemporary affairs.

The preparation of this thesis involved the help and encouragement of many people. Despite the advice, consultation, and material aid provided, the final presentation, idiosyncrasies, and conclusions are those of the author, and he takes full responsibility for any errors in factual or historical judgment that may appear in this study. The author cannot here acknowledge all indebtedness, but several individuals must be singled out. The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the members of the doctoral advisory committee. Indebtedness is acknowledged to Dr. Sidney D. Brown, who supervised the study from beginning to end, and whose interest, advice, guidance, and patience were indeed great. To Dr. Theodore Agnew special thanks are expressed for his having read the entire dissertation in rough draft form. Virtually all of his extremely valuable suggestions were incorporated in the final draft. Sincere

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To George R. and Erma M. Goodno, gratitude is extended for a unique challenge. Last, Judith Lynne is especially recognized, for reasons obvious to her and too personal to mention here.

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CHAPTER I

WALTER H. JUDD: A PROFILE

On April 20, 1939, Dr. Walter Henry Judd, surgeon and recently returned medical missionary to China, testified before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on the inherent danger of the United States "appeasement" policy toward Japan.¹ Five days later, on April 25, he appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and gave similar testimony.² The testimony which he presented then and in succeeding days to various congressional committees, plus the some fourteen hundred³ addresses which he delivered from 1939 to 1941 throughout

¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, American Neutrality Policy, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, pp. 332-54. Hereafter cited as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939.

²U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, pp. 295-320. Hereafter cited as: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939.

³Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XVIII, Part 2 (July 15, 1960), 1266.

the country, landed Judd a congressional seat which he held for twenty years. His entry into the political arena resulted not so much from planned political strategy as from the December 7, 1941, tragedy of Pearl Harbor. This premeditated attack by Japan established Judd's reputation as prophet for all time.

Judd was born in Rising City, Nebraska, on September 25, 1898, the sixth of seven children of a retail lumberman, Horace Hunter Judd, and his wife, Mary Elizabeth Greenslit. Both parents were of English stock, and their ancestors had come to America early to live in New England.⁴ Judd's grandparents migrated to the mid-west from New England about mid-nineteenth century.⁵ When the young Nebraskan manifested an interest in foreign missions, his actions were not unique in Judd family history, for the family had given Hawaii the man

⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, August 29, 1957; in 1692 a maternal ancestor of Judd, Ann Pudeator of Salem Town, was hanged with eighteen other "witches" in Massachusetts. Another "witch", Giles Cory of Salem Village, at the same time was pressed to death. Fourteen of the reported "witches" were cleared of the crime by action of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay in 1711. Judd worked in 1957 with Republican leaders from Massachusetts "to clean a blot on the country," by lifting the remaining convictions. For further account see: Minneapolis Star, April 19, May 21, 1957; Minneapolis Tribune, August 29, 1957; Marion L. Starkey, The Devil in Massachusetts (Garden City, New York: Dolphin Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 202-06.

⁵ "Biographical Information," Judd, Walter H., Vertical File, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

who was probably its first medical missionary when Dr. Gerritt Parmalee Judd of Connecticut landed there in 1828.⁶

A fundamental religious faith appears to have been the center of the daily life of Horace and Mary Judd. The Congregationalists of Rising City, where Judd attended grade school and high school, could not afford a full time or regular minister; but the church did not lack for volunteer leadership. Judd's mother, for one, regularly conducted Sunday school classes. Years later, while speaking about his earlier days, Judd recalled the map of St. Paul's missionary journeys which hung on the wall of the Sunday school room. "Sunday after Sunday, year after year," he recalled, "there it was, the world staring me in the face."⁷

Judd has explained his decision to enter the foreign mission field in several ways; however, without doubt his mother's exhortation on Christian precepts and the map of St. Paul's sojourns influenced him, as did a YMCA conference, held in Lincoln during Judd's senior highschool year, which stressed the need of taking Christ to the benighted heathen

⁶ Ibid., AP Special Washington Service, "Minnesotans in Washington."

⁷ Stanley High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," Readers Digest, L (May, 1947), 118: As condensed from The Missionary Herald, April, 1947.

of foreign lands.⁸ Youthful reading was another factor. On one occasion Judd remarked that Ian Maclaren's book, Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush, a story of a selfless doctor, exerted the most influence on his selecting his life's work.⁹ Wilbur Elston, a Minneapolis Star staff correspondent, reports that the life story of David Livingston exerted the influence on Judd which prompted him to prepare for the mission field.¹⁰ Other books which Judd felt influenced him greatly in deciding his life's work included: The Virginian, by Owen Wister; and The Doctor and The Sky Pilot, both by Ralph Conner. Commenting on these books, he once said: "I am so fond of these books that I still have them in my library."¹¹ Despite the

⁸This conference probably was the greatest single factor which led Judd to the China mission field. He cites this most frequently when asked about the subject.

⁹Minneapolis Tribune, December 18, 1955; the volume is supposedly written in a Scottish dialect. A central figure of the story is a Dr. MacLure who "had mony virtues, an' did his wark well, but it wes a peety he didna mair profession o' releegion." The doctor's eternal judgment, however, "has been ready long ago; and it iss a good judgment, and you and I will be happy men if we get the like of it." Not expecting eternal salvation, the doctor, nevertheless received it. Why? "Come, ye blessed of my Father...I was sick and ye visited Me." Ian Maclaren [John Watson], Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush (New York: Dobb, Mead and Company, 1895), pp. 326-27.

¹⁰Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952.

¹¹Minneapolis Tribune, December 18, 1955.

various tangible influences which might be cited, Judd often declared that he chose medical mission work deliberately because "the needs were the greatest and the workers the fewest."¹² This statement strongly suggests that his mother's admonition to Christian brotherhood and service was the decisive influence.

Committed to a career of service, Judd entered the University of Nebraska in 1916 to begin medical training. As a college freshman Judd suffered from an acute case of acne. A skin specialist, who had only recently bought an x-ray machine, informed Judd that "We've got a new way of clearing up acne like that--x-ray exposure." As a result of severe over-exposure Judd soon started developing precancerous growth which has plagued him ever since.¹³ In early 1961, when Judd was asked about the popularity of President John F. Kennedy, he replied that physical attributes were most important in winning high elective positions.¹⁴ Without doubt Judd's bout with acne and x-ray treatment which resulted in the removal of hundreds of small growths from

¹²High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 119.

¹³Victor Cohn, "The Congressman's Scars of Courage," Coronet, XLVII (July, 1960), 31-32.

¹⁴Minneapolis Star, March 16, 1961.

his face, which gives his face a severely scarred and burned appearance, has affected Judd's life and personality in no small way. It would be impossible to gauge exactly how extensively this unfortunate event modified his own career or served to identify him with certain causes; to intensify his drive for "the lost cause;" or to prove the correctness of his foresight or strategy which dominates his speaking.

Judd remained in college another year after his treatment before withdrawing to join the army in 1918, where he rose to the rank of Second Lieutenant.¹⁵ After he returned to the University, Judd began to practice the speaking skills which would serve him in later years; he spent some time on the Chautauqua platform during the summers. He supported himself on stage, also, during his undergraduate years--he played cornet in theatres, dance bands and Chautauqua tours. (He once said: "That cornet practically put me through college.")¹⁶ Despite these demands on his time, Judd earned a Phi Beta Kappa key and a Bachelor of Arts degree in pre-medical work from the University of Nebraska in 1920.

¹⁵"Biographical Information," Judd, Walter H., Vertical File, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

¹⁶Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952; High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 119.

Judd taught zoology at the University of Omaha to support himself from 1920 to 1924. He received his M.D. in 1923 and interned at the University Hospital in Omaha from 1922 to 1924.¹⁷ In spite of his busy schedule, however, he remained active in church and mission-oriented groups, and after his internship he served as traveling secretary for the Student Volunteer Movement, a recruiting society for various mission boards,¹⁸ in colleges and universities.¹⁹ During this travel he first visited the political district he was destined to represent²⁰ and first met the future Mrs. Judd.²¹

Mariam Louise Barber, the girl "told to meet him at the trolley and see that he got to the meeting on time," proved to have a great deal in common with the young doctor six

¹⁷ Charles Moritz (ed.), Current Biography 1949 (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1949), p. 308; High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 118.

¹⁸ Student And The Modern Missionary Crusade (New York: Student Volunteer Movement For Foreign Missions, 1906), p. 40.

¹⁹ Who's Who In America, 1948-1949, XXV (Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Company, 1948), p. 1301; Moritz, Current Biography 1949, p. 308; High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 118-19; Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266.

²⁰ Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952.

²¹ Minneapolis Daily Herald, September 17, 1962.

years her senior. Her own lifetime international interest began in India, where her father was superintendent of the Calcutta YMCA. Born in India, Mariam had first come to the United States at eight years of age, when she was sent to Montclair, New Jersey, for her public school education.²²

At the time of their meeting at Mt. Holyoke College, in South Hadley, Massachusetts, however, Judd had committed himself to leave for China within a few months. In early 1926, under the sponsorship of the Congregational Foreign Missionary Board, he began his ten-year career as a medical missionary in Shaowa, in northwestern Fukien province--a site twelve days' boat journey up the Min and Fu-t'un.²³ Some thirty years later Judd was to recall that when he arrived at his hospital, Fukien province was a "hot spot" for early Chinese Communist activities. Judd, however, had moved from viewing the Communists as mere "land reformers," to a very militant anti-Communist position. Judd related in 1960 that a roving band of Chinese Communists captured his hospital and the surrounding area in December of 1926. Frequently thereafter similar occurrences took place, he charged, but he acknowledged that he received courteous

²²Ibid.

²³High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 118-19; Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952.

treatment from the Communist bands. In March, 1927, he continued to assert, a Communist guerilla band mistook him for one of the hated English "colonialists" and had taken him to the "river" for execution before he convinced the leader of his American birth.²⁴ For the remainder of his stay at Shaowa, he explained, he experienced few problems with these seemingly dedicated "reformers".

Comparing Judd's recollection of 1926-1927 with the writing of Chinese historians, it appears quite probable that Judd's harassers were roving bandits, without a great deal of political philosophy, who were making the most of the warlordism which characterized Fukien at this time. Communist "hot spots" and bases of operation were located several hundred miles to the West and South of Judd's hospital. Eight years later, however, the Communists were to control the general area in which Judd's hospital was

²⁴ Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 166.

located.²⁵

Life in the hot, humid climate presented problems at Shaowa more vexing than the Communists or roving bandits. Judd contracted malaria, common in the Fukien area, and on several occasions nearly died from the severe attacks.²⁶ Thus the dreaded disease forced him to return to the United States, via Japan, in 1931. While in Japan Judd studied briefly at Tokyo University, taking courses in the English language. Meanwhile, his former hostess, Mariam Barber, had received her B. A. from Mt. Holyoke, and had enrolled in the teachers college of Columbia University. In 1929 she returned to southern India to teach high school English for two years in the American school run by the non-

²⁵ Minneapolis Star, of February 27, 1933, reported a talk delivered by Judd to the Minnesota State Student Volunteer Missionary convention, and quoted Judd as describing Fukien "as probably the most Communistic and bandit infested district in China." The article continued: "For six months the brigands imprisoned him along with other citizens of the city until the Chinese government finally overthrew the bandit regime." For additional information on Communist activities in Fukien see: John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927-1935 (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 252, 260-61, 345-46; Mao Tse-tung, Select-ed Works: 1926-1936 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), pp. 71-104; Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 180-81; Robert Payne, Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China (New York: Henry Schuman Inc., 1950), pp. 113, 142.

²⁶ Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266.

denominational United Mission Board at Kodikanal. She arrived back in the United States about the same time as Judd.²⁷ The following year, on March 13, 1932, they were married. During the same year Judd received a two year fellowship from the Mayo Foundation, University of Minnesota, to study surgery.²⁸

In 1934, after completing his fellowship, Judd returned to the China mission field, taking with him his wife and the first-born of three daughters. The family finally settled at Fenchow in the malaria-free hill area of Shansi province in northwestern China.²⁹ Mrs. Judd contributed to the local mission program by teaching music at the nurses' training school and English at the local high school.³⁰ Judd, however, had only a few quiet months when he could devote himself full time to the bodily ailments of the Chinese peasants who came to his hospital. During the early months of

²⁷ Minneapolis Daily Herald, September 17, 1962.

²⁸ Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952.

²⁹ Who's Who in America, XXV, p. 1301; Moritz, Current Biography 1949, p. 308; High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 119; Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266-67; Richard H. Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," The Nation, CLVI (February 27, 1943), 295.

³⁰ Minneapolis Daily Herald, September 17, 1962.

1936 the Communists began an advance on Shansi province. Only hours before the Communist occupation, Judd evacuated his family to the United States, but personally returned to his hospital post, where he remained during the Communist occupation.³¹ The "rebel" Communist control lasted only about a year, to be replaced by Japanese seizure.

After the Japanese invasion of northern China in 1937 and during the period of coalition between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists, Judd treated many Communist leaders, including Lin Piao, later to become Red China's Minister of Defense, who suffered from stomach ulcers. The alliance between the Nationalists and the Communists, an alliance of convenience to both parties, was of short duration. But regardless of internal strife, Judd felt that he could render medical service to the general Chinese populace, and this would warrant his staying on at the hospital. With the Japanese assault on Shansi province early in 1938, however, Judd began to realize the fallacy of his earlier thinking--he would be forced to minister to the Japanese rather than the Chinese. The Japanese captured Fenchow in February of 1938 and took over the large hospital which Judd super-

³¹ Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266.

vised,³² but Judd remained at his post first out of dedication to service and later as a semi-prisoner.³³ After the Japanese occupied the city Judd's medical practice consisted mainly of treating Japanese soldiers for various diseases, as the Japanese would not allow the Chinese to come to the hospital when they could prevent it.³⁴ After five months under Japanese occupation Judd had the opportunity to leave China and returned to his family in the United States.³⁵

Judd later stated that he resigned his position in China because he wanted to be free to speak out against the Japanese without embarrassing the organization for which he worked, and to secure those missionaries remaining in China

³²Ibid.

³³House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 339.

³⁴Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 295.

³⁵Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266; Victor Cohn relates from an interview with Judd that a "jittery Japanese general" was responsible for his being able to leave China in 1938. The story goes that the "general had gonorrhea, and feared his own medical officers' edict that any soldier with a venereal disease must not return to Japan for two years." Judd, however treated and cured him. Thus the general did not want Judd around as a reminder of his own "shortcomings", so he offered Judd safe passage through the Japanese lines. Cohn, "The Congressman's Scars of Courage," 33.

against Japanese reprisal.³⁶ The decision, he declared, came only after treating numerous cases of Chinese men, women, and children torn by American scrap iron processed into Japanese shrapnel.³⁷ Thus Judd became convinced that he could best serve the needs of the Chinese and the American people by appealing to the latter to stop aiding the Japanese war machine. Judd, after discussing his plan with his wife, decided that he could finance a speaking tour for a year out of their savings and a legacy of \$1,000 which he had received from his grandfather. The tour, however, lasted for over two years despite the fact that more than half of his speeches brought him no financial reward and the many "honoraria" amounted to no more than ten to twenty-five dollars.³⁸ Thus Judd, following the pattern established by missionaries, took his case directly to the American people.

Perhaps few Americans fully understand or appreciate the influence which foreign missionaries and missionary organizations have exerted on the formation of American foreign

³⁶ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, and Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 295.

³⁷ Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266.

³⁸ High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," 120.

policy, particularly in the field of East Asian relations. Doubtless these individuals and organizations exerted greater influence in the nineteenth century; nevertheless, their influence still could be observed and felt well into the twentieth century.³⁹ Out of a small band of missionaries returned from China grew a strong and effective organization which forced re-examination of American commercial and diplomatic relations with Japan in the years just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. This organization, the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, served as the rallying point for many returning American missionaries from China, and for others who sympathized with their point of view.⁴⁰

The committee's founders, Harry B. and Frank W. Price, had returned to the United States from the China mission field after the outbreak of war between China and Japan. They brought with them an ardent desire to do something which would help bring an early conclusion to the Sino-

³⁹ John W. Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," The Pacific Historical Review, X (September, 1941), 279; also see: Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), chapter XXIX; Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), passim.

⁴⁰ New York Times, January 19, 1939, p. 3.

Japanese conflict. Both of the Price brothers, as had their father before them, had served in various education and mission posts in China.⁴¹ Both men believed that hostilities could be stopped by halting American exports to Japan. In the summer of 1938 the two brothers gathered together persons associated with the missionary, religious, and academic work in China and discussed plans for carrying this idea to the general public. Out of these discussions emerged the Non-Participation Committee, which became commonly known as the Price Committee.⁴² The purpose of the committee, as outlined in one of its early publications,

is to help in bringing the essential facts to the attention of the American people, cooperating with other individuals and organizations that are working to this end, and to investigate ways and means whereby the stoppage of war credits and essential war supplies to Japan can be made effective for the remainder of the present conflict in China.⁴³

The founders contacted State Department officials and informed them of their project. The Department officials

⁴¹Harry B. Price, prior to his return to the United States, had served as Acting Dean of College Public Affairs, Yenching University. Frank W. Price, long associated with the Nanking Theological Seminary, was the translator of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "The Three Principles of the People." See New York Times, December 12, 1937, VIII, p. 12.

⁴²Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 293.

⁴³*Ibid.*

manifested pleasure upon learning of the committee's object of educating "the public toward a stronger stand against Japan's expansionist policy," and encouraged them to proceed. The committee kept in close contact with the State Department and congressional leaders at all times.⁴⁴ The group also achieved effective cooperation with American officials in China, whose actions they strongly supported.⁴⁵

The committee appealed to Henry L. Stimson, who had been Secretary of War in the Taft cabinet and Secretary of State under Hoover, and was to be a Secretary of War to F. D. Roosevelt. Stimson had already made himself the outstanding American champion of the Chinese cause.⁴⁶ Harry B. Price, Roger S. Greene, former vice-counsel in the United States diplomatic service, and the Rockefeller Foundation representative in Peiping for many years, and other old China hands who had rallied to the cause, invited Stimson to serve as honorary chairman. Strengthened by the prestige of the Stimson name, the committee intensified their agita-

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 294.

⁴⁵William C. Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 225.

⁴⁶Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 135.

tion for both a voluntary boycott and for government embargoes against Japan.⁴⁷

The Chinese National Government enthusiastically welcomed the formation of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. Chinese officials viewed the organization as another indication of the growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and the increasing tendency to support China concretely. China's official Central Daily News applauded the formation of the committee and anticipated "far-reaching" results in awakening the American people to China's plight. The New York Times reported that "leading American Journalists" in China cabled their appreciation to Stimson for his role in the committee's activities.⁴⁸ Membership in the organization

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ New York Times, January 22, 1939, p. 3.

increased rapidly and included men of diverse occupations.⁴⁹

Judd affiliated himself with the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression in the fall of 1938, and became foremost among the speakers who "took to the

⁴⁹ New York Times, January 26, 1939, p. 6; Harry B. Price reported that the committee met with immediate response in almost every section of the country, New York Times, January 26, 1939. The original group, however, carried on most of the activities of the committee. National figures associated with the movement included not only Henry L. Stimson, but personalities such as William Allen White, the world-famous publisher and editor of the Emporia Gazette; A. Lawrence Lowell, President emeritus of Harvard University and a strong Republican supporter of Wilson's plan for the League of Nations; Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Retired, former commander of the American Asiatic Squadron, and Henry I. Harriman, an American utilities executive and former President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Harriman served as an honorary vice chairman, Shall America Stop Arming Japan? (New York: American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1940), p. 40; Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 293. Jonathan W. Daniels, son of Josephus Daniels, United States Ambassador to Mexico, accepted an honorary vice chairmanship in late January 1939. Dr. Robert E. Speer, a religious author, also served on the honorary roster, New York Times, January 26, 1939, p. 6. Roger S. Greene, of the Rockefeller Foundation, assumed the Chairmanship and served as chief contact man in Washington, D. C. Frank Price returned to China soon after the committee's conception, but his brother Harry served as executive secretary, Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 293. Miss Josephine Schain, head of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, held the position of vice chairman, and Mrs. Sidney Gamble, a long-time supporter of the mission cause, served as treasurer. The organization maintained permanent headquarters in New York City, New York Times, January 19, 1939, p. 3. For a more complete history of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression see Donald J. Friedman, The Road From Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee For Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941 (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1968), passim.

platform in behalf of the Price Committee." He set out on his tour of some forty-six states, calling upon the American people to boycott Japanese articles and to demand an embargo on the sale and shipment of war materials to Japan. This, he declared, would have to be done immediately or Americans would have to give up their sons later in a war with Japan.⁵⁰ Thus while Judd could report that he represented no one officially--this was a personal crusade--he often asserted that he represented the opinions and attitudes of a large number of Americans in China. He did, in fact, represent the views of the majority of American missionaries and laymen in China.⁵¹

Despite the fact that the missionary movement in China stood for the maintenance of its own interests there, and that it resisted the demands of some groups that American interests be reduced to avoid trouble with Japan, their general demands, like Judd's, paralleled those of many politically minded civilians, State Department officials, and government officials in general. Many missionaries in China and many of the officers of the various national mission

⁵⁰Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 295.

⁵¹Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 295.

boards in the United States actively advocated the use of economic sanctions against Japan. Many missionaries, likewise, urged the adoption of effective measures to halt the shipment of various "war items" to Japan. Like Judd, they insisted that sale of certain materials to Japan violated a moral principle, and they could answer those individuals who feared that an embargo might bring on a war with Japan with seemingly sound logic: Japan would not and could not dare risk a war with the United States. The returned missionaries declared that an embargo would force Japan to abandon her invasion of China in short order.⁵²

Information about Asia which was received in the United States from American missionaries in China, particularly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, was decidedly partisan in favor of the Chinese. After the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1932, few, if any, American missionaries in Japan felt that they could justify the national policies of Japan. Furthermore, the missionaries from Japan did not have a history of attempting to secure opinion favorable to Japan, as compared to the missionaries' attempts of arousing sympathy for the Chinese. Unofficial Japanese governmental policy was, indeed, quite hostile toward

⁵²Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 295.

foreign mission activities in Japan. Not infrequently were missionaries openly harassed by the Japanese police, resulting often in violent anti-Japanese reaction by various mission groups. The drive to heighten the sympathy for the Chinese intensified in the late 1930's as the mission personnel returned from China and the mission boards labored to keep China's suffering before the American people. In this they were aided by the unique position the returned missionary has always occupied in the minds of the average church-going American. While under ordinary circumstances allegations of destruction and torture might be discounted as war propaganda by this sizable element of society, information circulated by missionaries of wide reputation was often accepted as fact.⁵³ Likewise, information presented out of context, or an incomplete picture of existing situations within a culture, by the same missionaries, tended to emphasize the differences between East and West--rather than the similarities of the existing cultures. Thus the validity of the missionaries viewpoint could seldom be challenged by the average church-going American. The missionaries had long been looked upon by this American group to be experts on the culture, civilization, and history of the people to

⁵³Ibid., p. 290.

whom they ministered. Thus, in innocence, the mission "expert" had on occasion been guilty of exploiting the ignorance of the congregations to which he spoke.

Assuming the role of just such an expert, Judd held and expounded the general theme that there existed in the Occidental World a general misunderstanding of, or an absence of appreciation for, the Oriental thought process and social and intellectual institutions. Even though Asian authorities of the West might take Judd to task at a later date over this point of view, his thesis met little, if any, opposition at the time. From the very beginning the people with whom Judd came into contact regarded him as a "top-notch" authority on China. Judd, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,⁵⁴ pointed out to the committees in dogmatic terms what he considered the United States needed most in dealing with Asians. This was an understanding of

⁵⁴ On August 2, 1939, Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stated on the Senate floor in response to recent testimony of Judd: "I wish to say that when the Committee...had heard a number of witnesses we had an informal meeting of the Committee on the question of other witnesses being called, and it was the unanimous opinion of those present at that meeting that the testimony of Dr. Judd had been so outstanding, and had so clearly and exhaustively outlined the situation in the Far East, that there was no need to call any other witnesses upon the Chinese-Japanese problem." U. S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, XXCIV, Part 10, 10753.

the psychology of the Asian people.⁵⁵

Judd's manner of speaking and presentation portrayed the attitude that his were the only correct--the only logical--observations. His positive attitude, the seeming depth of conviction, left little room for questioning the validity of his arguments. He attempted to relate to the committee his interpretation of how the Oriental relegated economic affairs to a secondary position in his daily life. To the Oriental, final objectives were paramount in their lives, and the total cost in lives, time, and monies could not prevent the realizing of these goals. To the West, the resources of China might appear relatively unimportant; however, to the Japanese with their scarcity of natural resources, Chinese resources were vital in the untimate objective of empire building. He pointed out how the information which the West could obtain from economic resources surveys could mean quite a different thing in the hands of the West as compared to the East--especially when this information was employed by Orientals in attempting to solve their own problems as they saw and interpreted them. The West could deduce that the price which Japan was paying was too great;

⁵⁵House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 332; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 296.

they would conclude that it "couldn't be." Thus Judd declared that economic information alone as interpreted by Westerners cannot be employed in understanding the Oriental's reactions or his reasoning in situations such as the Sino-Japanese conflict.⁵⁶ Though Judd failed to make clear exactly how Japan's desire for expansion differed from previous conditions which prompted other countries to expand or desire expansion, he did attempt to explain his concepts of the kind of war which Japan was carrying out. To Judd the Sino-Japanese War constituted a conflict of a nature unknown in modern times.

Whether Judd's presentation was intentional or not, it had the desired effect of stirring sympathy for the Chinese and portraying the Japanese as barbarians in China. Judd suggested that coequal in value with any factual information is the knowledge of the psychology of the people who employ the information. For instance, the United States, according to Judd, has been prone to read Japanese diplomatic notes as if these notes had been written by other Americans, that is, to take them at face value. Apparently Judd had in mind here the traditional East Asian concept of "saving face." His argument followed that since the Oriental ab-

⁵⁶House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 332-33.

horred head-on confrontation which would offend, the Japanese tailored their communications so that they would not be offensive. Thus, to Judd, all dispatches between Japan and the United States had to be interpreted in light of this concept of "face saving." The Japanese employed this device in writing their communications and assumed that the United States did likewise. The United States, however, assumed that Japan read American diplomatic notes at face value. This, Judd declared, was seldom done. Thus, the two countries were not truly communicating.⁵⁷ To Judd's thinking, the Japanese read into all official correspondence those ideas or concepts which would be included if they had written them, and as if they had been accustomed to "face saving" tactics. Judd suggested that perhaps the greatest contribution he and others who understood the Oriental thought process and language could make would be an explanation of the Eastern people.⁵⁸

Despite Judd's elaborate explanation of oriental tactics of composing diplomatic notes, it is doubtful that the Japanese avoided head-on confrontation any more than did

⁵⁷ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 296.

⁵⁸ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 333.

western nations. Henry W. Denison, a highly trusted and respected American adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office from 1881 until 1914, schooled many of Japan's leading diplomats in the art of composing diplomatic exchanges. Denison and other Americans ably assisted the Japanese in bridging the gap between the days of seclusion and the days of modern international intercourse.⁵⁹ Judd seldom, if ever, suffered from modesty when asserting his own knowledge of the Asian people. Characteristic of his own self-assured understanding of events in Asia is this statement: "If we who have lived many years in the Orient, and are first-hand witnesses to what is happening there, have any contribution to make...it is not so much in presenting statistical material which can be assembled from various handbooks and reports, as in trying to interpret from our intimate knowledge of the peoples living there what these facts mean to them, and what they are likely to do in given situations."⁶⁰

Interpreting events of East Asia, Judd expressed the belief that only a few of the problems which Japan felt

⁵⁹ Payson J. Treat, Japan And The United States 1853-1921: Revised and Continued to 1928 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1928), pp. 105, 192.

⁶⁰ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 296.

confronted her were real--such as population pressure and lack of raw materials. Others which, according to Judd, had been real in the past but that ceased to be so included disorderliness in China, the white man's imperialism in China, and communism in China. Then, to Judd, there were other supposed problems which were nothing but the products of Japan's national fear psychosis, such as alleged political designs by America in China.⁶¹ Judd viewed American activities which led to Dollar Diplomacy in the Pacific, and the continuing attitude of Americans in China, which indeed could be interpreted as an attempt to control or manipulate political affairs by economic coercion, as America's humanitarian concern for the benighted brethren of the world. America, indeed, was rescuing the Chinese, whether they realized it or not, from a stagnant civilization. Indeed, the future would hold China's eternal gratitude to the United States.

For Judd, there existed three general but exclusive concepts which could describe American attitudes regarding China--three concepts which Judd viewed as most frightening. The first was that the United States knew the full extent of the Sino-Japanese situation in China; second, that the situ-

⁶¹Ibid.

ation in China did not fall within the realm of business, the concern, or the responsibility of the United States; and third, that nothing could be done about Asia without getting the United States into war. Erroneous and terrifying as these attitudes might be, he felt that he could easily understand why American people held them. To Judd, however, "the single greatest tragedy" in all the post-World War era was that the United States, as "one of the few nations in all the world that really believed in the brave new technique of peace--didn't just give lip service to them while really depending upon power politics behind the scenes--gambled her very existence on them, is being destroyed at this hour, for her faith."⁶² Judd felt compelled, therefore, as an "expert" and one with "first-hand" knowledge, to cast some light on these attitudes and perhaps clarify the distorted image which many Americans held of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The events in China, Judd argued, could not be passed off as a simple political conquest. In reality they involved a "deliberate, systematic, cold-blooded, calculated destruction, not just of...[China's]...political independence, but of the nation's culture, a civilization that has

⁶²Ibid., p. 299.

stood for 5,000 years."⁶³

Attempts at subverting Chinese culture, however, could not be considered a unique goal of the Japanese. China had long known various forces which had attempted to defeat the Confucian system upon which traditional Chinese civilization is based. Even the American Christian missionary attempted to subvert the system. In direct contrast to Judd's portrayals of Japanese aims in China, the missionary almost without exception glorified the ideas of the founders of the Chinese Republic and of the National Government with its rejection of traditional ideas. The missionary in general, and Judd in particular, never failed to point with pride to the fact that a high percentage of the officials of the government of China had been educated in Christian institutions and that many of them were themselves Christians.⁶⁴

To Judd, however, the Japanese conquest involved a new kind of war, one which Judd argued could not be passed off as a struggle between armies--Chinese and Japanese. To Judd the war raging in China involved "primary attack, and not the

⁶³ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 333.

⁶⁴ Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 288.

incident attack" upon unarmed groups.⁶⁵ The Japanese did not define military objectives, Judd pointed out, "in the way that people used to in 'gentlemen's war,' such as railroad stations, barracks, air fields, arsenals, forts," and other conventional military goals.

Judd's concept of the so-called "gentlemen's wars" showed his misunderstanding of the history of war. There has always been present a certain degree of abuse of civilian population or non-combatants in the history of war. Judd, however, seems to have denied the presence of conventional military objectives on the part of Japan as he stressed the unorthodox tactics of the Japanese in China. In the Sino-Japanese War the attack was upon the wounded, both civilian and military, by preventing medical treatment; upon women "not primarily because of some peculiar beastliness...[in]...the individual Japanese soldier...[but]...because the most vulnerable spot in all of the Chinese armor is the home."⁶⁶ Likewise, the Japanese attacked the schools and the universities because scholars have traditionally provided leadership for the Chinese. China has not "made heroes out of the men with long swords, she made heroes out

⁶⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 333.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 334.

of the scholars, men who had long fingernails, and gowns, to show that they would not touch anything with their hands except the pen."⁶⁷ China had been able "to overcome previous conquerors because she had a superior scholarship and civilization," Judd stated.⁶⁸

Judd continued his argument by asserting that the present threat to China came not only from a superior military nation, which was always the case, but from a nation that considered herself superior in all other ways.⁶⁹ Japan had in fewer than one hundred years made tremendous economic, social, and political gains which placed her far ahead of any other Asian country. Judd's argument, however, followed that the basic objective of the Japanese involved demoralizing the Chinese in order to prevent the rise of a literate leadership which might have the stamina to survive and eventually absorb the conquerors, as had taken place in the past. Japan, Judd asserted, manifested a knowledge of what previous thwarted conquerors failed to consider. To both the House and Senate committees of 1939 he cited the "forced" growing of opium-producing poppies and the use of

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

the drug in China as a Japanese tactic to demoralize the Chiense.⁷⁰ No one challenged him on the point. But Judd was not alone in employing this topic to gain sympathy for his cause. Numerous accounts by missionary personnel related the opium evil to the Japanese occupation.⁷¹ Like Judd, the group emphasized endless accounts of wholesale distribution of opium and other drugs--of how the drug habit was inflicted upon Chinese through hypodermics by leading the Chinese to believe that the inoculation was against cholera.⁷² Judd often cited the closing of educational institutions in Manchuria as another tactic of the Japanese to break the Chinese spirit.

Despite Judd's testimony, the internal situation of Manchuria or Manchukuo during the 1930's was far better than the non-recognizing powers were willing or prepared to acknowledge. There was a marked contrast between Japanese action on the mainland before and after the establishment of the puppet government at Nanking in 1940.⁷³ Under Japan-

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 334-35.

⁷¹ For Example see: "Opium Supports Puppet Regime," Christian Century, LVII (January 3, 1940), 29.

⁷² Minneapolis Morning Tribune, December 18, 1941.

⁷³ See: Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 188-89.

ese control, some Asian historians have asserted, Manchuria possessed greater stability than at any time in modern history. It cannot be denied that the Chinese who resisted the Japanese occupation were disposed of; however, those who accepted the Japanese regime found increased security for life and property. The arbitrary and whimsical government of the warlord throughout China was nearly unbearable. The mercenary armies of the warlords had lived off opium production and distribution long before Japan came on the scene in China.⁷⁴ The warlord's device of levying such high taxes on land suitable for poppy-growing that nothing but opium could meet the payment had been carried on since the end of World War I.⁷⁵ The debased government of the "Old Marshal," Chang Tso-lin, and his son Chang Hsueh-liang, ceased to exist with Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

The new regime established a uniform currency system, reduced taxes and collected them more honestly, and promoted industrialization. Opium production and consumption, long a severe plague in Manchuria, were not abolished; however, the Japanese regime did place the traffic under rigid government control and limitation. The new regime accomplished

⁷⁴ John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 674.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 658.

to a greater extent what honest Chinese officials had failed to do since the early nineteenth century. Opium can be counted as a major factor in the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Thus, the opium problem expounded by the American missionary was not unique in China under the Japanese. The political philosophy on which the Japanese sought to rest the new state was a revival of Confucian philosophy--"Wang Tao"--the "kingly way." This made a strong appeal to the traditional-minded Chinese population in Manchuria and in other areas where the Japanese employed the philosophy in an honest manner.⁷⁶ Judd, however, perhaps because he was never seriously challenged, stressed what he considered the "unnatural" activities of the Japanese in China. Their "demoralizing tactics," Judd declared, were unknown to America, thus preventing an overall understanding of the Chinese situation. These factors, he declared, needed to

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 708; Paul H. Clyde, The Far East: A History of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia (2nd ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), pp. 646-47. Clyde further states that while in general this was true in Manchuria there was, however, some evidence that those who suffered from Japanese rule were not solely those who resisted the occupation. See in particular the picture presented by W. I. Ladejinsky, "Manchurian Agriculture under Japanese Control," Foreign Agriculture, V (1941), 309-40. Clyde notes that one must consider that there was a greater economic pressure on the Manchurian people as Japan's war program developed. A great many factors served to keep the Manchurian resistance movement alive.

be explained and viewed from a proper perspective⁷⁷ -- his perspective.

Judd hit hard and strong at what he regarded as erroneous concepts held by Americans in viewing the Chinese situation. He reasoned that the Asian problem did involve the United States for three principal reasons: "partly because of America's past, partly because of her present, and partly because of her future."⁷⁸ The United States' present position with China and her future involved the past, because the United States had traditionally taken the lead in insuring China's integrity. The role which the United States had played in the past had built up China's confidence in the United States. Thus, Judd said, if "meddling" is involved it has been of the past and is not of the present. The United States would simply be carrying out its commitments of the past, as she had in the past led China step by step to where she is today.⁷⁹

In accordance with Judd's third observation he asked the question: "Should the United States go to war on China's

⁷⁷House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 334-35.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 335.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 336.

behalf?" His response was a flat "never!" The United States had no obligation to go to war for China, as the latter did not ask or expect this sort of aid from the United States. China's sovereignty was the Chinese alone to defend, Judd declared; however, China could on the basis of past experience be appalled at finding the United States furnishing more than half of all the war supplies to the Middle Kingdom's enemy in its greatest hour of danger. How else could China feel, Judd seemed to ask, when the indispensable materials necessary for Japan to execute its rape of China came from the United States, and in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty which the United States sponsored.⁸⁰ Judd here demonstrated his lack of understanding of the Nine-Power Treaty. The treaty provided that the contracting powers, with the exception of China, agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. It contained no provisions which prohibited commerce between the signatory powers. The treaty did, however, set forth the concept that the violation by one signatory power of its obligations under the treaty constituted a violation of the rights of

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 337.

the powers signing the treaty.⁸¹ Thus, Japan in 1937, as in 1932, violated not only China's sovereign right, but the treaty rights of the United States and of the other six signatory powers. The treaty made no provision for enforcement of its provisions, and its value depended on the willingness of the signatories to abide by those provisions, or on the willingness of a signatory to take effective diplomatic, economic, or even military steps to prevent or punish any violators.⁸²

Judd did, however, deplore the shipment to Japan of articles of war or materials which could be converted into armaments. Supplying Japan with armory or vital materials, Judd said, is what hurts the Americans who live in China or who have lived there. He asserted that, "almost to a man," they believe that Japan could never have started her military adventure in China without the indispensable assistance of the United States of America.⁸³ To dramatize his thinking on this point, Judd related the following personal ac-

⁸¹For test of treaty see: Henry Steele Commager (ed.), Documents of American History (7th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 184-85.

⁸²Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order, pp. 133, 137.

⁸³House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 337.

count (although slightly exaggerated when compared with reports of Chinese historians):

I have been bombed myself over and over again, with American airplanes, and it never helps to know where they came from, especially during that first disastrous year of war; or to know that all of the high-test antiknock gasoline comes from America because it isn't made anywhere else; and to know that all of the lubricating oil for airplane engines and American-made arsenal machinery are the absolutely essential high-grade Pennsylvania paraffin-base motor oils; and to know that one-third of all the stuff that the planes drop down to kill and destroy is still coming from the scrap iron yards and steel mills of our country...I never could go to sleep without wondering if my people back in America knew what they were doing...I am an American citizen, too, and I feel, and we in China feel, that we have no right to allow our country to go on with this kind of policy, either by drift or deliberate choice, without having faced clearly the thing that we are doing. ⁸⁴

Judd scoffed at the idea assumed by many Americans that only two alternatives could be presented in discussing United States dealings with Japan. The United States neither had "to completely lie down or go to war." Judd asserted that peace and democracy cannot be served or saved by going to war for them, nor could they be served or saved by just

⁸⁴ Ibid. There is ample evidence to indicate that Judd was not above resorting "to exaggerated statements" when it became necessary to do so to prove a point, Friedman, The Road From Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee For Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941, p. 49.

doing nothing.⁸⁵ In essence Judd was pleading for "aid-short-of-war", which paralleled in large measure the philosophy expounded by William Allen White's "Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Law"⁸⁶ in regard to Europe. Judd, as did the White Committee, argued that aid to American allies was a substitute for war, not a step toward war. Judd employed this same basic idea in his defense of Chiang Kai-shek in the post-war period. He desired legislation making it impossible for the United States to sell and ship war materials to nations at war in violation of treaties which they had with the United States.⁸⁷ Judd pleaded for modification of that legislation which had been passed after the mid-1930's as an effort to keep the United States out of war. The Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937 had laid an embargo on the shipment of all munitions, arms and implements of war to belligerents; however, the acts allowed the selling of all indirect war materials, and these had to be handled on a "cash and carry" basis.

⁸⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Hearings, 1939, p. 352.

⁸⁶ See: Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1950), pp. 165-68.

⁸⁷ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 337.

The President had previously used the acts whenever possible to punish attacking nations and to aid attacked nations, who could not buy from the United States. In the Sino-Japanese War, however, he refused to invoke the laws--to allow China to continue arms purchases. This policy also allowed the Japanese to continue to purchase articles of war or materials regarded as indirect war materials, and she continued to have an edge over China in obtaining vital materials from the United States. Japan surpassed China in naval strength and ready cash, and took advantage of American neutrality legislation. The President did, however, take action against Japan by announcing in July, 1939, that the United States would in six months abrogate a 1911 treaty which guaranteed reciprocal trading rights. Beginning on January 26, 1940, the United States was free to cut off shipments of oil, gasoline, scrap iron, and other raw materials to Japan. President Roosevelt was legally required to apply the arms embargo to all belligerents. This, however, would have cut off munitions shipments to France and Great Britain. He chose, therefore, to call Congress into special session in November, 1939, to amend the neutrality laws. Only after repeated prodding did Congress act, and this was only to repeal the arms embargo, to apply the "cash and carry" requirement to all commerce with belligerents, and to

prohibit American ships from carrying materials to warring countries. Congress was not willing to act in regard to Japan so as to name Japan as a menace to American overseas interests.⁸⁸

Judd admitted to the House committee that there was a danger of reprisals from Japan if the United States shut off supplies to her. He felt that the United States had not done anything to stop Japan because of the fear that such an act might lead to war. Economic sanctions against Japan, he continued, would be the way not to war, but away from war.⁸⁹ Judd stated emphatically that he opposed a war with Japan. His hope involved saving Japan from herself and not destroying her. Nothing that Japan could do or even threaten to do, Judd continued, would justify or require the United States to go to war.⁹⁰ Japan, Judd felt, could not conceivably go to war with the United States at the present time, or for months ahead. Judd felt that Americans failed to view the Japanese in realistic terms. He pointed out that Japan "is

⁸⁸ For a more complete account of Neutrality Acts see Jules Davids, America and the World of Our Time: U. S. Diplomacy in the 20th Century (2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 153-85.

⁸⁹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 347, 352.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 347.

having all she can do to defeat the Chinese" with the assistance of the United States. He asked how could Japan then "defeat those same Chinese and the United States of America without our assistance?"⁹¹ To Judd this demanded too much of one's credulity, and he remarked that the United States strained "at the gnat of very remotely possible trouble as a result of action we might take, while swallowing the camel of the ruthless and barbarous war now progressing as a result of action we fail to take."⁹²

Fear of war with Japan at the present time he viewed as an "unreasoning and absurd bogey."⁹³ But insofar as the United States refused non-military measures now, she could be deliberately choosing the military role later. War, Judd asserted, could be prevented with relative ease at the present time before Japan got China any more under control. After China it would be the East Indies and the Phillipines.⁹⁴ He pointed to the Panay incident as a foretaste of things to

⁹¹Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy Hearings, 1939, p. 307.

⁹²Ibid., p. 310.

⁹³Ibid., p. 307.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 310.

come "if and when Japan has victory within her grasp and does not need to coddle us along any more in order to get our money and materials."⁹⁵ Judd pointed out that the United States did not have the "choice of getting out or not getting out," but only the "choice of being forced out gradually, which will be permanent, or of getting out voluntarily and rapidly now, shutting off war trade with Japan, and then returning before long with enormous enhancement of position, prestige, and opportunity." He reported that he saw the Japanese "shiver" for three months after the Panay incident as some of the Japanese soldiers got a little too enthusiastic and made premature aggressive moves against the United States. The Japanese, Judd asserted, did not fear that the United States would use all-out military force against them, but only that the United States might cut off its "indispensable trade with them."⁹⁶

Judd agreed with the objection that placing an embargo on Japan would be taking sides, but not between China and Japan. It would be "taking sides between law abiding and law breaking," and if Japan did not like the side she was on, all she had to do would be to get over "on the law-abiding

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 308.

⁹⁶Ibid.

side."⁹⁷ Judd continued this line of argument by stating that under provisions of "existing neutrality legislation which lays down the same rule for both sides in a conflict," the United States is actually taking sides. But here the decision does not have a moral basis, nor is it the decision of the United States as to which side she is on. Thus the United States is an accessory to Japan's crime against not only China, but against international law, and against the United States itself, because the United States aided and abetted Japan in her crime against the "sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity" of a country which the United States by treaty is obligated to respect. Thus, Judd asserted, the United States is violating its own treaty.⁹⁸ He did not wish to see Japan crushed, or to suffer the fate of the Central Powers at the conclusion of World War I; he wanted only to check Japan's military party and thereby allow her to free herself, China, and the United States from its threat. Then Japan could find ways of getting to the peace table to settle the China venture before she suffered economic collapse, especially if the United States offered some face-saving loopholes, as it

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 305.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 306.

could and should do.⁹⁹

The best interest of Japan could only be served, Judd argued, by certain economic sanctions. Likewise, Americans would benefit because many American activities worked against the nation's own best interest, as the action of the United States aided the process of building up a competitor that could put the United States out of business. The economic results would be devastating to the United States, Judd felt, if Japan could succeed in getting hold of China's manpower and natural resources. By using Chinese raw materials which she would obtain by confiscation, and by using Chinese conscripted labor, which would be forced into a status of economic serfdom, Japan could build in China, with the use of modern machines and human slavery, an industrial plant that could take over the whole world's markets in the products that she would manufacture.¹⁰⁰

The economic sanctions which Judd desired in the late 1930's had been suggested by Stimson, as Secretary of State, in 1932. President Hoover, however, blocked sanctions because he feared that the United States would be alone in levying a boycott and thus would bear the brunt of Japan's

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 309.

¹⁰⁰House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 330-40.

ire alone.¹⁰¹ Stimson had to settle for non-recognition in regard to Japan's action in Manchuria. He did, however, continue to champion the cause of China. In early 1940 the former Secretary of State proposed in a letter written to the New York Times that Congress pass legislation to prohibit the export of arms, munitions or raw materials for arms to Japan. Stimson viewed the trade as "a dirty business" carried on by only a few Americans.¹⁰² Both Judd and Stimson demanded that the United States cite Japan in specific terms as an aggressor against the United States rights in China. Stimson expressed views which not only paralleled those which Judd gave to the House and Senate committees a year earlier, but which also smacked of the "merchants of death" theory which came out of the Nye Committee of the mid-1930's. Stimson's letter was applauded, reprinted, and widely circulated by the American Committee for Non-participation in Japanese aggression.¹⁰³ The man who had opposed Stimson most strenuously in 1932, William R. Castle, Hoover's Under Secretary of State, opposed him also in regard to the undeclared

¹⁰¹ Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-33 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 91.

¹⁰² New York Times, January 11, 1940, pp. 1, 4.

¹⁰³ Ibid.; Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order, p. 294.

Sino-Japanese War. Castle had in 1932 consistently and adamantly opposed sanctions against Japan. In the late 1930's his views echoed the isolationist-neutralist sentiment. Castle charged that the Roosevelt Administration was risking war by setting itself up as "prosecuting attorney and judge of the rest of the world." He acknowledged that Americans could and should feel sorrow and pity for the suffering of the Chinese, but he spoke the words and attitudes which permeated American thought at this time: "We have enough to do to keep our own house in order, to see to it that the miseries brought upon innocent people of the world over do not also fall on our own citizens."¹⁰⁴

In contrast to the sentiments of these prominent Americans, Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador to Japan, favored a more moderate policy. For Grew, the possibility of reconciliation between the United States and East Asia never entirely disappeared.¹⁰⁵ Later he did, however, warn of the possibility that Japan might attack the United States with dramatic suddenness;¹⁰⁶ but at an earlier date he was greatly alarmed

¹⁰⁴ New York Times, January 11, 1939, p. 8.

¹⁰⁵ Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 307.

¹⁰⁶ Fairbank, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, p. 805.

by talks of embargo in the United States. Grew felt that Stimson and his "satellites" dangerously underestimated the risk of war which might follow the embargo.¹⁰⁷ He also believed Stimson's doctrine had been weak and had failed to accomplish its goal because it turned world opinion against Japan and broke down lines of communications. Grew likewise disapproved of Cordell Hull's lecturing Japan on the principles of international conduct. Hull's objective was to mobilize world opinion against Japan, which in turn would force her to halt her lawless action.¹⁰⁸ Stanley Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations in the Department of State in 1932, and Senior Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs in the late 1930's, further complicated the course of action the United States should take in Asia. On both occasions Hornbeck was inclined toward a boycott as the only means of bridling Japan.¹⁰⁹ Grew, in spite of differences with the State Department, believed that Rooseveltian foreign policy was

¹⁰⁷ Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition, p. 307.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 102.

"wise, sound, and beyond substantial reproach."¹¹⁰ Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's Under Secretary of State, tended to side closely with Grew; he felt that when the door of negotiation was closed, Japan was most likely to strike. He strongly supported Roosevelt's policy of giving neither provocation nor concessions to the Japanese.¹¹¹

When Roosevelt moved in early 1940 to prohibit sale of planes and aviation gasoline to Japan he acted wholly outside the framework of the Neutrality Acts and even in flat contradiction to the spirit of that legislation. For the Neutrality Acts, when invoked, provided that in the regulation of exports there must be no discrimination between the nation which is bombed and the nation which does the bombing, between the victim of aggression and the nation which had deliberately set upon a war of conquest. It was because of this hard-and-fast rule against any and all discrimination, and the belief that it would work to the disadvantage of China, that Roosevelt failed to invoke the Neutrality Acts in East Asia.¹¹² Judd applauded Roosevelt's action at this

¹¹⁰ Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition, p. 307.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² New York Times, January 11, 1940, p. 18.

time: he had specifically named Japan an aggressor in China. At this time Judd could lend his support to the President, because he realized that the Neutrality Laws did not give the President enough discretion in discriminating against aggressors. Later in 1944, however, Judd, more the partisan politician, asserted in a radio address that Roosevelt saw the danger of the Japanese situation in 1937 when he made his quarantine speech in Chicago, but that the President "would not risk his political career" to drive home to the American people the Japanese menace.¹¹³

Lending support to the President in 1939-1940, Judd had declared to the Congress and the American people that if they allowed Japan to continue her course of action in China, they would only be contributing to the eventual bankruptcy of the United States. By continuing the existing course, Judd declared, the American people were allowing Japan to become a military and naval power--a potential military threat which they already mistrusted and which they would have to arm against. Thus, if the United States would stop its aid to Japan, then money would not have to be spent in building up American armament. In conclusion to this argument, Judd felt that "a decent instinct or self-preservation would dictate" that the United States stop its assistance to

¹¹³ New York Times, November 6, 1944, p. 16.

Japan.¹¹⁴ Only by economic boycott of Japanese-produced commodities and embargo of all war materials could the Japanese military party be defeated short of war. Judd asserted that Japan possessed in adequate quantity only two of the twenty-six materials necessary to execute modern warfare, coal and sulphur. More than fifty percent of her imported war materials were obtained from the United States.¹¹⁵ Judd further emphasized that this astonishing recorded fact will in the future indicate that several democratic countries, including the United States, all by far stronger than Japan, "except in decisiveness and in spirit," destroy their own interests in Asia by aiding Japan to succeed in dominating the Pacific.¹¹⁶

Assessing why the United States had not taken definite action in Asia, Judd related that perhaps many reasons could be found, but perhaps the most important were:

lack of information as to what is going on and lack of foresight as to its significance for the future; ...unconcern...and...the sense of isolation and security that two wide oceans have given us for so many decades; preoccupation with our own internal diffi-

¹¹⁴Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy, 1939, p. 303.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 299.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 304.

culties; an economic order ailing so seriously that we hesitate to disturb it in the very least lest it have another relapse; widely believed so-called 'laws of business' that one must sell whatever he has to whoever will buy and pay for it...; plain greed and lust for profits from whatever source. 117

But perhaps the strongest of all was the fear that if the United States stopped sales to Japan the action might lead to war.

A recapitulation of what Judd stressed to the committees and his audiences throughout the country reveals that he believed: (1) that the United States did have, because of her past, her present, and her future, enormous stakes in East Asia, from legal, moral, humanitarian, and self-interest standpoints; (2) that substantial American support of Japan's lawless action, under present policies, would systematically destroy American interests in China, and thus threaten the security of the Philippines, and eventually of the United States; (3) that America's self-interest required extrication from the intolerable position the United States occupied; (4) that Japan's "illegal" and "criminal" action against China would be thwarted by the nonmilitary means of ending the partial financing of the war by stopping the purchase of her goods and placing an embargo on the sale and shipment of all war materials to her; (5) that the immediate

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 307.

employment of these tactics would be at minimum cost and at minimum risk to the United States, resulting in enormous benefits to the United States, and incidental benefits to China, to world peace, and eventually to the Japanese people; (6) and that if immediate action were not taken along these lines Japan presented an enormous danger to the United States, to all humanity, and all hopes for peace.¹¹⁸ The only sure way that the United States could keep out of war, Judd asserted, would be to prevent the eruption of this war which the United States could easily get into.¹¹⁹

Judd saw four principal ways of approaching the problem of stopping United States assistance to the Japanese war machine. One would involve legislation for the cutting off of exported oil and iron and their derivatives, along with copper, lumber, lead and other resources vital to the Japanese war effort. This policy could be justified, he felt, on the ground of self-preservation, for vital natural resources might be needed by the United States for its own defense in the future. Second, specific legislation would place an embargo on all loans and credits, along with prohibitive

¹¹⁸ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy Hearings, 1939, pp. 353-54.

¹¹⁹ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy, 1939, p. 297.

clauses governing sale and shipment of war materials to Japan. This could be enforced only so long as she continued her invasion of China or interfered with American trade in China in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. This, Judd felt, was nothing short of justice as long as Japan continued her provocative, illegal and unfriendly acts toward the United States and its interests. Third, reprisals might take the form of high import duties on Japanese silk or the closing of American ports and harbors to Japanese vessels until that nation allowed American ships to enter Chinese harbors and waterways which Japan had prevented American vessels from using. Judd often mentioned that his wife refused to wear Japanese silk, and then suggested to the ladies of his audience that they do likewise. Finally, the United States could prohibit Japanese remittance of money or credits from the United States as long as Japan interfered with American citizens or firms in Asia desiring to remit, without exchange restrictions and discriminations, money to the United States. Judd had been informed by legal authorities that the President could under existing legislation shut off Japanese imports to the United States as a result of Japan's discrimination against American trade in China,¹²⁰ but the President, in Judd's opinion, did not have the popular support to carry

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 304.

this out.

To follow any of Judd's suggestions would not indeed have been illegal under existing neutrality laws; however, such an action would have resulted in officially branding Japan as an aggressor. This would have been contrary to the spirit of the neutrality legislation and would have been an act which neither Congress nor the President was willing to do at that date. The New York Times charged that both the Congress and the President preferred instead to maintain the "elaborate fiction" that there existed in Asia no "war." In this "fantastic but essentially honorable position" the Government had the "over-whelming" endorsement of American opinion.¹²¹ The President, however, most concerned with "bolstering the moral and material resources of the...anti-Axis groups," did not invoke neutrality legislation against Asian nations, because in so doing China would have been penalized more severely than Japan.¹²²

The most desirable legislation, Judd believed, would be a combination of the extension of the "cash and carry" provision to all war materials, with executive and Congressional

¹²¹ New York Times, January 11, 1939, p. 18.

¹²² Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers And Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: War---And Aid To Democracies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 589-95.

authority to prohibit the exporting of any basic materials useful in conducting war, to any nation at war in violation of a treaty with the United States. This, likewise, would have involved the naming of Japan as aggressor, and Congress was unwilling even in late 1939 to grant the President greater discriminatory power in neutrality legislation. The "cash-and-carry" provision, which could not in itself be a deterrent, eventually proved beneficial to Japan. Judd, however, asserted that no nation at war under any circumstances should trade with the United States except on "cash-and-carry" basis. Executive and congressional prohibitive power, Judd believed, would serve as a powerful deterrent to all treaty-breaking nations.¹²³ Only additional congressional legislation, Judd believed, held the answer to the Sino-Japanese problem. On several occasions he asserted that the "administration has done all it could under existing legislation to help China."¹²⁴ He expressed belief that the people of this country "overwhelmingly" wanted such action taken by the United States Government, by whatever legal machinery the Congress "in its wisdom and experience devises

¹²³Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation, And Our Foreign Policy, 1939, pp. 304-05.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 318

as best calculated to accomplish such ends."¹²⁵

In conclusion, Judd would usually assure his audience that the United States could "temporize or postpone but not escape" the Asian problem. Thus, the "ultimate cost and danger will be infinitely greater," he feared, "than any possible cost and danger now"; it "is already very late"; but he felt convinced "on the basis of long experience with and knowledge of the eastern people" that the United States could stop the war "without firing a shot." But if the United States did not, and quickly, then ultimate war with Japan would be "almost inevitable."¹²⁶

Judd continued speaking against the Japanese menace for approximately two years. But often he felt that he had no greater impact than did President Roosevelt's "quarantine speech" of 1937. Although Judd spoke eloquently, the disease of appeasement, which he saw permeating the 1930's often left him disheartened. Toward the end of 1940 he realized that Japan, at that late date, could not be stopped short of war. Thus, feeling pangs of wasted energy and being short of funds, Judd limited his speaking activities and established himself in medical practice in Minneapolis.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 312.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 311.

On January 1, 1941, he took over the practice of a good friend, Dr. Y. T. Johnson, who was being called into the national guard.¹²⁷ Judd, however, continued to talk on the world situation. It has been reported that Judd's stirring appeal to audiences enabled members of Congress to trace his itinerary through their states by the mail which they received demanding passage of embargo legislation. Several national radio broadcasts by Dr. Judd, "particularly those on the Town Meeting of the Air program, produced marked demonstrations of opinion."¹²⁸

By February, 1941, the directors of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression concluded that public opinion had come to support a more positive policy in regard to Japan, that their mission had been completed, and that they could close out active campaigning.¹²⁹ The Committee had during the eighteen months of its most intensive efforts "received almost \$100,000.00 from contributions, speakers' fees and the sale of litera-

¹²⁷ Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1952.

¹²⁸ Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 295; for an example of one of Judd's Town Meeting of the Air discussions see: Walter H. Judd, "Let's Stop Arming Japan!" Readers Digest, XXXVI (February, 1940), 41-44.

¹²⁹ Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 294.

ture."¹³⁰

There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Price Committee exerted considerable influence in swaying public opinion. As a result of the activities of this committee, "hundreds of women's clubs, church, youth, labor, and business groups...[went]...on record in favor of an embargo on shipments to Japan."¹³¹ Various Congressmen read into the Congressional Record statements, petitions, and resolutions from city and state groups which requested concrete action against Japan. The Price Committee in general and Judd in particular can be credited with the positive action of many of these organizations which resulted in a flood of letters and telegrams descending on Washington "demanding either legislation or executive action, or both."¹³² Members of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression rejoiced over Roosevelt's selection of Stimson, on June 19, 1940, as Secretary of War, feeling assured that

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 293; Dr. Masland states in a footnote on page 293 that: "Original contributions were made by a group of individuals who had for some time been supporting organizations promoting collective security. It might be noted that these same individuals appear to have furnished the funds which made possible the establishment of the William Allen White Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies."

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 294.

¹³² Ibid.

the latter would aid in formulating foreign policy. The committee lobbied to speed Stimson's confirmation because its members felt that he was sincerely interested in getting the embargo applied, and that he would influence the President away from compromising or temporizing with Japan.¹³³

The committee served, without doubt, as "an important factor in overcoming the indifference and isolationism across the country and in Congress which held the administration in check during the first year or more of the Sino-Japanese War."¹³⁴ William E. Daugherty, a member of the Special Defense Unit of the United States Department of Justice, asserted that the "hundreds of so-called 'China people' or Americans who have lived in China, who established and promoted such organizations as the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, served as China's most important propaganda and pressure elements."¹³⁵ When the President moved ahead with economic pressure against Japan, it was "perhaps safe to conclude that popular acceptance of

¹³³Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft, p.139.

¹³⁴Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 295.

¹³⁵William E. Daugherty, "China's Official Publicity In the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, VI (1942), pp. 70-86.

Administration policy...[resulted]...in part...[from]...the constant campaigning of the [Price] Committee."¹³⁶

By the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Judd had built up a large and prosperous practice in Minneapolis.¹³⁷ Judd had felt that he must, however, continue his efforts on behalf of China, although convinced that the American people would remain unconcerned until too late to prevent wholesale bloodshed of American men.¹³⁸ Probably the peak of Judd's fame among church-goers came when, on the morning of December 7, 1941, he told the assembled membership of Mayflower Congregational Church, Minneapolis, that Japan would not hesitate to attack the United States, and soon. After the news of Pearl Harbor came over the radio that afternoon, Judd was regarded as a "minor prophet."¹³⁹ The many speeches which Judd had delivered on imminent war with Japan took on new meaning and significance to the citizens of Minneapolis. His prophecy became tangible proof to many that indeed Judd un-

¹³⁶ Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy," 295.

¹³⁷ Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296.

¹³⁸ Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266.

¹³⁹ Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943

derstood the Asian world.¹⁴⁰

The Pearl Harbor attack convinced some of Judd's friends that his knowledge of Asia qualified him to be an effective wartime Congressman. In the summer of 1942, young Republicans of the Minnesota Fifth Congressional District were racking their brains for a candidate to oppose isolationist incumbent Oscar Youngdahl in the primaries. Someone thought of Judd. After due consideration and several refusals, Judd consented; however, he felt that his chances for victory were slight. Even Governor Harold Stassen did not think Judd had a chance, but his supporters embarked on a bell-pushing campaign that reversed the odds in a few weeks.¹⁴¹ The Cowles newspaper interests, the Star and the Tribune, Minneapolis' largest dailies, gave Judd their full support. He also received strong labor union support.¹⁴²

During the campaign Youngdahl often referred to "outsiders" coming in to "take over" the Fifth District; then he would ask with sinister implication "what their motives were."¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296; Congressional Quarterly, "GOP Keynoter Judd an Expert on Asian Policy," 1266.

¹⁴¹ Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943.

¹⁴² Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296

¹⁴³ Minneapolis Tribune, September 3, 1942.

Youngdahl campaigned on the principle that there had been an honest difference of opinion on foreign policy before Pearl Harbor and that he simply voted his convictions and what he considered to be the sentiment of his constituents. He contended that the importance of personal service from Congressmen had been minimized by his opponent. Judd's reply was that Youngdahl could not pass off his record with "there were a lot of people who didn't see the cloud or didn't believe the storm would descend on us." Judd reminded the constituents of the Fifth District that their own recollections, and the Gallup Poll, revealed that a majority of the American people saw the danger of war long before Youngdahl was able to see it. It was his job, Judd declared, to "see what the people saw, and as their representative, to seek a solution instead of feeding them soothing syrup."¹⁴⁴

Judd rested his candidacy in the primary election of 1942 on the theory that the people wanted "fresh minds" in Washington to deal with the world crisis--men with a "new approach" to world affairs--"men who 'admit they don't know it can't be done.' " He repeatedly emphasized that the Congress of which Youngdahl was a member had "signally failed"

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

in its responsibility to the general public.¹⁴⁵ Judd hit hard throughout the campaign on the topic that he was the "prophet of war" with Japan and a foe of isolationism, while Youngdahl had voted against lend-lease and every other major piece of legislation which would have better prepared the United States to fight an offensive war.¹⁴⁶ His campaign workers portrayed him as an "authority on the Japanese menace" because of his "long years of residence" in the Orient, and as a man so well-versed in world affairs that his services in Congress would be invaluable in the winning of the war and in post-war adjustments.¹⁴⁷

The Minneapolis daily papers were flooded with "letters to the editor" proclaiming Judd's vast knowledge of the Oriental people, and damning Youngdahl for his isolationist position.¹⁴⁸ Judd had a huge committee of volunteer workers who put on a door-to-door campaign for him which literally overwhelmed the Fifth District. His wide personal acquaintanceship gained during his intensive series of lectures on

¹⁴⁵Minneapolis Tribune, September 4, 1942.

¹⁴⁶Minneapolis Tribune, September 10, 1942.

¹⁴⁷Minneapolis Sunday Tribune and Star Journal, August 30, 1942, p. 7.

¹⁴⁸Minneapolis Tribune, September 10, 1942.

the East Asian situation before he became a candidate also contributed to making the primary election the most exciting in many decades, since Judd had spoken in Minneapolis alone some seventy times prior to his campaign.¹⁴⁹

Judd defeated Youngdahl by some 10,000 votes,¹⁵⁰ receiving approximately 56 percent of the votes; it was a substantial victory, particularly so in a year in which the tide of world events would seem to favor an incumbent. The Minneapolis Star Journal summed up Judd's victory over Youngdahl by stating: "The rather decisive victory of Walter H. Judd ...is another proof of the ability of the people to understand issues and reject trivialities and make sound choices when they are confronted with clear alternatives...Judd's victory...resulted from a people's uprising which astonished orthodox politicians by its zeal and coherence."¹⁵¹ From the primary Judd went on to victory in the general election on November 3, winning over his Democratic opponent, Dr. Thomas P. Ryan, by a majority of nearly two to one,¹⁵² al-

¹⁴⁹ Minneapolis Sunday Tribune and Star Journal, August 30, 1942.

¹⁵⁰ Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943.

¹⁵¹ Minneapolis Star Journal, September 9, 1942.

¹⁵² Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943.

though the opponent's views on most questions differed only slightly from Judd's.¹⁵³ The Christian Science Monitor applauded Judd's victory. In electing Judd to high office, the Monitor said, "Minnesota has not only proved that she has abandoned isolationism for a broader international outlook; she has also made a real contribution to American statesmanship."¹⁵⁴

Richard Rovere, in describing collectively the election of eight new House members, including Judd, in the general election of 1942, wrote: "The truth seems to be, as so often it is in American politics, that they were elected less because of the stand on specific issues than because they appeared to the voters to be more honest and reasonable men than their opponents."¹⁵⁵ After Judd took office on January 6, 1943, his popularity increased so rapidly that he became one of the most widely-known Congressmen outside his own Minneapolis district. He became one of the most sought-after speakers, not only for partisan Republican rallies, but for civic, religious and professional groups. During his Congressional days Judd received an average of eight invitations

¹⁵³ Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 296.

¹⁵⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, March 17, 1943.

¹⁵⁵ Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," 294.

a day to speak at some function. He turned down nearly twenty for every one he accepted, but still delivered well over one hundred talks a year.¹⁵⁶ Judd's platform style, his personality, his subject matter, whether on the House floor, filling the pulpit, or speaking with a convention of educators, seldom failed to arouse pungent reaction from both critic and admirer.

¹⁵⁶ Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1954. During the month of February, 1952, Judd was booked for twenty-two speeches, well above his average; he was on a round of Lincoln day addresses for the Republican National Committee. Six of the twenty-two were in his district, and two others were elsewhere in Minnesota. At this time he earned several thousand dollars a year from his talks. He received from \$100 to \$250 for most speeches for which he was paid, but more than half of his addresses were without any fee, Minneapolis Tribune, August 30, 1952.

CHAPTER II

WALTER H. JUDD: REPEAL OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSION LAWS

Judd officially became a member of the United States House of Representatives on January 6, 1943, and on February 25 he delivered his maiden speech in the House on the need for better understanding of the Asian peoples. He emphasized America's grievous error of legalizing racial discrimination in dealing with the Orientals, for he saw in American legislation--the exclusion laws--a chief deterrent to improved East-West relations. Judd believed that the major reason for the December 7 attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor could be found in these laws, while the Chinese still smarted from their sting. Judd felt strongly that immediate action should be taken to modify this American position. By removing this stigma placed on the Chinese, Judd believed, the United States would check one of Japan's most effective war propaganda tools, and bolster China's morale, thereby giving that nation encouragement to continue in her fight against Japanese aggression. Prior to taking his House seat Judd had declared his intention to work for removal of the Asiatic exclusion policy from American immigration and naturalization

law. Thus repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws received priority in Judd's legislative goals.

Judd addressed the House at length on American-Asian relations, associated problems, and possible solutions. Judd had been elected on a platform stressing international issues; he sought to awaken Congress and the State Department to the expanding role Asia would play in future world affairs. Minneapolis sent, and the House received, without apparent serious question, the former missionary as an authority on all Asian matters. Judd spoke with an air of compulsion, as one familiar with the psychology of the people of East and Southeast Asia, in "hopes" of correcting some misconceptions about Asian culture and way of life. "It is apparent," he told his House colleagues, "that in the last 20 years of diplomatic dealings with certain oriental nations, and in our military relations thus far in the war, we have, with the best intention, made some grievous errors."¹ These errors, Judd felt, sprang directly from Americans projecting their own ideas and their own reactions into the minds of the Orientals who "have not had our background and who, therefore, naturally do not have many of our ideas and

¹U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1342.

reactions."²

Continuing his case for the Oriental mind, Judd expressed his belief that following the First World War, the United States went through a period of "disillusionment and debunking and cynicism." Many Americans, he asserted, "took over in their thinking" one of the communists' basic theses--economic determinism--the "doctrine that no man or nation ever does anything except on the basis of what he or it expects to get in immediate material gains."³ Here Judd found American thinking in error regarding the mind of the Oriental. He told his colleagues that the things that a nation could "have" or "have not" could not always be "counted or measured or weighed." What Asians chiefly sought did not fall into these categories, but consisted of "certain intangible things, certain things of the spirit" which they call "face."⁴ To illustrate his point, Judd cited the Golden Rule. He asserted that when dealing with Asian people or with people of different cultures the Golden Rule should read: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

if you were they."⁵ To Judd, this constituted a great difference in practice from the connotation Americans traditionally give to the Golden Rule. What seems right, just, and logical to the Western mind is often not that which seems right, just, and logical to the Eastern mind, he emphasized.⁶

In reference to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Judd asserted that the United States State Department "knew everything about the Pacific--except the Japanese." The Japanese, Judd continued, learned from China the principles of unorthodox warfare--the sort of warfare which enabled China to fight Japan for five years without proper equipment, but with a "will." The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the reasoning behind it Judd viewed as basic to this unorthodox concept of warfare. The attack by an inferior power against such great odds--the Japanese against the United States--can be traced to earlier United States-Japanese relations, he felt. The United States and the Western world failed to take into consideration the Japanese struggle for recognition during the early twentieth century. But just as Japan rose to the top in might following the Russo-Japanese War, which seems to have dispelled the island country's inferiority complex,

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

there occurred two events to which Japan could not adjust. One was the refusal of the Western powers to insert into the League of Nations covenant recognition of the principle of racial equality. The second blow, delivered by the Congress of the United States in 1924, was Oriental exclusion.

Judd recalled for his House colleagues the labor troubles on the Pacific coast in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The problem, the white population contended, resulted from Oriental immigration which had supposedly caused a reduction of wage levels.⁷ The Oriental population thus received the brunt of cruel and often most brutal discrimination. It was unjustly asserted that the Orientals had caused the undercutting of native wage scales and living standards. Judd pointed out that the United States Congress explained Oriental exclusion as springing from economic sources, which was true only in part; had this alone been the real reason for exclusion, Judd continued, there would not have been a murmur of protest from any Oriental nation. The East recognized the United States as a sovereign country and realized that Congress had a right to regulate

⁷For an extensive objective discussion see: Mary Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Henry Holt and Company 1909), passim; Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), chapter II; Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1939), chapters II-IV.

immigration, but felt that the United States did not have the right to insult friendly people solely because of their race or the color of their skin.⁸ Unfortunately, however, the basis on which the United States excluded Orientals was one of race--a desire to make non-Caucasians ineligible for American citizenship.⁹ Judd continued:

No matter what a man's or a woman's ability may be, or education or culture, or charm, or professional skill, if the pigment in his or her skin is different from ours, he or she is because of that fact automatically and inescapably branded as inferior, forever condemned to a level below us--officially stigmatized. Gentlemen, that day we made war between ourselves and Japan inevitable--if and when Japan could manage to get sufficient military strength to attack us. ¹⁰

The United States, Judd proclaimed, is "reaping today [World War II] in bloodshed what we sowed then in arrogance and in the belief that somehow we were above the laws of human community."¹¹

Judd suggested that perhaps a good case for American friendship might be made out of the United States selling war supplies to Japan. But this only resulted, he said, in

⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1245.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

a buildup of military strength and in the attempted conquest of China--a selling down the river of an "old friend." Judd argued that

no mind that can add up two and two and get four can ever make out a case for doing those two things at the same time. If you are going to insult Japan and make her hate you, then you had better not arm her. If you are going to arm her, then you had better not insult her. ¹²

Judd emphasized to his House colleagues that the war did not represent the sentiment of the Japanese populace, and that he did not bear any antagonism toward the Japanese people. The war to Judd constituted a conflict organized and executed by the Japanese military party, primarily to retaliate for exclusion laws. Without doubt this was an exaggerated point of view, but Judd expressed on many occasions his conviction that, while the United States could win the Second World War without repealing the laws, another war could not be prevented without their repeal. ¹³ After their passage, Judd declared, Japan could only seek vengeance on the United States, to make the United States take back the racial insult and humiliation placed at the door of Asia. This desire to conquer America for revenge led Japan

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Richard Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," The Nation, CLVI (February 27, 1943), 296.

to attack China first, as she dared not leave a strong China, friendly to the United States, at her back.¹⁴ Judd's thesis left little ground for the more conventional theory that Japan followed the road of imperialism for nationalistic reasons and to obtain strategic resources which she needed for industrial purposes. The revenge theory, along with Judd's disdain for racial discrimination, led him to take up the cause for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws.

Chinese exclusion, however, was but one example of illiberality which had permeated the immigration and naturalization code for nearly two decades. The 1924 Immigration and Naturalization Act excluded all persons not eligible for citizenship, that is, all persons whose skins were not red, white, or black. Under the terms of this act, students, ministers, businessmen and persons within other named classifications could be admitted, but for temporary residence only. No Chinese, whatever his class or occupation, could be admitted legally for permanent residence on the same basis as persons of the three approved colors. The 1924 law set down the same stipulation for all Asiatics. When the 1924 law

¹⁴U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Hearings, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, p. 160. Hereafter cited as: House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943.

was passed excluding all Orientals, however, the Chinese were not put on the same footing as other Orientals, for Congress did not repeal existing Chinese exclusion laws. The Chinese alone remained a race singled out by Congress as "unfit" for immigration and naturalization. The "great wall" of exclusion against the Chinese dates from 1882. Carey McWilliams declared that the exclusion of the Chinese by Federal legislation is a clear illustration of Congress yielding to the specific will of one of its individual states in the absence of any general demand. He noted the following factors in explaining the exclusion laws: (1) All but one of the anti-Chinese laws were passed by Congress on the eve of a national election--thus they were passed for an avowed political purpose. (2) The interrelationship of the Southern attitude toward the Negro and the California attitude toward the Oriental prompted Southern Congressmen to side with California on a quid pro quo basis. (3) White Americans throughout the United States had a general absence of real knowledge of the Chinese and failed to recognize the issue as related to national interest.¹⁵

Antagonism toward the Chinese had first expressed it-

¹⁵ Charles F. Marden, Minorities in American Society (New York: American Book Company, 1952), p. 162; McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin, pp. 91-104.

self in the form of lawless violence, then in discriminatory city ordinances and state legislation, and finally in Federal legislation to exclude Chinese immigrants.¹⁶ With the adoption of such legislation, the United States was formally committed to a policy of racial discrimination at variance with traditions, principles, and prior policies in East-West relations. Congress in 1882 had suspended all Chinese immigration and had prohibited naturalization for ten years. A repeated suspension for another ten years came in 1892. At the end of this period, in 1902 and 1904, Congress extended the suspension of Chinese immigration indefinitely along with other humiliating gestures, which led to a major boycott of American goods by the Chinese. Of some fifteen acts concerning the Chinese passed by Congress between 1882 and 1913, perhaps one of the more provoking clauses had to do with Section Six Certificates which were not required of any other group. A Chinese wishing to visit the United States had to have, in addition to his Chinese passport, a special American document telling his occupational status. In the case of all other Asiatics the United States accepted passports of the alien's own government as evidence that the visitor was one of those favored classes who were permitted

¹⁶ Marden, Minorities in American Society, p. 161.

to visit the United States.¹⁷ The Chinese did not accept the discrimination without a struggle. However, the Supreme Court consistently lent support to the Government's position.

In Chew Heong v. United States (1884) it held:

A restriction upon their [Chinese] further immigration was felt to be necessary, to prevent the degradation of white labor and to preserve to ourselves the inestimable benefits of our Christian civilization.¹⁸

In the Chinese Exclusion case of 1889 the Supreme Court again unanimously upheld the power of Congress to pass exclusion legislation even when it contravened formal treaties.¹⁹

Such notorious discrimination against the Chinese, indeed against all Asians, Judd asserted, would have to be discarded before East and West could honestly try to give real expression to the ideal of "peace". Judd had concluded his maiden speech by expressing the heroic role of China and Russia in making Europe and America more secure in their war efforts. China he saw as a great buffer for Russia, and Russia the great buffer against possible Japanese entrance

¹⁷ Richard J. Walsh, "Our Great Wall Against the Chinese," The New Republic, (CVII November 23, 1942), 671-72.

¹⁸ 112 U.S. 536; Milton R. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Postwar America (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 340.

¹⁹ 130 U.S. 581; Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 340.

into Europe. A fallen Russian, to Judd, would mean a disaster for the United States in not only Europe but in Asia as well. China, he felt, neutralized a great amount of Japanese manpower, not only in fighting men, but in the shipping and factory manpower needed to supply Japanese troops in China.²⁰ America could and should, Judd asserted, show her appreciation for this Chinese achievement by repealing the Chinese exclusion laws.

Judd's speech was hailed by some of his colleagues as "the greatest" and "the most informative" speech delivered on the House floor in years, with reference to the background situation in the South Pacific and the relation of this area to the United States.²¹ His rhetorical display of February 25 was not the beginning, however, of a movement to allow Chinese to immigrate and obtain American citizenship, but it was the launching of the House phase of that movement. The movement itself had been underway since the summer of 1941. Soon after returning to the United States from China, Donald Dunham, a former member of the American consular service in Hong King, approached Richard J. Walsh, editor of Asia and the Americas and president of the John Day Company, on the

²⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1942, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1346.

²¹Ibid., p. 1347.

need for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws.²² Their discussion resulted in the crystalization, in late May 1943, of the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion. Judd's name and person was once again brought into close association with many notable friends of China.²³ The first formal meeting of the committee did not take place until May 25, 1943, while its last session was held on October 12. Long before May, however, a tremendous amount of labor had been extended by what may be called a quasi-committee in arousing sympathy for and preparing Congress for repeal.

Nearly all individuals who worked actively in the repeal campaign did so as volunteers or in connection with their activities for organizations with which they were regularly employed and which desired repeal of the discrimination laws.²⁴ The early activities of the quasi-committee

²² Fred W. Riggs, Pressure on Congress (New York: King's Crown Press, 1950), p. 48.

²³ The Citizens Committee brought together in 1942 such personalities as: Pearl S. Buck; H. J. Temperley, author of several volumes on China and Japan; W. W. Pettus, President of the College of Chinese Studies, University of California; Read Lewis of the Common Council for American Unity; Monroe Sweetland, C.I.O. official, labor adviser, civil rights worker, and newspaper publisher, Julian Arnold of the China Council of Berkeley, California. Most of these persons, along with Judd, became active members during the committee's formative period.

²⁴ Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 47.

were carried out in small meetings and discussion groups throughout the country and by endless letters crossing and re-crossing the country. Interested individuals sounded out labor leaders, members of Congress (especially from the West coast), church officials, ministers, missionaries, patriotic organization leaders, and businessmen, to see whether or not they would support such Congressional legislation. The group, operating through Walsh's New York office, proceeded with all due caution to prevent any public opposition to their goal. The attitudes of all possible opposition groups were investigated, as were all supposedly friendly groups which included China and the Chinese in the United States. C. L. Hsia, director of the Chinese News Service, supported an immediate campaign, but declined to take an active role in the movement because he felt it would be unwise for a Chinese to figure too conspicuously.²⁵

In order to prevent the repeal question from becoming a campaign issue in 1942, the committee delayed any general public action until after the general election in November. The period of quiescence ended on November 10, 1942, when Walsh spoke on the subject before the Town Hall Round Table, a New York City league for political education. He urged that the United States repeal the Chinese exclusion acts,

²⁵Ibid., p. 49-50

place Chinese on an immigration quota basis, and make Chinese eligible for naturalization.²⁶ Timing being of the essence to the movement, Martin J. Kennedy, a Democratic Representative from New York, seeking to sound out congressional sentiment, introduced his proposed Chinese Citizenship Act of 1943 only three weeks after Judd's initial plea in the House for the Chinese cause.²⁷ With Kennedy's move "the die was cast, and the campaign for repeal was forced from the stage of private correspondence and consultation into the open."²⁸ Kennedy's bill for outright revoking the Chinese exclusion acts can be considered the first repeal bill introduced in the House since the original exclusion act had been passed in 1882. Several bills similar to Kennedy's followed in short order. The major one was submitted by Warren G. Magnuson, a Democrat from Washington.²⁹

The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization announced hearings on Kennedy's and Magnuson's bills for the

²⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

²⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 1, 1079.

²⁸ Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 52.

²⁹ U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., LXXXIX, Part 2, 2571.

latter part of May, 1943, with the stipulation that testimony would be confined to China and the Chinese.³⁰ Only after the House Committee limited hearings to the Chinese did the general lines on which the Citizens Committee should be formed emerge clearly. While Judd and the original element of the Citizens Committee argued for limiting legislation to China alone, other individuals and organizations were working for an "all or nothing" approach regarding repeal legislation. Bruno Lasker, a sociologist and publicist who chaired the National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship, and Read Lewis of the Common Council for American Unity, favored bills affecting all Orientals. The course of events, however, favored those who were supporting action for the Chinese only, and these persons and groups accepted the position that China could serve as an entering wedge for more effective reform legislation for all Asiatics.³¹ Judd favored by-passing legislation for the entire Asian area at this time apparently for expediency's sake. He skillfully dodged confrontation, whenever possible, on whether Japan should be granted a quota. When asked, his usual reply was

³⁰Hearings were held on May 19, 20, 26, 27, and June 2, 3, 1943. It was at this time that the Citizens Committee held its first meeting.

³¹Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 52.

that he felt the Japanese should be excluded, not because of their race, but because of their nation's conduct, which should be the only condition for exclusion. When quizzed as to whether the Japanese should be granted equality of treatment with other Orientals, Judd replied: "If some future Congress should perhaps decide they have developed a government which has proved itself a genuinely democratic and friendly nation for a long enough time to be trusted and worthy to be readmitted to the family of nations, it could extend them immigration privileges if it wished."³²

By mid-1943, only when it had become clearly hopeless to strive for reform legislation applying to all Asians, did the Citizens Committee objectives crystallize. Then and only then did they adopt three general goals. They pledged themselves to work for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, a quota for individuals of Chinese origin, and eligibility of Chinese for naturalization. Members likewise pledged themselves to three strategic decisions, which coincided with Judd's objectives: first, to concentrate on Chinese exclusion repeal rather than attack the ban against all Asian immigration; second, to reject bills previously introduced in the House and to stress the three objectives of the

³²House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 148.

committee in every way possible and through every channel which might bear fruit; and third, to limit committee membership to American citizens--in order to impress "Congress with the fact that Americans were demanding the repeal of the antiquated Exclusion laws."³³

After studying the situation intimately, Judd realized that the most logical way to ensure passage of repeal legislation was through the majority Democratic party. This was the reason why he never submitted his own comprehensive bill for repeal. Thus, working with a Democratic sponsor from the West or South, where opposition was likely to be the greatest, Judd believed his goal could be accomplished. The active support of Ed Gossett, a Texas Democrat, and the previously mentioned Warren G. Magnuson, a Democrat from Washington, fulfilled the desired qualification. In addition, both were men of "prestige" and "experience" in the House.³⁴ The support also of Samuel Dickstein, a New York Democrat and chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, and Noah M. Mason, an Illinois Republican and a member of Dickstein's Committee, proved of incalculable value for the repeal effort. Without doubt a major move in

³³Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 56.

³⁴Ibid., p. 116.

arousing support for the repeal effort came in mid-May, just before Committee Hearings were held on the Chinese exclusion question. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, on a country-wide tour, invited a number of key Congressmen, chiefly certain crucial members of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, to a dinner party. During the evening she discussed the possibilities of repealing the exclusion laws, "stressing the great importance of such action in boosting Chinese morale, and pointing out how much it would mean to China's part in the war effort."³⁵ Mme. Chiang's dinner comments only reinforced Judd's House speech of February 25.

Judd occupied a unique position at committee hearings ten days later. He gave nearly thirty pages of testimony and was offered all the respect of a true authority on China. He asserted that if the United States wanted to make sure that China would hold out against the Japanese until Hitler could be defeated and the United States could concentrate fully on Japan, then the United States would have to do two things: first, get more material help to China; and second, "send more spiritual help, more to strengthen morale and faith."³⁶ The less military assistance, Judd declared,

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 146.

which the United States could deliver to China immediately, then the more imperative it became that the United States give China the "intangible things." Likewise, the less the United States could assume the military offensive immediately, the more imperative it became for the United States to win the political offensive quickly. Judd then asserted that the "most dramatic and helpful thing imaginable" would be a removal by Congress of the discrimination found in the United States immigration laws against Chinese.³⁷ He explained in detail various alternatives which could be used to correct the discriminations. He insisted that the national origins concept, first applied in the 1924 legislation, should apply to all persons including the Orientals; that persons of all races should be on the same truly equitable basis as far as eligibility to enter the United States. The only exception would be those persons whose national origin by birth or ancestry was that of a country with which the United States was at war.³⁸ A thorough study and application of this idea, Judd asserted, would end all discrimination, and the great stigma against Orientals would be removed from the country's immigration laws without increasing the total

³⁷ Ibid., 147.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 149-50.

number of immigrants eligible to come to the United States by any more than 500 Asians per year.³⁹ The world waits, Judd proclaimed, "to hear what Congress says about the purposes of this war in Asia."⁴⁰

After the hearings Mason took up the Chinese cause with tremendous vigor. He echoed the sentiment of Judd's testimony whenever the question came up for discussion, emphasizing the importance of the Chinese to the European war effort and declaring that something be done beyond financial aid for China to demonstrate American appreciation for her role in the entire war effort. Mason, however, viewed a general revision of the quota system with disdain. When quizzed about the Japanese he replied that without doubt neither he nor the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization would ever favor the admittance of the Japanese under the quota system.⁴¹

Despite the differences in opinion about how extensive a reform program Congress should undertake in Asian immigration and naturalization law, a considerable common ground existed on which the supporters of repeal of Chinese exclu-

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 147.

⁴¹U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5685.

sion could gather. The basic arguments presented by those who supported modification or repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws and favored equality of treatment for the Chinese included: First, the repeal of the acts would be a friendly gesture toward China which would cement Sino-American relations in time of mutual peril.⁴² Second, the morality of the discriminatory acts could be questioned because they violated the Burlingame Treaty, which had promised China most-favored-nation treatment.⁴³ Third, repeal of the acts would give Chinese morale a psychological lift at a time when they suffered both moral and physical stress and were in fact, near the breaking point.⁴⁴ Fourth, the United States should pass this legislation for moral reasons. To Judd, one of the greatest questions facing the United States involved whether the American people practiced what they advocated regarding the concept that "all men are created equal in rights before the law, to be judged on the basis of what they are, or are or are not, as individual human beings, not by the race to

⁴²Ibid., 5739

⁴³House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 152.

⁴⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5739.

which they belong."⁴⁵ Fifth, congressional failure to repeal the exclusion laws could result in a Chinese military collapse and result in a separate peace treaty with Japan. Sixth, America's great new potential for expanded trade would be with China, and thus immediate action should be taken to offer proof of sincere friendship in order to take advantage of trade opportunities following the war. Seventh, repeal of the exclusion laws would stop an all-important phase of Japanese propaganda, namely that the United States exhibited unfriendly attitudes toward China, otherwise she would grant the Chinese citizenship privileges. Eighth, continuing the exclusion barrier and forbidding China a quota would make the Chinese doubt American friendship and might even cause China to withdraw from the war. Ninth, putting China on a quota basis with other nations, besides being fair and equitable, would amount to a bagatelle, since current quota restrictions would permit only 107 Chinese to enter each year, and no one should quarrel with the admission of such a small number. Tenth, a combination of the above cited reasons would make the Chinese exclusion situation a vital war measure.⁴⁶ This legislation, it was argued,

⁴⁵House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 152.

⁴⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5739.

should be passed in the interest of security for the United States. Even aside from legal or moral or economic reasons, to Judd, the "decent instinct of self-preservation" required that the United States remove every possible sore spot in its relations with China.⁴⁷ After the war, Judd declared, the United States would need as many friends as possible unless the nation would be willing to remain permanently militarized.⁴⁸

Despite the eloquent pleas of numerous Representatives that Congress allow China to regain her "pride" and give her support to hold back the tide of fascism, several "die-hards" continued their crusade to keep America safe from the "yellow horde." John B. Bennett, a Michigan Republican and a member of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, was one of the most forceful opponents against any revision of the existing quota system. He rejected as "pure poppycock" the propaganda angle and scoffed at the idea that it might affect Chinese morale one way or the other.⁴⁹ His basic argument throughout rested on the contention that any

⁴⁷House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Acts Hearings, 1943, p. 153.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 154.

⁴⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 4, 5740.

legislation involving a quota for the Chinese contemplated a complete reversal of a "well-established immigration policy of a sixty-some years standing." Furthermore, Bennett asserted, no matter what basic considerations might be involved, the world situation "being as it is this is not the time to change immigration policy either with respect to the Chinese or any other people."⁵⁰ Judd reacted to Bennett's argument by pointing out that unfortunately the propaganda employed by the Japanese could be traced to relations, actions, and attitudes of the United States toward China.⁵¹ Lex Green, a Democrat from Florida and also a member of the immigration committee, supported Bennett in his strong opposition to any revision of the quota laws. Green expressed the fear that the proposal would be only the first step in "opening the gates" to Orientals.

The basic arguments against repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws can be summarized as follows: (1) Basic immigration policies should not be changed in time of war. Any bill which repealed the exclusion laws would change a policy of sixty years standing which thirty Congresses had not found it necessary to alter. Whether United States general

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 5739.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 5741.

⁵²Ibid., p. 5746.

immigration policy would need revision would be one of the greatest post-war problems and Congress should not attempt to deal with it "piece-meal" while the war was still in progress. Furthermore, the opposition felt it desirable to await the return of American soldiers from the battle fronts before embarking on a "radical" change in immigration laws.

(2) Under existing legislation all Asians are excluded, and repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws would place China in a favored position in Asia. Thus, to deny other Asian nations quotas, while granting one to the Chinese, would constitute a greater act of discrimination against other friendly Asian people. (3) To grant these privileges to the Chinese would be nothing more than "gesture legislation," since the Chinese could not avail themselves of the legislation until the war ended. Furthermore, proposed legislation extended to the Chinese only a few "crumbs" as it did not place them on a base of equality with other nations. Other aliens could be admitted from certain countries as non-quota immigrants when born in nonquota countries or when coming to the United States as members of a family of a citizen parent; but any Chinese, no matter in what country he was born, would be charged to the Chinese quota. Perhaps this was the most valid of the arguments presented by the opposition since proposed legislation indeed stipulated that Chinese nation-

ality would be determined by ancestry rather than by nativity. (4) The minority group in their formal report expressed the feeling that Congress trod on most dangerous ground when it assumed the "task of legislating enemy propoganda out of existence."⁵³

The merits and shortcomings of repeal commanded Congressional attention for both brief and lengthy periods during the spring and summer months, with Judd speaking periodically for positive action. Then, on June 29, 1943, Magnuson, author of an earlier repeal bill, introduced an immigration and naturalization bill as H.R.3070, a bill destined for success.⁵⁴ A few days later, July 2, Judd included in the Congressional Record a cablegram signed by Bishop W. Y. Chen, the Secretary of the National Christian Council with headquarters in Chungking. This was one of the very few times that a Chinese national spoke out in favor of repeal or mentioned the subject in public. The cablegram read: "Revised immigration laws would greatly enhance traditional

⁵³U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Minority Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Report No. 732, Part 2, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, pp. 1-2. Hereafter cited as: House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Minority Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732.

⁵⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 5, 6786.

friendship China and America, have incalculable good effect international relations."⁵⁵ In speaking about the message, Judd recalled that during the recent immigration committee hearings he had been asked whether the Chinese or only a few Americans considered this problem of great importance, as nearly all of the requests had come from Americans rather than from the Chinese. Perhaps Judd's reply can be offered as one of the reasons for Chinese reluctance to speak out more definitely.⁵⁶ Judd said:

The basic reasons for the Chinese reticence is their own sense of dignity and pride. Their record for 5,000 years as well as for the last 6 years will stand without any need for them to advertise or argue it. They realize that our discrimination against them, while pretending to be their best friend, is a reflection more on us than on them. ⁵⁷

The second reason for China's reluctance to participate actively can be found in advice offered by the Citizens Committee. The committee accepted the general belief that Japan's Ambassador Hanihara's strong comments against the 1924 exclusion provisions influenced Congress to accept the clause as perhaps a gesture of defiance against attempted "foreign

⁵⁵ U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 11, A3414.

⁵⁶ Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 117.

⁵⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 11, A3414.

interventions."⁵⁸

The Chinese government did favor repeal; however, there was no official communication between governments on the topic. The precise role of the Chinese Embassy and nationals in the United States is uncertain, but without doubt both played a major "behind the scenes" role. Furthermore, the widespread sympathy for repeal both in Congress and throughout the country did not make necessary extensive public activities by the Chinese.

The Citizens Committee apparently did a thorough job in publicizing the "absolute" necessity of repealing the Chinese exclusion acts, since influential Congressmen were flooded, as was Judd, with letters, editorials, petitions and pleas from religious leaders, religious and civic groups, and private citizens favoring repeal. In keeping with this general consensus, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on October 7, 1943, reported out H.R. 3070 favorably without amendments and recommended that the bill be passed by the House.⁵⁹ Four days later Bennett submitted to the House the committee's minority report on the bill.

⁵⁸ Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 117; U.S. Foreign Relations, 1924, II, 369-73.

⁵⁹ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Report Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Report 732, Part 1, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.

The committee members signing the report, with the exception of William P. Elmer, a Democrat of Missouri, denied that they held any prejudice against the Chinese as a race. They asserted that all material aid possible should be afforded China in order that the Japanese might be crushed and the Pacific War ended. They apparently felt out of honest convictions, however, that this type of legislation could be of no material benefit to China, and thus amounted to nothing more than a "feeble gesture to do a futile thing at the expense of a sound and long-established rule of immigration."⁶⁰ The minority report adequately summarized the general attitude and arguments of the opposition in the House during the nine months of debate on the subject. The report as such, however, presented little, if any, new evidence or arguments for the opposition which might strengthen their position.⁶¹

Despite the tenacious struggle of the opposition to immigration and naturalization reform, H.R.3070 passed the House by voice vote on October 21, 1943.⁶² Victory for repeal came, however, only after lengthy and heated debate in

⁶⁰ House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Minority Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732, p. 2.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁶² U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 7, 8635.

the House. President Franklin D. Roosevelt lent his support to the cause by forwarding to Congress an eloquent request for passage of the proposed legislation, saying in part: "Nations like individuals make mistakes. We must be big enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and to correct them."⁶³ The Senate Committee on Immigration favored the Magnuson bill over one of its own bills. Charles O. Andrews, a Democrat of Florida, after a conference with Magnuson, had introduced a companion bill to H.R. 3070 in the Senate on September 30.⁶⁴ On November 12 the Senate Committee recommended that Magnuson's bill be passed without amendment.⁶⁵ Fourteen days later the Senate took positive action. Only Presidential approval stood between failure or realization of one of Judd's goals in Congress. The President signed the bill on December 17, whereupon repeal of Chinese ex-

⁶³U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws And To Establish Quotas, Report No. 535, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, pp. 2-3. Hereafter cited as: Senate Committee on Immigration, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws And To Establish Quotas, Rpt. 535; U. S., Congress, House, Message From The President of The United States Favoring Repeal of The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Document No. 333, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 12, A4417.

⁶⁵Senate Committee on Immigration, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws And To Establish Quotas, Rpt. 535, p. 1.

clusion became Public Law 199.⁶⁶

The bill as enacted provided for the abolition of the Chinese exclusion acts, but this alone did not give the Chinese equality of treatment. It did, however grant them a quota, later set at 105 by Presidential Proclamation, computed under the provision of Section 11 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1924.⁶⁷ A quota of 100 per annum had been allotted to China by the 1924 legislation, but this quota could be used only by persons eligible for citizenship who were born in China; the repeal act did not alter this provision of the 1924 law. The repeal law applied only to Chinese persons and persons of Chinese descent regardless of their place of birth. The quota regarding non-orientals born in China continued to exist after the passage of the repeal act.⁶⁸

⁶⁶57 Stat. 600; U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 8, 10010.

⁶⁷Section 11(b), 43 Stat. 159, states: "The annual quota of any nationality for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that national origin (ascertained as hereinafter provided in this section) bears to the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100." Also, see: U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Part 6, 8575, which states: The Chinese population of the United States in 1920 was 74,000 and the total population of the United States was 105,710,620.

⁶⁸House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732, p. 3.

Public Law 199, furthermore, made the Chinese racially eligible for citizenship, thus allowing them naturalization.⁶⁹ The law also provided in connection with distribution of the quota that a preference of up to seventy-five percent be given to Chinese born and residing in the mother country at the time of application of the law. This provision resulted from the feeling that Chinese temporarily in the United States, or residing in or native to neighboring countries, should not be allowed to use up the entire quota without giving Chinese persons born and residing in China the opportunity to take advantage of it.⁷⁰

Comparison of the bill of 1943 with the 1924 legislation and with later immigration laws shows that the 1943 enactment did place the Chinese on a basis of technical equality. It did not, however, place the Chinese on a full-quota parity base with other groups eligible for migration and citizenship. This particular piece of legislation introduced a new principle into American immigration and quota laws by stipulating that nationality would be determined by

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 2; Fred W. Riggs, "U.S. Legislation Affecting Asiatics-I," Far Eastern Survey, XVI (April 23, 1947), 89.

⁷⁰ House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732, p. 2.

ancestry rather than by nativity.⁷¹ In contrast to the Chinese, white persons, persons of African nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere could migrate under the existing law, employing the principle of nativity and not race as the determining factor for quota purposes.⁷² All Chinese persons coming to the United States as immigrants would be charged to the Chinese quota regardless of place of birth. Thus true equality of treatment would have to come later for the Chinese.

Regardless of the inequality to the Chinese, Public Law 199 was still a major victory for Judd and the Citizens Committee. It provided the necessary "door-opener" for a much greater goal which Judd had come to desire and a point which the opposition had feared--complete revision of immigration and naturalization laws governing Asia. Opposition to repeal had come primarily from four sources: labor, veterans' organizations, West Coast interests, and "patriotic" societies. This opposition, however, did not prove as effective as might be expected. Perhaps the strongest vocal opposition came from super-nationalistic and "patriotic" groups

⁷¹Ibid.; Riggs, "U.S. Legislation Affecting Asia-tics-I," 89.

⁷²House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Report, Repealing The Chinese Exclusion Laws, Rpt. 732, p. 2.

such as: the National Blue Star Mothers; the American Coalition; Mayflower Descendants; the Sons of the American Revolution; Daughters of the American Revolution; and Native Sons of the Golden West. In general this segment of opposition was composed of individuals and groups which opposed all aliens who did not fall into the concept of a "white America." It is doubtful whether these groups carried much weight with the majority of Congressmen. Within other groups traditionally opposed to immigration revision there were severe splits which tended to weaken any effective repeal opposition. While the Americanism and legislative committees of the American Legion opposed repeal, the national executive committee approved a resolution supporting repeal. The American Legion's Department of California not only called for repeal of the Exclusion Act, but recommended that the Oregon and Washington Departments take similar action.⁷³ A similar situation can be found within the Veterans of Foreign Wars organization. Surprisingly, the C.I.O., generally expected to oppose repeal, urged the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to approve a repeal law. The A.F.L. failed to take the expected militant hard line against repeal; however, groups within the union such

⁷³New York Times, October 31, 1943, IV, p. 18.

as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters kept up a running attack on the repeal movement.⁷⁴ Perhaps the effectiveness of these groups was offset by a degree of indifference on the part of individuals who might be expected to side with them under ordinary circumstances.

Public opinion polls revealed that the West Coast states favored repeal more strongly than the national average.⁷⁵ Newspaper accounts indicated that the visit of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to the West Coast in the spring of 1943 played no inconsiderable part in swinging sentiment in the direction of repeal. Supporting West Coast organizations employed Judd's major theme that repeal of the Exclusion Act was important in combating Japanese propaganda which accused America of discriminating against aliens, in giving concrete assurance of good-will toward China, and bolstering her morale.⁷⁶ Organized labor groups which supported repeal took the position that patriotism necessitated support. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union resolution declared that repeal was "not only economically sound but militarily necessary to deal a crushing blow to Japanese and Nazi

⁷⁴For a more complete account see: Riggs, Pressure on Congress, pp. 65-91.

⁷⁵New York Times, November 21, 1943, p. 13.

⁷⁶New York Times, October 31, 1943, IV p. 18.

anti-American propaganda."⁷⁷

The split in groups traditionally opposing revision doubtless enabled the supporters of repeal to accomplish their goal in short order. Judd's role in obtaining this repeal legislation cannot be overemphasized, although he received vigorous assistance and support from Joseph R. Farrington, Republican Delegate from Hawaii, and Jerry Voorhis, Democrat from California.⁷⁸ Judd's accomplishment is indeed remarkable because at this time he held no key position in party, committee, or regional councils. His reputation, however, as an "expert" on the Chinese people, the accepted idea that he was an "authority" on Asian affairs, his deep conviction on the subject and his role as a returned missionary, have to be considered in assessing Judd's influence on this legislation. He played the major strategic role in making Public Law 199 possible, although both Farrington and Voorhis were active in planning strategy and furthering personal contacts for the repeal, thus making Judd's activities more effective. Together these three men provided the necessary liaison between the Citizens Committee, which carried out its task in a tactful and tireless manner, and Congress,

⁷⁷ New York Times, June 8, 1943, p. 35.

⁷⁸ Riggs, Pressure on Congress, p. 81.

which until early 1943 had been the major obstacle to repeal legislation. Without this liaison and the energetic endeavors of both the Citizens Committee and the Congressional group, the realization of a quota for the Chinese would have been much later in coming.

CHAPTER III

WALTER H. JUDD: THE QUEST FOR "EQUALITY" IN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS

The repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws was but the first of several rebuffs which racial exclusionary principles in American immigration and naturalization legislation were to receive within a decade. A second rebuff came in 1946 when persons belonging to races indigenous to India and the Philippines received quotas. The exclusionary principle was dealt a sweeping blow with the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which nominally repealed all racial exclusionary provisions in the United States immigration legislation, although strong characteristics of a racist policy remained. Despite the shortcomings of the 1952 legislation it furthered the gradual process of removing racial discrimination from the immigration laws of the United States. Judd's contribution to the 1952 enactment surpassed his 1943 role, although, had Judd set his own pace, racial exclusion would have ended three years sooner.

While Judd and the Citizens Committee labored for repeal of the anti-Chinese exclusion laws, Judd was also work-

ing in conjunction with the Immigration and Naturalization Service on a more comprehensive bill which would have struck down the "barred zone of Asia in the 1924 law and extended the quota system to all people of Asia." No such measure, however, was introduced in 1943 because Judd felt that a comprehensive bill of this sort could not pass Congress.¹ Judd, however, continued his work on the more comprehensive program in hopes of realizing more equitable treatment for the Orientals after the war ended.

With the end of the war the entire immigration and naturalization structure as outlined in the Immigration Act of 1924 came under attack. In 1946, for the first time in nearly two decades, the annual number of permanent immigrants to the United States passed the 100,000 mark. The attempted resettlement of the horde of European refugees uprooted by the war and its aftermath posed a most grave problem for the United States. Both humanitarian and political interests argued for the admittance of a large number of these homeless souls who were fleeing from misery, hunger, persecution, and the general squalor of meager existence into which millions

¹Fred W. Riggs, Pressure on Congress: A Study of The Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: King's Crown Press, 1950), p. 39.

had been thrown.²

Judd expressed great empathy for this suffering segment of humanity. He seemingly viewed all refugees as examples of "the flight for freedom," and the United States as the "arsenal of freedom" had an obligation to assist in alleviating their plight. But it was not humanitarianism alone that prompted him to support refugee programs in Europe and to speak in defense of allowing additional displaced persons to enter the United States.³ Recognizing and assisting in this humanitarian endeavor would fortify the "free people" of the world against the spread of communism, and in this way it was "good business for America."⁴ Just as Judd had argued that repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws would strengthen China against Japanese propaganda, he now argued that granting all Orientals a quota would weaken Communist propaganda. Judd would go so far as to assert that "adequate" immigration and naturalization revision would be the "strongest card we hold in Asia, even above our navy and air

² Harvey Wish, Contemporary America: The National Scene Since 1900 (3rd ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1961), pp. 270-73; Oscar T. Barck, Jr., and Nelson M. Blake, Since 1900: A History of the United States in Our Times (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), pp. 297-300.

³ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, January 25, 1946.

⁴ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, May 31, 1945.

force."⁵ Judd frequently declared that existing immigration and naturalization laws were totally inadequate to deal equitably and readily with the severe problems facing the United States.⁶ Resulting immigration and naturalization legislation tended, however, to define Judd's concept of "adequate" legislation as mere "token" legislation.

Similar but perhaps less severe problems had impelled Congress to further "study"⁷ the immigration flow in the period following World War I. This study resulted in the Immigration Act of 1924⁸ which, in conjunction with an act of 1917 which codified nearly all previously enacted exclusion provision, governed American immigration policy until the

⁵ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, August 19, 1943.

⁶ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, June 25, 1946. Judd's concept can be considered in accord with a pattern developed by the United States Congresses over the years. American citizenship, or eligibility to naturalization, has been extended over the years to include: 1790, free white persons; 1870, persons of African nativity or descent; 1900, inhabitants of Hawaii; 1917, inhabitants of Puerto Rico; 1924, American Indians; 1927, inhabitants of the Virgin Islands; 1940, races indigenous to North or South America; 1943, Chinese; 1946, Filipinos and natives of India.

⁷ The last general investigation of the United States immigration system was made by the Congress in 1907 and continued until 1911.

⁸ 43 Stat. 153.

Immigration and Nationality Act became effective in 1952.⁹ The act of 1924 strengthened and clarified a number of the earlier provisions of law and introduced new concepts of immigration policy which became the basis for similar provisions of the 1952 act. The 1924 Act, as amended, contained two quota provisions. The first, effective until June 30, 1929, set the annual quota for each allowable nationality at two percent of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in the United States in 1890. The total quota limit was set at 164,667. The second provision, which was effective from July 1, 1929, to December 31, 1952, introduced the most controversial national origins quota system--it provided that the quota for any country or nationality had the same relation to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the United States in 1920 having that national origin had to the total number of inhabitants in the United States of the year.¹⁰ Also, the 1924 Act introduced the pro-

⁹ Frank L. Auerbach, Immigration Laws of the United States (2nd ed.; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1961), p. 9.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10; Barck, Since 1900, p. 299; U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, Providing for Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 16. Hereafter cited as House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Providing for Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws Hearings, 1948.

vision that no alien ineligible for citizenship could be admitted to the United States as an immigrant. The Supreme Court had in 1922 ruled that Japanese were ineligible for citizenship.¹¹ Thus, the "ineligible for citizenship" clause was aimed at the Japanese, particularly at those who had found their way into the United States despite the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907.¹²

When the 1924 bill was pending in Congress, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes pleaded for the deletion of the provision which states that "No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States."¹³ Hughes felt that such legislative action "would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament."¹⁴ The Japanese Ambassador, Hanihara, lodged with the State Department a note of protest by declaring that "grave consequences" were likely to ensue if the proposed 1924 law were enacted. In 1929 a Japanese leader said of the law: "It is

¹¹Milton R. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1946), p. 23.

¹²Auerback, Immigration Laws of the United States, p. 11.

¹³Milton R. Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 5.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 6.

not a closed incident."¹⁵ In 1930 Congressman Albert Johnson, author of the 1924 Act, announced that he favored an amendment to repeal the exclusion provision, but nothing came of his remark,¹⁶ and the general racial exclusion clause was allowed to remain on the statute books for nearly three decades.

When the preliminary quota statistics were announced, the interested American public obtained perhaps a truer insight into the essence of the 1924 enactment. The new quota doubled the allotted British quota, while reducing the German and Irish quotas by nearly one-half. It reduced the Scandinavian quota by nearly two-thirds. Thus a cry of protest arose from the affected groups, and both Herbert Hoover and Alfred E. Smith advocated repeal of the national origins provision during their Presidential campaigns of 1928. Whether the law was well-worded (as argued by restrictionists) or not, the task of determining the national origin of the entire population of 1920 proved to be virtually an impossible undertaking; however, all efforts to change the debatable formula met with most bitter opposition. Nativists and patriotic organizations cooperated through the "American

¹⁵Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁶Ibid.

Coalition" to advance the cause of "Keeping America American." Organized labor resisted any change that might increase the total volume of immigration, and perhaps threaten to lower wages. The restrictionists won out and the new quotas, after several postponements, finally became effective on July 1, 1929.¹⁷

The "liberal" immigration policy sentiment, however, did not die out completely during the 1930's and early 1940's. But not until after the entry of the United States into World War II did Congress begin to give serious attention to the immigration problem. The repealing of the Chinese exclusion laws gave added emphasis to the need for serious study of the entire immigration policy structure. During and after debate on the anti-Chinese laws a few Congressmen pointed out that no serious or extensive study of the immigration problem had been made since passage of the 1924 law. They argued that this lack constituted a grave problem which Congress must deal with, and to deal with it in an intelligent manner, they realized, would require a serious inves-

¹⁷ Barck, Since 1900, p. 299

tigation.¹⁸ The House took the lead in such a study. On January 4, 1945, Samuel Dickstein, a New York Democrat and chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, introduced into the House a resolution to authorize his committee to study the basic problem affecting post-war immigration and naturalization.¹⁹ The House passed the resolution on March 21.²⁰ The Senate did not act on the subject until July 26, 1947, when its resolution directed the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof to make a full and complete investigation

¹⁸ On January 4, 1945, Samuel Dickstein, a New York Democrat, introduced in the House of Representatives Resolution 52, to authorize the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to study the basic problem affecting post-war immigration and naturalization. U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 1, 59.

¹⁹ — Dickstein served as Chairman of the Select Committee to Investigate and Study Laws and Problems Relating to Post War Immigration and Naturalization, as authorized by House Resolution 52. U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 1, 59.

²⁰ U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., XCI, Part 1, 59.

of the United States immigration system.²¹

On the same day, July 26, 1947, that the Senate approved the immigration study resolution, Judd introduced the first of his several immigration and naturalization reform bills into the House. The essence of this bill provided that all persons permanently and legally residing in the United States could be naturalized.²² This bill, like one which followed several months later, died in committee without a hearing.²³ On January 20, 1948, Judd introduced a

²¹U. S., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Immigration and Naturalization, Document No. 3, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 1-2. Pursuant to Senate Resolution 137, a special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was appointed, consisting of Senators Forrest C. Donnell, John Sherman Cooper, Pat McCarran, J. Howard McGrath, and Chapman Revercomb, chairman. Under the rules of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Alexander Wiley, the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, served as ex officio member of the subcommittee. Also, pursuant to an invitation extended by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator H. Alexander Smith of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senator Harry F. Byrd of the Senate Committee on Armed Services were designated to act in an advisory capacity to the subcommittee with reference to the study of displaced persons.

²²U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCIII, Part 8, 10523.

²³U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCII, Part 9, 11764. Judd introduced H. R. 4824 on December 19, 1947. This would have provided the privilege of becoming a naturalized citizen of the United States to all immigrants having a legal right to permanent residence, and would have placed all Asiatic and Pacific peoples on the same basis in immigration law as Chinese persons and races indigenous to India.

third bill, H. R. 5004, on which hearings were held, and which was the foundation for the section on repeal of racial exclusion and the Oriental quota system of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act.²⁴

The Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization²⁵ of the Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on H. R. 5004 on April 19 and 21, 1948.²⁶ Judd was the first to testify before the subcommittee. He described the purpose of his bill as an attempt to obtain a comprehensive revision of the 1924 immigration and naturalization law. It would, Judd

²⁴U. S. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 1, 331.

²⁵The House Committee of Immigration and Naturalization was abolished by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and its functions were placed under the Judiciary Committee.

²⁶A partial list of those testifying who supported the bill included: Joseph R. Farrington, Delegate from Hawaii; W. Walton Butterworth, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Samuel W. Boggs, special advisor on geography, Department of State; Joseph C. Grew, former United States Ambassador to Japan; Mike M. Masaoka, National Legislative Director, Japanese American Citizens League; Sanford W. Bolz, Washington Representative, American Jewish Congress. A partial list of supporting documents included: Letter by John J. McCloy, President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; letter by General Mark W. Clark; letter by General Bonner Fellers; statement by Richard J. Walsh, of John Day Book Company; letter by Walter W. VanKirk, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America; editorial from the St. Paul Dispatch; editorial from the Washington Post. House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Providing for Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws Hearings, 1948, p. 5.

asserted, eliminate the necessity for constant piece-meal revision for particular groups or individuals, and at the same time preserve the fundamental principle of the quota system based on national origins.²⁷ Judd accepted the national origins concept as good legislation and stated he had no desire to destroy the principle. To Judd's mind the bill removed with "one stroke" the remaining racial discriminations in United States nationality and immigration laws, which he felt had contributed greatly to ill feelings in many quarters of the world. Yet his bill, Judd declared, would make no basic change in the quota principle of existing law. It would only extend existing law and thus admit per year a few hundred more immigrants of Asian ancestry, who remained ineligible under the 1924 law as amended.²⁸

Judd pointed out to the subcommittee that several remaining areas of Asia had quotas which were available to non-orientals born in these Asian countries. Thus the objective sought by H. R. 5004, Judd explained, was simple in concept: "On the one hand, to end discrimination in nationality and immigration laws in a manner which conforms to the idea behind the national origin quotas, and on the other hand to grant immigration quotas to certain, carefully de-

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

financed areas in the Far East whose immigration quotas are at present available only for those born there who are Caucasian or of African descent or of American aboriginal descent."²⁹

H. R. 5004 would have made eligible for naturalization the nearly 90,000 persons admitted legally for permanent residence prior to July 1, 1924, but who remained racially ineligible for naturalization. These persons, however, if they sought naturalization, would have to meet the same basic requirement as more recently arrived immigrants from other countries. Of the nearly 90,000 persons ineligible for naturalization in the United States, according to the 1940 census, about 85,000 were of Japanese origin, between 3,000 and 4,000 Korean, and about 145 were of Polynesian origin or were native to minor islands of the Pacific. Judd pointed out that the number who would seek naturalization would be less than 90,000 because many had died since 1940, and because some four to five thousand Japanese had returned to Japan as a result of relocation procedures which the United States carried out after its entrance into World War II. Thus Judd estimated that the total number involved would be less than 85,000 persons even if all wanted to take out naturalization papers, because many would fail to pass the naturalization requirements placed upon all immigrants applying

²⁹ Ibid.

for naturalization.³⁰

To allow the naturalization of these people, Judd argued, would be justice pure and simple, since they resided in the country legally and had the right to stay in the United States the remaining years of their lives. Thus, to have this group, with an average age of fifty, fully incorporated as citizens rather than as alien residents would be advantageous to the body politic of the United States.

"They pay taxes; they are good law-abiding members of their communities," Judd argued, and they "have proved through their conduct during the war, and especially through the conduct of their children who served with heroism, distinction, and valor" in the United States armed forces, "that they are loyal to the United States and fully worthy of American citizenship."³¹ Judd could imagine no substantial objection to allowing these people to become naturalized citizens if they desired to; to disallow them would constitute discrimination and injustice. To dispose of this discrimination, Judd continued, would surely ease the conscience of the American people, and it would increase the respect

³⁰ Ibid., p. 6; according to the United States census of 1940, there were resident in the United States and its Territories 84,658 aliens of Japanese descent; 3,139 of Korean descent; and 145 who were listed as Polynesians and "other Asians."

³¹ Ibid.

for the United States abroad.³²

The above discussed part of the bill involved a nonrecurring situation as it would take care, for all time, of that group of persons who came legally to the United States prior to 1924. The other major element of the bill, immigration, would establish formulas and procedures by which, Judd felt, racial discrimination would be eliminated in the United States immigration laws and by which the basic national origins quota principle could be continued. It set up for the entire Asian world a so-called "Asia-Pacific Triangle" devised for H. R. 5004 by a State Department geographer, Samuel W. Boggs, and comprising all the "quota areas" of the Asian world, with the exception of the Philippines, and including all colonies and other dependent areas, situated wholly within the triangle bounded by the meridians 60° East and 165° West longitude and by the parallel 25° South latitude. Any alien who immigrated to the United States and who was "attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to the Asia-Pacific triangle, regardless of his place of birth, would be charged either to the appropriated country quota within the triangle or to the separate Asia-Pacific triangle quota." The quota areas, however, and the colonies and other existing depend-

³²Ibid.

ent areas would be subject to revision from time to time, the bill provided, because of development toward independent political status.³³

Within this geographical area were located certain independent countries which had obtained immigration equality under the 1943 act, which established a quota for the Chinese, and the 1946 act, which established quotas for natives of India and the Philippine Islands. Those areas already having quotas would remain the same, but other independent recognized countries would receive quotas. The bill, in addition, would have established a quota of 100 immigrants a year for the whole area, usable by all persons born in or indigenous to parts of the triangle other than the countries having individual and separate quotas. Thus the bill would have made it possible for every individual of Asian origin immigrating to the United States to have his ancestry traced back and assigned to the proper quota.³⁴

Judd explained to the subcommittee that each of the naturalization and immigration bills which had become law in the past tended to be more complicated than the last because there are so many persons of mixed blood in Asia, amounting

³³Ibid. The term "quota area" replaced the ambiguous term "nationality" in immigration and naturalization law.

³⁴Ibid.

to halves, quarters, and eighths, and "to decide whether a person born in Indo-China of mixed ancestry belonged, for example, to the Filipino quota, or the Chinese quota, or the Indian quota" constituted a most difficult procedure.³⁵ Under H. R. 5004, however, there was a precise formula whereby on the basis of the ancestry of each person, the quota to which the individual would be attributable could be accurately determined. An individual whose ancestry is attributable by as much as a half or more to an Asia-Pacific triangle recognized country would be charged to the quota of that country, and thus he could not come from a nonquota country as a nonquota immigrant. The bill in its entirety consisted of complicated terminology, as Judd explained to the subcommittee, but he assured the group that it had been gone over very carefully and that it would work to remove the stigma that attached itself to the complete prohibition of immigration of certain races, and yet it would make sure that there would not be a flooding of the United States with people of lower economic standards or other cultural patterns.³⁶

The quotas established by his bill, Judd argued, would bring in fewer than a thousand persons a year of the groups

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

falling under the new system. The fact stands that six of the countries receiving quotas had very small populations and their population was of a sort that never emigrated, and there appeared to be no reason why they would want to emigrate; and, if they wanted to, most of them could not come to the United States because they would not be able to meet the literacy or financial qualifications imposed on all immigrants. Apparently Judd did not regard the "literacy test" as a form of racial discrimination. Thus, Judd reasoned, the number of immigrants involved did not constitute a major problem, and thus he felt that no adequate justification could be given for not taking action, while many reasons existed as to why action should be taken.³⁷ Judd believed that his bill was a powerful weapon against the spread of communism. To him the billion people of Asia would tip the balance of power away from Russia and toward the United States. Thus the enactment of H. R. 5004, to Judd, would be a powerful weapon in that struggle.³⁸

Judd's bill sought to accomplish both the removal of racial ineligibility--whereby race as a cause for exclusion for naturalization purposes would be eliminated--and the removal of the absolute bar against certain persons as immi-

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

grants. In addition, Judd sought to advance the administrative procedure of the existing immigration and naturalization laws by revisions worked out with the Justice Department and State Department. In total, Judd argued, only about 185 additional people could come in from the Pacific area under the revision; however, more of the existing quotas could be used by persons indigenous to the Pacific area. As an example, Judd cited the quota of Japan, which stood at 100, but which under existing law no Japanese could use. Under H. R. 5004 the quota for Japan would be increased to 185. This is the figure worked out under the same formula as applied to everybody else in the 1924 act. But that quota would be usable by persons of Japanese ancestry, as well as Caucasians or other Japanese-born groups eligible for citizenship.³⁹

In his testimony, Judd pointed out that actually the total number of immigrants coming to the United States from all quota countries of the world would be about 635 fewer than were coming in or than could come in under existing law.⁴⁰ Under the 1924 law it worked out that every time immigration officials determined a quota for a country they had to figure 0.00165854857 of the number of persons from

³⁹Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 11, 16-17.

that country who lived in the United States according to the 1920 census.⁴¹ This is approximately one-sixth of one percent.⁴² Judd stated that one-sixth of one percent gives a figure of a half of one percent less than the 1924 law so that hereafter the immigration quota for every country would be fixed at one-sixth of one percent, thus reducing by 635 the number of people who could immigrate to the United States under all the quotas of the world.⁴³ This slight reduction, Judd emphasized, would apply to those countries which had a quota greater than the minimum quota of 100 for any quota area.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the number of immigrants from any colony or dependent area would be limited to 100 of the quota chargeable to its "mother country."⁴⁵ Thus, as such, no person would be excludable "per se" because of his race.

Judd was able to gather an impressive list of personalities who favored a general repeal of racial discrimination in American immigration law. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor for the Secretary of State, in writing Frank Fellows, chair-

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 11, 16.

⁴²Ibid., p. 11.

⁴³Ibid., p. 11, 16.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 12.

man of the subcommittee, favored H. R. 5004, and expressed the conviction that race discrimination in immigration legislation "has complicated the conduct of foreign relations for many years."⁴⁶ Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General, speaking for the Justice Department, favored passage of the bill if certain changes in terminology were made.⁴⁷ George P. Miller, Democratic Representative from California, presented an eloquent plea for passage of the bill by citing the splendid World War II record of the Japanese-Americans.⁴⁸ Joseph R. Farrington, Republican Delegate from Hawaii, urged most earnestly that the bill be reported to the House for consideration. He had previously introduced in the House two bills similar in nature to H. R. 5004, but he felt that this bill was superior to his own bills.⁴⁹

W. Walton Butterworth, Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, testified before the subcommittee to "vouchsafe" the support of the State Department for the bill. He emphasized the fact that for years the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between the United States and Oriental countries had been impeded by the racial discrimina-

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 20-21.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 33.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 29-30.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 33-36.

tion which existed in American immigration laws. Butterworth stressed the offensiveness of the exclusion laws to the Asian and their usefulness in much foreign propaganda against the United States. He concluded by declaring that the State Department hoped very much that Congress would act promptly so that the bill might be passed by the Second Session of the Eightieth Congress, because it was of key importance to United States relations with Oriental people.⁵⁰

The former United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, testified to the urgency of a bill such as H. R. 5004. Grew high-lighted his testimony by reading a statement made by Baron Sakatani during debate in the Japanese Diet, during February 1924, in regard to the 1924 exclusion legislation:

If this bill is enacted by the United States it would lead to grave consequences. I do not mean to say by that the Empire will go to war with the United States over this question. But what I do mean to say is that if the Japanese people are to be classified by the United States as an inferior race, that action would seriously destroy the present desire of the Japanese people to cooperate with other signatory nations in supporting the nine-power treaty and to observe the letter and spirit of that treaty in resolving our issues with China. If the bill becomes law, no one can foresee where that will end.⁵¹

Grew concluded his statement to the subcommittee by commenting that "Congressman Judd's bill...will have a very powerful

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 36-38.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 44.

effect in leading up to that most desirable objective...[of strengthening]...our bonds with nations whose friendships can be ours."⁵²

In departing from previously anti-Japanese sentiment, Bertrand W. Gearhart, a California Republican, added his voice to those who favored complete repeal of racial exclusion:

So, let us pass this legislation. Let us embrace these new principles, because they are enlightened principles. These people are here; a handful more will come. Let them become citizens, because they have demonstrated their trustworthiness, because we know that they are worthy, because they⁵³ are the kind of people we like to live next to....

Other notables who favored the bill included: John J. McCloy, head of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and who was Under Secretary of War during the Second World War; General Mark Clark, who commanded most of the Japanese-American troops in Italy and France during the war;⁵⁴ Edward J. Ennis, chairman, Committee for Equality in Naturalization; Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, psychological warfare officer and military secretary to General

⁵² Ibid., pp. 45-46. At the time the Japanese Ambassador, Hanihara, warned the United States that "grave consequences" might follow the termination of the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 which Japan had adhered to faithfully.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 49.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 51-52.

Douglas MacArthur; and Dillon S. Myer, former Director of the War Relocation Authority for four years.⁵⁵ Sanford H. Bolz, Washington Representative of the American Jewish Congress, strongly recommended the passage of H. R. 5004; however, he expressed the desire to abolish the national origins clause. He felt that if immigration quotas were dependent solely on place of birth and all racial barriers were removed then the process of elimination of racial discrimination would be nearly complete in American immigration and naturalization law.⁵⁶

To refute the above testimony, Harry V. Hayden, Jr., National Legislative Representative of the American Legion, appeared in opposition to the bill. Hayden declared: "The American Legion...has long been alert to the importance of guarding our country against improper immigration and improper naturalization" legislation. He assured the subcommittee that the action and attitude of the American Legion did not originate "from any narrow standpoint but from a standpoint of the security and welfare of the country that our members fought to preserve."⁵⁷ Perhaps the essence of Hayden's remarks, speaking for the American Legion, can be sum-

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 72.

med up as a belief that the immigration and naturalization laws should be

...tightened up with reference to speaking of the English language, unequivocal obligation to bear arms, and now, in connection with this bill, that immigration should be made truly selective and confined to the present quota or such reduced quotas as may hereafter be established and that: only such persons shall be admitted from any country who may be found to be assimilable and well-disposed to the basic principles of our American form of government and way of life.⁵⁸

Similarly, John B. Trevor, President of the American Coalition, the national voice of various nativist groups, spoke in opposition to the bill. He asserted that the proposed legislation would "turn loose into the community a class of immigrants whose presence will not only aggravate the racial animosities which already exist...but...will render infinitely more difficult the efforts...to promote amicable relations with the various races and states whose people are the beneficiaries of this bill."⁵⁹

Despite the overwhelming support of H. R. 5004, the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee took no further action on the bill. On June 4, 1948, therefore, Judd introduced a similar bill⁶⁰ in hopes of forcing the subcommittee

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 77.

⁶⁰H. R. 6809, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.

to send a bill to the House floor for debate;⁶¹ this bill also died in committee. But a measure of success was forthcoming for Judd, for during the First Session of the Eighty-First Congress he again took up the cause of revision of immigration and naturalization procedure. On January 3, 1949, he introduced H. R. 199.⁶² The bill stated nothing new in terms of basic policy. It simply extended to the remaining twenty-five percent of the population of Asia, of which the Japanese constituted approximately one-third, the same privileges which Congress had granted to the Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos in 1943 and 1946. The maximum annual number of immigrants from Asia would be less than one percent of the total authorized immigration quota for the world.⁶³

⁶¹U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 6, 7116.

⁶²U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 1, 17; Legislation identical with H. R. 199 was introduced in the 81st Congress by George P. Miller, a California Democrat as H. R. 90. In addition, identical legislation was introduced by Francis E. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania, as H. R. 308; Delegate Joseph R. Farrington, of Hawaii and Republican, as H. R. 1214; and Representative Sidney R. Yates, Illinois Democrat, as H. R. 14444.

⁶³U. S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Report, Providing The Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen of The United States to all Immigrants Having a Legal Right to Permanent Residence, To Make Immigration Quotas Available to Asian And Pacific People, Report No. 65, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 2. Hereafter cited as House Committee on the Judiciary, Providing The Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen, Rpt. 65.

Five weeks later, on February 10, Ed Gossett, a Texas Democrat, for the Judiciary Committee, reported H. R. 199 back to the House with a minor amendment, and recommended that the bill pass.⁶⁴ In its report, the committee cited the loyalty of the Nisei,⁶⁵ American-born children of Japanese immigrants, who had been interned in relocation centers, and who had volunteered for military service in World War II. Furthermore, the committee expressed its satisfaction with the record of loyalty and dependability of all individuals of Japanese extraction residing in the United States during the war: "All authorities are in agreement that there was no sabotage or espionage by a person of Japanese ancestry

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 1; U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 1. 1147.

⁶⁵ General Mark W. Clark said of the Nisei: "Under my command in Italy the Four Hundredth and Forty-second Infantry Regiment and the One Hundred Infantry Battalion, composed of Nisei, fought the Nazi combat forces with the valor and skill characteristic of the young Americans that they are.... As I recall the outstanding feats of valor in combat of the members of the Four Hundred and Forty-second Infantry and the One Hundredth Infantry Battalion, the number of Purple Hearts awarded to them because of wounds received in battle, and their extremely low hospital rate because of their eagerness to return to the line after having been wounded, I can only urge that the rights of citizenship in our great America be given to the parents who furnished us with such outstanding young manhood, men who willingly gave their all that America might live." House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Providing for Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws Hearings, 1948, p. 52.

resident in the United States or Hawaii, either before, during or after Pearl Harbor."⁶⁶ The committee accepted this statement despite the questioning of it by Hayden of the American Legion.⁶⁷ The Judiciary Committee had reviewed the prior hearings on H. R. 5004, and affirmed its belief that the enactment of this bill, H. R. 119, would strongly benefit the foreign relations of the United States.⁶⁸

When the bill came to the floor for debate, on March 1,

⁶⁶ House Committee on the Judiciary, Providing the Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen, Rpt. 65, p. 3.

⁶⁷ House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Providing for Equality Under Naturalization and Immigration Laws Hearings, 1948, p. 72.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 36-37; House Committee on the Judiciary, Providing The Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen, Rpt. 65, p. 6; The Committee Report stated that the purpose of H. R. 199 was: "(1) to provide without racial restriction the privilege of becoming a naturalized resident; (2) to make immigration quotas available to Asian peoples in accordance with the national origins provisions of the 1924 Immigration Act, under specific provision that persons indigenous to an Asia-Pacific triangle described therein shall be charged to the quota for the quota area to which they are by ancestry indigenous, wherever born; (3) to place in quota status the alien husbands, wives, and unmarried children of the United States citizens who are chargeable to a quota area having a quota of less than 200; (4) to provide a priority of up to 75 percent for aliens immigrating to the United States chargeable to quota areas within the Asia-Pacific triangle who were born and are resident therein; (5) to simplify the mechanics of computing quotas by providing that the annual quota for any quota area shall be one-sixth of 1 percent of the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920 attributable by national origin to that quota area; (6) to provide an annual limit of 100 immigrants from each colony, chargeable to the quota of the governing country." Ibid., pp. 1-2.

only Vito Marcantonio, a New York American Labor Party member, and Adam C. Powell, Jr., a New York Democrat, seriously questioned any aspect of the proposed legislation. They questioned the limiting of immigration from the British West Indies to one hundred annually whereas previously natives of this area could come into the United States under the British quota.⁶⁹ Judd answered them simply by saying that such an arrangement would only bring the whole pattern for colonies into uniformity.⁷⁰ Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, did not oppose, but saw in the bill, imperfection in dealing with colonies. He viewed this aspect of the bill as "extraneous" to the basic purpose of H. R. 199.⁷¹

The House agreed to the minor Judiciary Committee amendment without question and proceeded to vote on the bill, despite Powell's and Marcantonio's attempts to block the vote.⁷² H. R. 199 passed the House by an overwhelming vote of 336 to 39,⁷³ on March 1, 1949. Judd's bill as forwarded to the Senate Judiciary Committee met with deferred action

⁶⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 2, 1678-82.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 1678-1682.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 1684.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 1687-88, 1690-92.

⁷³Ibid., p. 1692.

pending the consideration of all-inclusive legislation on immigration and naturalization.⁷⁴ The New York Times first expressed support for Judd's H. R. 199 on May 16, 1949.⁷⁵ After several weeks of inactivity of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the proposed legislation the Times chose to attack the committee directly and Pat McCarran, Nevada Democrat and chairman of the Judiciary Committee, indirectly. The paper acknowledged the great pressure from the American Legion; however, it expressed the opinion that even if the Judiciary Committee was unwilling to face facts on Oriental immigration it could at "least do justice to the some 80,000 persons who are legally in the United States and whose loyalty and value are unquestioned, but who happen to be barred from citizenship by laws that are now an admitted anachronism."⁷⁶

McCarran was working on a compromise bill of his own which he described as a complete rewriting of immigration and naturalization laws. It became quite apparent that any legislation in this area would have to bear the McCarran

⁷⁴U. S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Report, Provides the Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen of the United States to all Aliens Having a Legal Right to Permanent Residence, Report No. 3140, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950. pp. 1-2.

⁷⁵New York Times, May 16, 1949, p. 20.

⁷⁶New York Times, September 10, 1949, p. 16.

name if it were to get past the Senate Judiciary Committee. McCarran was very reluctant to give Judd any credit for the latter's services in working out a quota and naturalization system for the Orientals. His sole public comment on the Judd measure was that his proposed legislation overcame the objectionable feature found in the Judd bill on the subject of admitting persons from the Asian Pacific area. McCarran viewed H. R. 199 as making it almost impossible to bring the Chinese wives and children of American citizens to the United States. His own proposal, however, was nearly as restrictive on this subject.⁷⁷ The three bills, Judd's, McCarran's, and that of Francis E. Walter, a Democrat of Pennsylvania, who chaired the House Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee, were frankly discriminatory in their immigration provisions as affecting Asians.

When it became apparent the Senate would not act upon Judd's H. R. 199 in the Eighty-First Congress, Francis Walter introduced as a separate resolution House Joint Resolution 238, on May 9, 1949. The resolution incorporated Judd's basic quota and naturalization concept as presented

⁷⁷ New York Times, April 21, 1950, p. 16.

in H. R. 199,⁷⁸ but amended the Nationality Act of 1940.⁷⁹ At this point the direction of congressional action started to veer to the right from Judd's original intent and take on certain restrictive measures which were contrary to the spirit of H. R. 199. The House Joint Resolution passed the House on June 6, without debate,⁸⁰ and the following day was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee.⁸¹ The Senate Committee reported the resolution out on October 13, 1949, with the recommendation that it pass;⁸² however, when it came up for consideration it was passed over at the request of Richard Russell, Georgia Democrat and member of the Judiciary

⁷⁸U. S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Report, Providing the Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen of the United States to all Immigrants Having a Legal Right to Permanent Residence, Report No. 634, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 1; U. S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 5, 6489.

⁷⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 5, 6489

⁸⁰U. S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 6, 7272.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 7320.

⁸²U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 11, 14388; U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Report, Providing the Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen of the United States to all Immigrants Having a Legal Right to Permanent Residence, Report No. 1167, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 1.

Committee.⁸³

The Senate did not consider House Joint Resolution 238 until June 8, 1950. Russell proposed an amendment which he stated would limit the provisions of the measure strictly to the Japanese. He further declared that "the bill as presented to the Senate was so broad that I felt it would permit a great many aliens, including those who were here by virtue of treaties, to be included under its terms."⁸⁴ McCarren, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, supported Russell's amendment; he commented that the amendment accomplished what the committee thought to be the intent of the measure. The Russell amendment sought to restrict the application of the resolution exclusively to Japanese persons and persons of Japanese descent who entered the United States, excluding Hawaii, prior to July 1, 1924. The Senate accepted the amendment and then passed the resolution by a voice vote.⁸⁵ The House expressed its disapproval of the Senate amendment and agreed to ask for a conference on the Joint Resolution.⁸⁶

⁸³U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 11, 14769.

⁸⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 6, pp. 8285-86.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 8286; Congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, VI (1950), 241.

⁸⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 7, 8658.

On August 14, 1950, McCarran reported to the Senate that in the judgment of the conference the version of the Joint Resolution as initially passed by the House would be followed; however, the resolution as amended by the conference provided for a more thorough screening of applicants for citizenship.⁸⁷ On the same day the House agreed to the conference report. Judd declared that the original version of the Joint Resolution had been the first section of his H. R. 199, which still awaited final Congressional action; however, he added that the Joint Resolution would remove racial discrimination from both immigration and naturalization laws and would establish quotas for the twelve remaining excluded areas of the world.⁸⁸ Thus, on August 29, Congressional officials from both Houses affixed their signatures to House Joint Resolution 238, and the House forwarded it for Presidential consideration.⁸⁹ President Truman, however, vetoed the resolution on September 10, 1950,

⁸⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 9, 12413; also see: U. S., Congress, House, Committee of Conference on H. J. Res. 238, Conference Report, Amending the Nationality Act of 1940, Report No. 2914, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, pp. 1-7.

⁸⁸ Congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 241; U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 9, 12466.

⁸⁹ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, CXVI, Part 10, 12660.

with the request that Congress re-enact a section granting naturalization privileges regardless of race.⁹⁰ He continued: "When first introduced in the Congress this resolution provided that the right to become a naturalized citizen of the United States should not be denied or abridged because of race," whereas as amended it would be impossible to administer the act without "creating a twilight species of second-class citizens, persons who could be deprived of citizenship on technical grounds, through their ignorance or lack of judgment."⁹¹ The President urged Congress to reconsider the resolution at once, "reenacting in such form as to preserve section 1 and to remove those ill-advised provisions in section 2, which seek to strengthen the Nationality Act of 1940 but which actually weaken and confuse it."⁹²

The House took up President Truman's veto on September

14. Judd responded to the veto by stating:

...I very much wish it (House Joint Resolution 238) had been accepted in the Senate as it was passed by the House...I believe it would have been better as a simple bill saying as my bill did that 'the right to become a naturalized citizen of the United States

⁹⁰ Congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 241; U. S., House, Amending the Nationality Act of 1940 As Amended: Message from The President of The United States, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Document No. 702, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 2.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁹² Ibid., p. 2.

should not be denied or abridged because of race.⁹³

Walter was not as charitable to the President as Judd in requesting that the House override the President's veto.⁹⁴

Only Emanuel Celler, a New York Democrat and chairman of the Judiciary Committee, praised the President's action. He viewed the amended resolution as "suckled by fear and nursed by hysteria."⁹⁵ The House, however, passed the resolution over the President's veto 307 to 14--a total of ninety-three more than the two-thirds required to override a veto.⁹⁶ The Senate did not take up House Joint Resolution 238 again, and thus allowed it to die from the Presidential veto. McCarran was formulating his own bill. It was two years later that Congress challenged and overrode President Truman's veto on a bill which incorporated the essence of Judd's H. R. 199, and Walter's House Joint Resolution 238.

After President Truman's veto it was McCarran and Walter, chairmen of the immigration and naturalization subcom-

⁹³ Congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 241; U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Cong., 1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14859.

⁹⁴ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14859; Congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 241.

⁹⁵ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14858-59.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 14859; Congressional Quarterly, "Naturalization of Asians," 241.

mittees in the respective houses, who dominated the scene in revision of existing immigration and naturalization law, replacing Judd. The latter, however, cooperated and worked with Walter for the principle of H. R. 199. After a number of bills were introduced in the House and Senate a Joint Subcommittee, consisting of seven members of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,⁹⁷ and the seven members of the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House,⁹⁸ held extensive hearings on three pieces⁹⁹ of proposed legislation.¹⁰⁰ The hearings confirmed the domination by McCarran and Walter.

On the second day of the hearings, March 7, Judd appeared before the Joint Subcommittee. He declared that

⁹⁷ McCarran introduced S. 716 on January 29, 1951. U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 1, 714. The Senate Subcommittee on S. 716 included: Pat McCarran, Nevada, Chairman; James O. Eastland, Mississippi; Herbert R. O'Connor, Maryland; Willis Smith, North Carolina; Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin; Homer Ferguson, Michigan; William E. Jenner, Indiana.

⁹⁸ House Subcommittee No. 1 Immigration and Naturalization included: Francis E. Walter, Pennsylvania, Chairman; Michael A. Feighan, Ohio; Frank L. Chelf, Kentucky; Ed Gossett, Texas; Louis E. Graham, Pennsylvania; Frank Fellows, Maine; and Clifford P. Case, New Jersey.

⁹⁹ The bills included: H. R. 2816, Celler; H. R. 2379, Walter; and S. 716, McCarran.

¹⁰⁰ S. 716 and H. R. 2379 were first filed with the subcommittee; subsequently H. R. 2816 was filed with the Joint Subcommittee.

whether the provisions of H. R. 199 were enacted into law by themselves or were divided up and acted upon separately, or were incorporated in the so-called omnibus bills before the subcommittee, he did not care--so long as Congress acted.¹⁰¹ The essential provisions of Judd's H. R. 199, he felt, had been incorporated in Walter's, McCarran's and Celler's omnibus bills on which the subcommittee was holding hearings. Judd felt that with such powerful support from three such "distinguished" Congressmen action would soon be taken.¹⁰² Judd discussed his former bill at length and pointed out why the ideas and provisions should be passed. He employed the same basic arguments which he had used in the hearings on his own bills earlier. Judd asserted that such legislation would aid the Asians to move toward "Christian democracy."¹⁰³ Thus, if the United States could help any part of Asia toward representative government, it had the obligation to do so. This cause, to Judd's mind, could be advanced by merely removing racial discrimination from American immigration barriers; this did not mean the

¹⁰¹U. S., Congress, Joint Hearings, Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, Joint Hearings, Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Law, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 29.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 34.

removal of immigration barriers altogether, only granting all Asians a small quota. Such action would advance the cause of the United States in East Asia, Judd asserted.¹⁰⁴

In summary and conclusion Judd declared:

Congress should pass the provisions of...[his] ...bill, in one form or another--first, for moral reasons. It is a matter of simple justice and a powerful demonstration by deeds that we believe in the dignity and decency of the individual human beings.

Second, for security. It is imperative to our country that the opposite shore of the Pacific, as well as of the Atlantic, be in the hands of people friendly, not hostile, to the United States.

Final repeal of the old exclusion laws will remove the single most powerful propaganda weapon our enemies have used and are using so skillfully against us....Third, economic reasons. America has grown great and powerful by the process of an expanding economy. The greatest undeveloped resources in the world--material and human--are in the Asia-Pacific triangle. Assuming that we win the present military struggle in the world, America will need on her side in the years ahead the materials, the manpower, the markets of Asia. We do not win people as friends, allies or customers by insulting them. ¹⁰⁵

During the hearings, March 6 to April 9, 1951, the statements and testimony of over one hundred individuals were received.¹⁰⁶ The general tone of the testimony resembled that of previous hearings on immigration and naturalization, although there was little denunciation of the McCar-

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 34-35.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 1-787.

ran and Walter bills by groups which had previously fought change, because of the severe security precautions which were included. After the hearings were completed and consideration had been given to the suggestions and comments presented at the hearings, along with various conferences with several governmental officials, McCarran introduced a "refined" version of his former bills as S. 2055,¹⁰⁷ and Walter introduced the companion bill, H. R. 5678.¹⁰⁸ Both measures, often described by the authors as being identical, contained a few slight differences, but in general they both tended to tighten existing immigration and naturalization laws. Both bills contained the basic concepts incorporated in the Judd bill, H. R. 199; that is, they provided for the naturalization of those Asians legally residing in the United States, and provided for a quota for the remaining non-quota Orientals, as worked out by Judd.

McCarran's S. 2055 was modified in the Senate Judiciary Committee and emerged on January 29, 1952 with another num-

¹⁰⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 8, 10680-81.

¹⁰⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 10, 12876.

ber, S. 2550, and the recommendation that the bill pass.¹⁰⁹

On February 14, 1952, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported equally favorably on Walter's H. R. 5678, with amendments. The greater part of the amendments which the subcommittee made to Walter's bill consisted of corrections of typographical errors or suggestions for perfecting the language of the bill.¹¹⁰ Both McCarran and Walter sensed strong opposition to their bills in their respective Houses, the former from Herbert H. Lehman, Democrat from New York and Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat from Minnesota; and the latter from Celler.

McCarran's first opposition came in the Minority Views of the Judiciary Committee on his S. 2550.¹¹¹ The Minority

¹⁰⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Report, Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws, Report No. 1137, Part 2, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws, Rpt. 1137, Part 2.

¹¹⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 1, 1053; U. S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Report, Revising the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, Report No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 1-3. Hereafter cited as House Committee on the Judiciary, Revising the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, Rpt. 1365.

¹¹¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 2, 2229. Those signing the Minority Report, Senate Report 1137, Part 2, included: Estes Kefauver, Tennessee Democrat; Warren G. Magnuson, Democrat of Washington; Harley M. Kilgore, West Virginia Democrat; and William Langer, North Dakota Republican.

Report described S. 2550 as "a bill which, under the guise of a codification of existing immigration statute, in fact incorporates...hundreds of highly controversial provisions." The basic reasons why the minority group termed the bill "undesirable" and declared that it should be rejected included the arguments that it did not correct many of the defects in existing United States immigration laws, and that many of its new provisions ran counter to American "democratic traditions of justice and equality."¹¹² The members who signed the Minority Report joined with Humphrey and Lehman to oppose the McCarran bill and press for approval of the so-called Humphrey-Lehman bill. On March 12, 1952, Humphrey introduced a bill, S. 2842, entitled "The Immigration and Naturality Act of 1952," on behalf of himself and twelve other Senators. Lehman had introduced a similar bill at an earlier date which was never reported out of committee.¹¹³

¹¹²Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws, Rpt. 1137, Part 2, p. 1.

¹¹³U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 10, 13658. The twelve other Senators were: Herbert H. Lehman, New York Democrat; William Benton, Connecticut Democrat; William Langer, North Dakota Republican; Harley M. Kilgore, West Virginia Democrat; Paul H. Douglas, Illinois Democrat; Brien McMahon, Connecticut Democrat, died July 28, 1952; Francis T. Green, Democrat of Rhode Island; John O. Pastore, Rhode Island Democrat; Blair Moody, Michigan Democrat; James E. Murray, Democrat of Montana, Estes Kefauver, Tennessee Democrat; and Wayne Morse, Republican of Oregon.

The Humphrey-Lehman bill would have permitted the processing and admission, under the existing quota system, of an increased number of aliens. The resolution would also have provided for meeting the emergency world situation in regard to the religious and political refugees from Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as for helping alleviate the over-population in western Europe caused by the flight from tyranny in other parts of the continent. The bill further sought to eliminate the stigmas of racial discrimination and discrimination based on sex. The Humphrey-Lehman bill would base the quota system on the 1950 census and would abolish the exclusion of Negroes from the census for quota determination purposes. It further provided for pooling of unused portions of the quotas so as to make the entire system more flexible and, in the opinion of President Truman, more real-

istic.¹¹⁴ The Humphrey-Lehman proposed legislation retained many concepts of existing legislation; however, it did provide for easier management of the immigration and naturalization process. There were admittedly significant differences between the McCarran and the Humphrey-Lehman bills, but the latter would only mitigate, rather than destroy, the principle of the McCarran bill and of the 1924 Act. It has been, perhaps accurately, charged that it was not basic conviction, "but political expedience, that led these senators to make this concession to a principle which they con-

¹¹⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVII, Part 2, 2140-43. Some of the groups supporting the Humphrey-Lehman bill included: Administrative Law Division of the American Bar Association; Amalgamated Clothing Workers (CIO); American Friends Service Committee; American Hellenic Veterans Association; American Jewish Committee; American Veterans Committee; Americans for Democratic Action; Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers; Catholic Committee for Refugees; Chinese American Citizens National Association; Common Council for American Unity; Congress of Industrial Organization; Czechoslovak National Council; Friends Committee on National Legislation; Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; International Ladies Garment Workers Union (AFL); Jewish Labor Committee; Jewish War Veterans of the U. S.; Lithuanian American Congress; Lutheran Resettlement Service; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; National Council of Catholic Charities; National Council of Churches of Christ; National Council of Jewish Women; National Lutheran Council; Order of the Sons of Italy in America; Polish Legion of American Veterans; Synagogue Council of America; Union of American Hebrew Congregations; United Auto Workers (CIO); and the United Service for New Americans.

sidered 'harsh and discriminatory.'" ¹¹⁵ It was Humphrey who pressed for allowing immigrants of one-half Asian ancestry to be charged to the Asia-Pacific area only if they were born in that area. ¹¹⁶ Judd might have been expected to support the Humphrey-Lehman bill as it smacked less of racial bigotry than the McCarran or Walter bills; however, perhaps political expediency and the fear of the "Communist conspiracy" led Judd to give seemingly full support to McCarran's and Walter's measures.

McCarran used the "conspiracy" pitch continuously to gain support for his bill. The Nevada Senator charged that "there has been an intensive letter-writing campaign to sabotage this bill under the auspices of the same groups which so vigorously opposed" the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950. McCarran charged that there are "certain elements which are bent upon the destruction" of the American immigration and naturalization systems, and "that every Senator who voted against the Internal Security Act and who is still a member of the Senate is listed as a sponsor of the so-called

¹¹⁵ Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, pp. 15-16; Congressional Quarterly, "Immigration and Nationality Act," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (1952), 159; U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVII, Part 5, 5604.

¹¹⁶ U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 5758-59, 5766.

Humphrey-Lehman substitute bill."¹¹⁷ McCarran proceeded to point out to his Senate colleagues the "subversive" elements who opposed his bill, citing the Daily Worker along with other "Communist branded" newspapers, "front" organizations, and "pink" authors.¹¹⁸ Lehman responded to McCarran by declaring that the Nevada Senator had not given any explanation whatsoever regarding the merits of his resolution. McCarran seemed more concerned, Lehman asserted, with questioning "at least by implication, the loyalty and patriotism of the Senators who oppose the enactment of S. 2550."¹¹⁹ William Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, replied to McCarran that the "Daily Worker bogey has been used until it is threadbare."¹²⁰ Brien McMahon, also a Connecticut Democrat, asserted "that if this bill should be passed by both Houses, I certainly think that it would be returned to Congress, because, in my opinion, no self-respecting President could sign a bill embracing such outlandish provisions as are contained in the bill."¹²¹

¹¹⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 4, 5093.

¹¹⁸Ibid., pp. 5093-97.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 5100.

¹²⁰Ibid., pp. 5149-54.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 5154.

The debate in the Senate was long and bitter; however, the opposition to McCarran's proposed legislation finally realized the futility of their continuing. Neither the House nor the Senate was in a mood to tamper with the national origins formula as set forth in 1924.¹²² Thus Humphrey reported that, although a number of amendments remained on his desk, it appeared "perfectly obvious they will not be agreed to unless we have the concurrence of the Judiciary Committee, and there seems to be a difference of opinion."¹²³ Humphrey concluded: "we have tried to argue the question of immigration legislation with vigor, with knowledge of fact, and with intelligence." He then expressed a sincere hope that the McCarran bill would not become law.¹²⁴

The temper of the opposition in the House was mild when contrasted with that in the Senate. The sole dissenting voice of the Judiciary Committee to Walter's immigration bill appears to have been that of Emanuel Celler, chairman of the Judiciary. Like the liberal force in the Senate, the New York Congressman regarded the quota system as too rigid and desired that the unused quotas be distributed among

¹²²Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, p. 15.

¹²³U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 5790.

¹²⁴Ibid.; U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 4, 4996-97.

countries having less than 7,000 quota allotments in the same proportion as they bore to the total "quota pie."¹²⁵ It was Celler, not Judd, who vocally objected on the House floor to the theory of nativity as the determining factor in the granting of immigration visas to all peoples with the exception of the Oriental people. Celler emphasized that H. R. 5678 placed a special stigma on people of Oriental or part Oriental ancestry. "This he viewed as offensive and the basis for "tragic consequences...in the development of our foreign policy vis-a-vis Asia."¹²⁶ Without a doubt Judd accepted this principle in the proposed law because of the "yellow horde" theory which still held sway in the minds of some of his colleagues. He was more concerned with obtaining at least a "token" gesture toward racial equality in immigration law than in correcting all the discrepancies in legislation regarding the Orientals. Interestingly, Nattan E. Cowan, director of the legislative department of the CIO, distributed letters to all Congressmen in opposition to Walter's bill--the basic faults which the CIO representative cited paralleled those which Celler found objection-

¹²⁵ House Committee on the Judiciary, Revising the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, Rpt. 1365, p. 326.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 327-28.

able.¹²⁷ In the House, only Celler, Democrat Hugh J. Addonizio of New Jersey, and Louis Heller, New York Democrat, seriously questioned the wisdom of Walter's bill early in the House debate.¹²⁸

The opponents of Walter's bill in the House were from the first clearly overridden. Thomas J. Jenkins, an Ohio Republican, the House "jester" during debate, interpreted the defeat of each amendment as "a great compliment not only to the ability, but to the fairness of those in charge of the bill."¹²⁹ Judd's first comments of significance during the House debate on H. R. 5678 came near the close of discussions. He paid tribute to "the great Committee on the Judiciary and especially to its Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization for its hard and arduous work on this bill."¹³⁰ He expressed gratitude for the "long-suffering and understanding patience" which the subcommittee exhibited for those "who perhaps seemed at times to have axes to grind because of the importunity" with which some Congressmen pressed for certain changes in the United States immigration

¹²⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., XCVIII, Part 4, 3201-06.

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 4306-11.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 4442.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 4439.

and naturalization law. Judd expressed appreciation for what he considered Walter's "unfailing courtesy, along with his thorough mastery" of the problem confronting the country on immigration and naturalization procedures, and for Walter's "high patriotism" in attempting to do those things which he believed served the best interests of the country.¹³¹ Judd's comments at this time give insight into his thinking throughout his political career--that perhaps the intensity of a man's conviction is more important than the validity of his thinking. Judd acknowledged that he did not see Walter's bill as a final solution to American immigration and naturalization problems, nor did he feel that it gave perfect equity and justice in all situations. He did, nevertheless, feel that the bill, if enacted into law, represented an "enormous forward step and a great improvement over the hodge-podge of immigration legislation which has grown up since the last comprehensive revision."¹³²

Judd's apparent motive in giving strong support to Walter's bill was to support the token gesture of abolishing racial discrimination, establishing quotas for all Asians, and preserving the basic national origins principle. He had spent nine and one-half years working to get this "long-

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid.

overdue action taken." His concern about Asia sprang from his concern for the United States and for world order--his concern was to maintain the status quo of the United States in the hierarchy of nations. On the House floor Judd again expressed the contention that the "Racial Exclusion Act of 1924" would be determined in the writings of future historians to have been the basic cause of World War II, as the act which "turned Japan over into the hands of the rabble-rousers and the militarists who were trying to develop a race war of the colored peoples of the earth against the white people as a means of gaining world power for themselves."¹³³ In closing on an emotion-laden pitch for Walter's bill, he told his House colleagues that he was "deeply grateful" that the omnibus H. R. 5678 "contains in one place or another all the provisions" of his earlier H. R. 199--provisions to remove racial discrimination from both immigration and naturalization laws.¹³⁴ Judd was convinced that Walter's bill did establish "equity" and "justice" in immigration and nationality as far as "race is concerned,"¹³⁵ even though the Asian immigrant quota was determined by ancestry rather than nativity. To Judd's mind the bill was a

¹³³ Ibid., p. 4440.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

"monumental" piece of work when considered "in toto." He chided those who opposed the bill with holding to illogical reasoning because they did not believe the bill did everything it should: "to give something less than wholly complete equality to Orientals is certainly far better than to vote for total exclusion of them because of their race."¹³⁶

The opposition in both the House and Senate was aware that they were defeated; nevertheless, their last resort was to appeal for a Presidential veto. The conference committee which considered Walter's and McCarran's bill yielded to the House version of the legislation. The House approved the conference report by a standing vote of 203 to 52,¹³⁷ and the Senate accepted it by a voice vote.¹³⁸ On June 12, 1952, after having received the Vice President's and the House Speaker's signatures, H. R. 5678 went forward for Presidential consideration.¹³⁹ President Truman vetoed the McCarran-Walter bill on June 25. In his veto message to the House of Representatives, the President acknowledged the grave need for a general revision and modernization of the immigration

¹³⁶ U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 5, 6987.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 6991.

¹³⁸ U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 7019.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 7128, 7167.

and naturalization laws, stating, however, his judgment that H. R. 5678 constituted a "step backward and not a step forward...."¹⁴⁰ The President described the bill as a "racist" piece of legislation designed to discriminate against Asian and Southern and Eastern European people, and asserted that all "beneficial effects" of the legislation were offset by other severely unjust provisions. The President condemned the retention of the national origins quota system by stating that this "quota system--always based upon assumptions at variance with our American ideals--is long since out of date and more than ever unrealistic in the face of present world conditions," and is a "constant handicap" in the conduct of American foreign relations.¹⁴¹

In a message to Congress on March 24, 1952, the President had stated the need for an emergency program to deal with immigration from Europe: "Our present quota system is not only inadequate to meet present emergency needs, it is also an obstacle to the development of an enlightened and satisfactory immigration policy for the long-run future."¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ U.S., Congress, House, Immigration and Nationality Act, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, House Doc. 520, p. 1. Cited hereafter as Immigration and Nationality Act, House Doc. 52, 1952.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 3.

Congress chose to ignore this Presidential plea. The President expressed his belief that the McCarran-Walter bill would compel Congress to resort again to "emergency legislation in order to admit any substantial portion of the refugees from communism or the victims of over-crowding in Europe." He did, however, acknowledge the need for numerical limitation, but he argued that "the over-all limitation of numbers imposed by the national origins quota system" in the McCarran-Walter Act set the quotas too low for the need facing the United States.¹⁴³ Referring to Asia, the President declared that he wanted American residents of Japanese ancestry and friends of the United States throughout Asia to understand his action:

...I cannot take the step I would like to take, and strike down the bars that prejudice has erected against them, without, at the same time, establishing new discriminations against the people of Asia and approving harsh and repressive measures directed at all who seek a new life within our boundaries. I am sure that with a little more time and a little more discussion in this country, the public conscience and the good sense of the American people will assert themselves, and we shall be in a position to enact an immigration and naturalization policy that will be fair to all.¹⁴⁴

The President felt that it would be impossible to administer with fairness and justice the part of the act dealing with

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 2.

Asia and the Asian quota system. Mr. Truman suggested that while "good" legislation was being worked out that Congress remove from American statutes racial barriers against the Asians.¹⁴⁵ In conclusion, the President requested that Congress create a representative commission to examine the basic assumptions of the United States immigration policy. He felt that it should study the quota system and examine the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 8. Mr. Truman suggested a twelve man commission with sufficient funds, staff, and power to obtain information so that a complete and accurate report might be completed within a year after its creation. Pending completion of the study and its serious consideration by Congress, the President felt, however, that certain steps should be taken within the year. First, he urged Congress to exact legislation which would remove from American statutes racial barriers against Asians. Second, he strongly requested that Congress enact temporary, but emergency, immigration legislation to authorize the admission of 300,000 additional immigrants to the United States over a three-year period. Listed among these immigrants would be Greek and Dutch nationals, Italians from Italy and Trieste, Germans and persons of German ethnic origin, and religious and political refugees from communism in Eastern Europe. President Truman suggested that the commission be bipartisan and be divided equally among persons from private life and persons from public life: "Perhaps four members be appointed by the President, four by the President of the Senate, and four by the speaker of the House." President Eisenhower, in his State-of-the-Union Message of February 2, 1953, expressed the same sentiment held by President Truman. Mr. Eisenhower stressed the point that existing immigration legislation "contains injustices" and requested Congress, after review, to "enact a statute which will at one and the same time guard our legitimate national interests and be faithful to our basic ideas of freedom and fairness to all." Auerbach, Immigration Laws, p. 25; U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 1, 752. President Eisenhower made several similar pleas during his Administration.

effect of present immigration and nationality laws, and then ascertain the ways in which they could be brought into line with American national ideals and the foreign policy of the United States.¹⁴⁶

Congress, however, had not yet reached President Truman's "enlightened" stage regarding immigration and naturalization law. When the House considered the President's veto message the day following the veto, Walter rapidly regressed to petty tactics in defending his bill. He castigated the President by declaring his veto message to be an "elaborate opus" whose "fictional and amateurish character" could be but the work of "ghost writers" who had "neglected to do one thing--to read the bill."¹⁴⁷ Walter continued his emotion-laden defense of the bill for twenty minutes and declared that the bill's "authors, supported by every one of the administrative agencies working in the field of immigration and naturalization, recommended the passage of this legislation and now they most sincerely recommended that it be passed again, the Presidential 'ill advisers' notwithstanding."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶Immigration and Nationality Act, House Doc. 520, 1952, p. 4.

¹⁴⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8214.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 8216.

Celler taunted Walter: "the gentleman from Pennsylvania, having given voice to his views whereby he took the President to task for, shall I say, having what might be deemed the temerity in vetoing this bill, I feel it incumbent upon myself to say a few words in support of the President."¹⁴⁹

The New York Congressman expressed his belief that President Truman had exercised "discretion," and that he had "acted with fortitude, integrity, and with wisdom, as he saw fit."¹⁵⁰

He commented further that the "veto is the veto of the President" regardless of ghost writers which might have been employed. Celler then scoffed at Walter for perhaps being so naive as to find anything unusual in ghost writers for individuals in high places.¹⁵¹

Alfred D. Sieminski, a Democrat of New Jersey, joined Celler and spoke briefly for sustaining the President's stand.¹⁵²

Massachusetts Democrat John W. McCormack also came to the President's defense, and reasoned that the veto message presented enough convincing reasons why the President had vetoed the bill, and why the House should sustain his veto. He cited remarks which he had made on the House floor as early as February 14,

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 8217.

1929,¹⁵³ denouncing the national origins clause.¹⁵⁴ McCormack had viewed the clause as unrealistic when enacted into law in 1924, and when it became effective in 1929, as well

¹⁵³U.S., Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1927, LXX, Part 4, 3472-77.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 3472-77; U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8218-19. Mr. McCormack, commenting on the national origins clause, said that: "Nobody seems to know its real parenthood, although one John B. Trevor, of New York City, who was a captain in the Intelligence Department of the Army, detailed in New York City during the war, [World War I] appears to claim the credit for it. I have heard that the Ku Klux Klan claims the credit for conceiving it and securing its adoption as an amendment to the immigration law. I am satisfied, however, that their only knowledge of it was after its adoption in the Senate in 1924, as an amendment to the bill that passed the House, and that thereafter the Ku Klux Klan used it as a means of trying to carry out its purposes by attracting additional members to its ranks. It seems rather hard for me to believe that anything that such an organization might sponsor would receive the favorable consideration of either or both branches of Congress. It appears from the records of the hearings of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization which reported the immigration law that the national-origins received little, if any consideration from the committee. It is quite probable--and so far as I can find it is a fact--that it was not presented to the committee for consideration. In any event, when the bill was reported in the House it was not a part thereof, and during debate an amendment was offered in the house which included in substance the provisions of the present law. The amendment was rejected. The House later passed the bill and while under consideration in the Senate, Senator Reed of Pennsylvania moved the amendment which inserted the present national-origins clause into the bill. Upon its return to the House it was sent to conference, and the House conferees recommended the adoption of the amendment, which action was taken. Whether or not it is correct, I am informed this amendment was reluctantly accepted by the House in order that the whole bill might not fail of passage."

as being "equally unrealistic today."¹⁵⁵ Judd denounced more moderately the veto than did Walter:

...surely nobody questions the right of the President to veto this bill. The thing which a great many of us do question is the wisdom of his vetoing it, especially at a time like the present....The President said the bill 'repudiates our basic religious concepts, our belief in the brotherhood of man'...I submit that it is the President's veto that repudiates our basic religious concepts, our belief in the brotherhood of man, because it keeps our statutes as they are, with hundreds of millions of people in those crucial areas still outlawed because of the color or the pigment of skin....Is it not better to accept the bill with its real gains, even though it does not correct all that many believe to be inequalities, than to reject the great steps which it represents in the very areas where we are sustaining our most serious losses? Is it sensible to reject those forward steps just because the bill does not achieve the Kingdom of Heaven on earth? ¹⁵⁶

As the debate progressed, the proponents of the Presidential veto felt disheartened over their chances for victory.¹⁵⁷ In a roll-call vote on the evening of June 26, the House voted 278 to 113 to override the President's veto.

¹⁵⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8219.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 8217-18.

¹⁵⁷The Congressman speaking for sustaining the veto included: Emanuel Celler, Democrat of New York; Isidore Dolinger, New York Democrat; Louis B. Heller, New York Democrat; Arthur G. Klein, New York Democrat; Alfred D. Sieminski, Democrat of New Jersey; and John W. McCormack, Massachusetts Democrat. Only Francis E. Walter and Walter H. Judd spoke for overriding the veto.

More than forty members either paired or did not vote.¹⁵⁸

On the same day the Senate reached an unanimous-consent agreement, which provided that in the event the House of Representatives voted to override the President's veto it would vote at 2:30 p.m. Friday, June 27, on the matter. The time between noon and 2:30, the agreement provided, would be divided equally and controlled by Senators McCarran and Humphrey for debate on the issue.¹⁵⁹ The McCarran forces followed the same argument which they had previously used, while the proponents of the Presidential veto quoted from the New York Times, America, The Washington Post, and other newspapers and magazines which supported the veto or which carried articles favoring the veto. Despite the strong protest of the opponents of the bill, the final vote in the Senate tallied fifty-seven yeas to override and twenty-six nays. Thirteen members did not vote because of absences or pairing.¹⁶⁰

Thus the McCarran-Walter omnibus immigration bill, H. R. 5678, officially the Immigration and Nationality Act, be-

¹⁵⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 6, 8225-26.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 8142-43.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 8267.

came Public Law 414¹⁶¹ on June 27, 1952, when the Senate completed its action. Because a two-thirds vote is needed in both Houses to override a Presidential veto, a switch of only two votes in the Senate or eighteen in the House would have sustained the Presidential action.¹⁶² If durability is the test of good legislation, then the McCarran-Walter Act cannot be considered good legislation in totality, not even for its time. Thirteen years later, after strong support from President John F. Kennedy and general approval of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Congress struck down the racist national origins principle of 1924 and the general nationalistic sentiment which colored the McCarran-Walter Act, and enacted the basic concepts which President Truman requested in his 1952 veto message. It has been stated that "public sentiment clearly favored a more liberal policy" on immigration in 1952.¹⁶³ But, it was charged, an "anachronistic committee system and factional divisions in the major parties put a cluster of rural and isolationist Senators and

¹⁶¹66 Stat. 163-281.

¹⁶²Congressional Quarterly Almanac, VIII, p. 154.

¹⁶³In his presidential campaign General Eisenhower said in Boston with regard to the McCarran-Walter Act: "Only second-class Americanism tolerates second-class citizenship. It's time to get rid of both, and that includes rewriting the unfair provisions of the McCarran Immigration Act." New York Times, October 22, 1952, p. 4; also see: Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, p. 27.

Congressmen into a strategic position from which they effectively frustrated the will of the majority" on this issue.¹⁶⁴

In general, the revision and codification of immigration law in the McCarran-Walter Act followed much of the old line of policy without "significant deviation; indeed, it intensified the rigidities, discriminations, and injustices of the earlier legislation."¹⁶⁵ The act did, however, establish quotas for Japanese and other Oriental people--thus finally eliminating the racial discrimination features of American legislation. Furthermore, the elimination of race as a bar to naturalization and extending quotas to all Asiatic countries was generally regarded as highly commendable.

For his role in drafting the McCarran-Walter Act, the Twin Cities chapter and the Midwest District Council of the Japanese-American Citizens League honored Judd on August 15, 1952, at a testimonial dinner. At the same time Mike Masaoka, national legislative director of the Japanese-American Citizens League, was honored for his efforts since 1945 to achieve citizenship for the some 85,000 persons (Issei) of Japanese ancestry in the United States.¹⁶⁶ The Japanese-

¹⁶⁴Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life (1st Ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957), p. 225.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Minneapolis Tribune, August 15, 1952.

American Citizens League was probably the only nationality organization that urged Congress to enact the 1952 act over President Truman's veto. Later, commenting on the 1952 legislation, Masaoka said that "token immigration is better than total exclusion."¹⁶⁷ Masaoka continued to work for repeal of the National origins clause; Judd, however, appears to have been satisfied with the "token" gesture of 1952.

¹⁶⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, To Amend The Immigration and Nationality Act, and For Other Purposes, Part 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 622.

CHAPTER IV

WALTER H. JUDD: IN DEFENSE OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S CHINA

Following the November election of 1942, when Judd had arrived in Washington as a newly elected Congressman, he commented: "I want to get to the bottom of the State Department business."¹ Judd was referring to State Department Foreign Relations Papers which described American foreign policy in the 1930's and early 1940's, and the attack on Pearl Harbor. Judd, elected as an "expert" on Asia, desired in 1943 to investigate the conduct of the Pacific war; to keep China in the war; and to keep China in Nationalist hands--and friendly to the United States.

American foreign policy--particularly in Asia--was to become Judd's overriding interest. It was, however, several years before Judd became a strong voice in the arena of foreign affairs. He sought and obtained a seat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1947; eventually he held the senior Republican post of the Far East and the Pacific Sub-

¹Richard H. Rovere, "Eight Hopeful Congressmen," The Nation, CLVI (February 27, 1943), 295.

committee. Judd was to become in the post-war period one of the most vociferous critics of the Truman-Marshall-Acheson East Asian policy; yet, perhaps, he was to remain one of the more "responsible" and "level-headed"² members of the "China bloc" or "Asia-First" element which attracted national attention for nearly a decade in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Perhaps the dominating thesis during the first decade of Judd's congressional career was that adequate attention was not being paid to the "seriousness of the situation in the Far East."³ Sufficient and effective American aid to the Chiang Kai-shek forces--to prevent a Chinese Communist takeover--received top priority in the field of foreign affairs in Judd's activities during the post-war period. To be sure, Judd supported a general European aid program, but by giving full support to Europe, he felt that the Democratic Administration could be forced to prevent the Nationalist regime from crumbling.

The question of "truth" in Judd's assertion--that the Administration did not recognize the seriousness of the situation in Asia--was the basis of bitter controversy which raged throughout the Truman and into the early years of the

²Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China 1941-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1963), p. 537.

³U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, XC, Part 3, 3553.

Eisenhower Administrations; however, by the time of Eisenhower's election mainland China had succumbed to communism. But, Judd believed, with a Republican Administration the China ailment could be cured, and China would be restored to the "rightful" and "democratic" rule of Chiang Kai-shek. Judd, during the post-war period, expected the Truman Administration unwaveringly to follow commitments made under wartime duress to Chiang Kai-shek, whether or not Chiang Kai-shek carried out his responsibility under these commitments. The unique situation in China combined with the traditional attitude that the United States had special responsibility regarding China prevented the United States from immediately withdrawing from China at the conclusion of the war as she had done elsewhere in allied countries. A brief discussion of China's internal problems will show the unique position into which the Truman Administration was thrown.

By the early twentieth century the United States felt confident that its action in China contrasted favorably with the predominantly economic centered drive of other foreign powers in China. American nationalism, regardless of rationalization, was never divorced from economic considerations. Perhaps because the American economic aspirations in China never developed as she desired, the United States assumed a position regarding China which was based on high idealism

and moral self-righteousness--this evolution of United States policy in China can be traced directly to missionary efforts. There was, however, a contradiction between American attitudes and actions in the Middle Kingdom. The United States during the second half of the nineteenth century framed her policy in moral terms; nevertheless, she was unwilling to enforce this idealism when it came in direct conflict with the high stakes of other powers in China--American vital interests at this time, it was felt, were not centered in Asia. Perhaps because of American missionary efforts involving philanthropic and educational activities, coupled with the Open Door, the Boxer Rebellion, the Boxer indemnity, and the presence of Chinese studying in the United States, the United States assured herself that she was China's "greatest" friend in the Western world.

But with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the realization that perhaps Chinese sovereignty was linked with American security or vital interest in the form of men, time, and money, the United States was forced to reassess her relationship to China--a reassessment done under war-time duress. The American role in the Pacific, however, involved not only defeating the Japanese, but contending with China's internal political struggle. Original military strategy called for invasion of Japan through China; but, at the time of General Joseph W. Stilwell's recall in November 1944, as commander

of the China-Burma-India theater and chief-of-staff to Chiang Kai-shek, the strategy of "island-hopping" had replaced original military intentions of invading Japan through China. China, therefore, did not assume the importance to the over-all war effort that had been previously planned. President Roosevelt had already fully committed the United States to China as one of the Big Four--unequal treaties were abolished in 1943, along with the Chinese exclusion--because the United States was duly impressed with the great sacrifices of China, notably as personified by Chiang Kai-shek and his beautiful, shrewd and persuasive wife, in their struggle against Japanese aggression; however, such a position did not reflect the realities of the times.

While becoming thus committed, the Nationalist Government was becoming more corrupt and dictatorial, and less effective in governing the populace. The possibility of full-scale civil war erupting between the Nationalists and Communists became more imminent, with hints that Chiang "might" have to withdraw from the war and make a separate peace with Japan sufficient to prompt additional American aid. China did tie up a sizeable number of Japanese forces, which might otherwise intensify the American struggle in the Pacific and perhaps modify American involvement in Europe, the priority area.

With these possible developments facing the country,

President Roosevelt dispatched Major General Patrick J. Hurley in August 1944, as his personal representative to China. Soon after arriving and in approving of Chiang's demand that Stilwell be relieved of his command, Hurley announced American policy: "to keep China in the war, to support Chiang and the National Government, to persuade Chiang to undertake certain reforms, and to promote unity and democracy to which all Chinese proclaimed their dedication."⁴ Judd--and the general American populace--agreed to such statements and objectives; realistically, however, as seen today, these objectives were clearly "irreconcilable." If the lever of withdrawing American support and aid was removed from American policy, then there was no way of inducing Chiang to make changes he chose not to make.

The lever was withdrawn at the moment Chiang Kai-shek declined to execute President Roosevelt's request to which he had previously agreed in principle, that Stilwell, directly under Chiang, be given full command in early 1942, of all Chinese and American forces in China. Stilwell, who favored a tough "quid pro quo" policy toward Chiang, was finally re-

⁴The China White Paper August 1949, [Originally issued by Department of State in 1949 as United States Relations With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949] (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), Introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke.

placed by Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer. Soon after Stilwell's recall the President appointed Hurley as ambassador to China to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Clarence E. Gauss on November 1, 1944, and in which capacity Hurley served until November 26, 1945. Hurley continued after the Chiang-Stilwell crisis to make gestures toward mediation between the Nationalists and the Communists; he fully supported the policy of supplying military material and financial support only to the recognized Chinese National Government; and he encouraged reform in domestic affairs. The central government, however, became more and more ineffective as the friction between the Nationalists and Communists grew more intense.

With V-J Day (September 2, 1945) the basic question of power between the Nationalists and Communists remained unanswered. China still faced the internal struggle for supremacy of opposing ideologies and major factions. Thus the Truman Administration inherited a policy regarding China--a policy made under war-time duress--which had to be converted to a feasible post-war and cold war situation. Furthermore, the President was gravely concerned about future developments in Sino-Soviet relations.

Judd, however, at this time had not formulated the theory that the Soviet Union was the "avowed" enemy of Nationalist China or of the United States. He still viewed

the Moscow and Cairo conferences as a "'magna charta' for China and the orient." Only months before he paid public tribute "to the statesmanship of Stalin in conceding China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia." Judd viewed Stalin's action as the preliminary step in the "restoration physically of China."⁵ In like manner Judd could still "praise unstintedly" the Democratic presidency of Harry S. Truman. "I believe," Judd declared, "a man like Truman is the best kind of president we can have in times such as the present."⁶ In assessing the President's activities at the Potsdam Conference, Judd remarked: "Truman is a very good American, a hard headed Missourian...and did an excellent job." He continued to assert that "Politics is the 'art of the possible,'" and that Truman "probably got everything possible out of Potsdam."⁷ In essence, Judd for months to come considered that Chiang Kai-shek's China was safe with Truman as President. On the domestic front there still prevailed a harmonious picture of bipartisanship in regard to Asia.

What might be considered bitter partisanship on the China question did not burst forth until after the congressional election of 1946 when the Republicans won a clear

⁵ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, January 6, 1944.

⁶ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, May 31, 1945.

⁷ Minneapolis Morning Tribune, August 6, 1945.

majority in both the Senate and the House. But by 1948 President Truman had regained enough popular support to win re-election. The 1948 election also saw a regaining of both Houses by the Democrats.⁸ Thus Marshall, on becoming Secretary of State after returning from his 1947 mission to China, could pursue more effectively his own policy in regard to China--a policy resulting in large measure from the 1947 failure to arrange a peaceful settlement between the Nationalist and Communist forces. Marshall, as Secretary of State, followed briefly a policy of disengagement in China; however, he was forced to go along with the Republican majority in Congress and give lip-service to limited aid in order to

⁸The Republican Party Platform which was adopted in June, 1948, was most vague in regard to foreign policy and made only a polite bow to China. A close reading will reveal that no severe criticism was leveled against the Democratic Administration's foreign policy. Without doubt the vagueness in the Republican Platform to a great degree sprang from the wide gulf within the Republican ranks on what should or could be done for China. The 1948 Platform declared: "Within the prudent limits of our own economic welfare, we shall cooperate, on a basis of self-help and mutual aid...We will foster and cherish our historical policy of friendship with China and assert our deep interest in the maintenance of its integrity and freedom." U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 12, A4662. The Democratic Platform barely mentioned China." Ibid., p. A4659. The Republican Presidential candidate of 1948, Governor Thomas Dewey, spoke only vaguely of "bringing an end to the tragic neglect" of China. Bradford H. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 121. See also the New York Times, June 23, October 1, 16, and 28, 1948.

prevent "black-balling" of American European commitments. By mid 1947, however, the Truman Administration had moved from the conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek could be saved to the viewpoint that the Chiang Government was doomed--that only an all-out military intervention could save the Nationalist regime. Because of a Republican Congress and the influence of individuals such as Judd in the House and William Knowland, a Republican of California, and Styles Bridges, a Republican of New Hampshire, in the Senate, consensus in Congress and throughout the country prevented Marshall from pursuing what he regarded as a realistic China policy during 1947 and 1948. During these two years the Republicans used the threat of "torpedoing the Marshall Plan for recovery of Europe as a way of getting support for China."⁹ After the Democratic victory in 1948 Marshall moved again from the policy of "limited-commitment" to that of disengagement.

The Democratic victory of 1948, because of the most confident assurance of victory by the Republicans, produced a violent reaction among them. However, no longer did the Democratic Administration have to "buy" Republican support for its European program at the price of concessions on China. Thus, the Democratic victory of 1948 only heightened

⁹ The China White Paper August 1949, Introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke.

partisanship on the China issue--and now "in the bitterness of defeat" the Republicans sought to "draw blood wherever they could."¹⁰

Those individuals who sought "blood" chose to explain the gradual deterioration in China by postulating a "great conspiracy" in the United States State Department. They preferred to explain the disintegration of the Nationalist hold on China wholly in terms of external forces rather than in terms of neglect by Chiang and his cohorts. Before V-J Day the consensus of several Foreign Service men in China was that the chances of Nationalist surviving were minimal. As early as August 3, 1944, John S. Service, a Foreign Service Officer in China, reported that the "Chinese Communists have become the most dynamic force in China and are challenging the Kuomintang for control of the country."¹¹ Similar sentiment was expressed by John P. Davies, Jr., who reported on November 7, 1944, that the "Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support." Davies explained this support for the communist move-

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Department of State, United States Relations with China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 566, (From Memoranda of John Stewart Service, October 9, 1944.

ment by asserting that "the governments and armies are genuinely of the people."¹² Another Foreign Service Officer in China, Raymond P. Ludden, likewise recognized the ineffectiveness of the Chiang forces in the war. Both Service and Davies believed that a coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists could find a satisfactory place was the best solution to the Middle Kingdom internal impasse. Likewise both individuals felt that to crush the Communist forces would take a foreign intervention on a scale equal to the Japanese invasion of China. If the United States were to come to the Kuomintang's rescue on its own terms, Service wrote in June 1944, it "would be buttressing--but only temporarily--a decadent regime which by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems;" this kind of aid would only be "gaining...a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning."¹³ These and other individuals connected with the China foreign service believed that the Soviet Union desired to develop out of North China and Manchuria a separate Chinese state--perhaps even a Rus-

¹²Ibid., p. 367, (Memoranda of John P. Davies, November 7, 1944).

¹³Ibid., p. 573, (Memoranda of John Stewart Service, June 20, 1944).

sian satellite.¹⁴

In contrast to many State Department officials, Judd at this time felt that "Russia's official conduct with regard to the Chinese Communists since they made a pact with Chiang in September 1937," had "been perfectly correct and circumspect."¹⁵ Judd took a "fact-finding" trip to China in late 1944, and addressed his House colleagues on March 15, 1945: "one of the things I wanted to find out in China was how much, if any, is the Kremlin behind the Communists in China." He emphasized that when he spoke of Communism he did not mean "Russia," as "many Americans automatically did." He affirmed his belief to the House that the Soviet Union was not aiding the Chinese Communist forces: "There was no evidence that I could find or hear about that Moscow has been backing or supplying with materials or with guidance, the Communist government in China during the last 7 years."¹⁶

Judd wanted it clearly understood at this time that he was not making charges against Russia. But he did charge

¹⁴Ibid., p. 564, (Memoranda of John P. Davies, January 15, 1944).

¹⁵Walter H. Judd, "What Is the Truth about China? The Great Moral Decision of Chiang Kai-shek And The Chinese People," Vital Speeches of the Day, XI (June 1, 1945), 565.

¹⁶Ibid.

that the Communists in China, and the "Communists and fellow-travelers" in the United States, were working primarily in terms of what they believed would best serve the Soviet Union's future policies and interests. He was convinced that the "Chinese Communists" were "first Communists and second Chinese," in their thinking, just as he "knew" that "American Communists" were "first Communists and second Americans."¹⁷ Judd refuted Service's observation that:

"The Chinese Communists have a background of subservience to the U.S.S.R., but new influences--principally nationalism--have come into play which are modifying their outlook."¹⁸ Judd, however, believed that the Chinese Communists were loyal to the Soviet Union, whether Russia wanted their loyalty or not. He contended that the purpose of the Chinese Communists was to make "Russia overwhelmingly the strongest power in Asia as well as in Europe." This, Judd believed, would be just as bad in the long run for the Soviet Union as it would be for Asia and the United States, because a strong Russia in Europe and Asia would require enormous armaments and constant tensions and suspicions which "he hoped profoundly" would not be the situation in the post-war

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 496.

¹⁸ United States Relations with China, p. 565, (Memoranda of John Stewart Service, April 7, 1944).

world.¹⁹ His apparent misunderstanding of Marxist philosophy, that communism would take root in an industrialized state rather than an agrarian one, and of Russian communism led him to proclaim that true Marxism cannot win in China as it did in Russia. He reasoned that the communist appeal in Russia was "to the totally dispossessed, such as the serfs" and since China was not a nation of serfs--being "predominantly a nation of lower middle-class people"--communism would have no appeal to the vast Chinese population.²⁰ Judd had originally held that the Chinese Communists were "just agrarian reformers, just Chinese patriots struggling only for the freedom of China and for democracy."²¹ As late as 1942 he still believed this:

You could persuade Herbert Hoover, J. P. Morgan, and Winston Churchill to be Communists as easily as you could persuade a landowning Chinese peasant, whose ancestors have lived on one piece of land for centuries, to take the only tangible thing he has and dump it into a common pot just on the promise that around the corner will be something better.²²

In early 1945 Judd felt that if the Chinese Communists could stall along until the war in Europe ended, "then they

¹⁹Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 496.

²⁰Ibid., p. 497.

²¹Ibid., p. 496.

²²Walter H. Judd, "Behind the Conflict in the Pacific," The Journal of the National Education Association, XXXI (September, 1942), 169.

could hope for powerful support from Russia," perhaps even try for an "October revolution in the hope of getting control of all of China." But if that failed, Judd felt, the Chinese Communists could at least rebel and try to split off north China, including Manchuria--in the name of freedom, of course--and then the new "independent democracy" could "invite Russia in to protect it as she is protecting the new 'independent' governments in Eastern Europe." In the use of the terms "independent" and "democratic" Judd simply implied that the Soviet Union only moved into those areas where a political vacuum already existed. To Judd, however, the resulting new "North China" could, if it so desired, "voluntarily insist...on being taken in as one of the United socialist soviet republics." He did, however, express the opinion that the Chinese Communists had real democracy within their own party: "that is the source of much of their strength--but when it comes to extending democratic rights to those who disagree with them, their record is infinitely worse than that of the Central Government."²³

Judd strongly opposed Stilwell's proposal of arming the Communist forces and in so doing rejected the basic premise of American policy in Asia as set forth by Ludden and Service:

²³ Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 497.

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.²⁴

Judd's logic is quite apparent when he reports that the Chinese Communists tried to sell the West "a gold brick" when they tried to disseminate the report that they had to "maintain their army or be destroyed." They maintained their separate army, Judd exhorted, "to seize power after Chiang...armed them with American supplies under the pretext of unity."²⁵ Judd asserted that the Japanese had made no serious efforts "to destroy the bases of the Communists" who were "alleged to be the real anti-Japanese elements," but the Japanese launched repeated campaigns to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's bases and his armies, who according to false rumors had not been fighting the Japanese. Judd's use of the term "false rumors" referred apparently to such dispatches as Ludden's and Service's: "There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own pres-

²⁴ United States Relations with China, p. 575, (Memoranda of Raymond P. Ludden and John Stewart Service, February 14, 1945).

²⁵ Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 497.

ervation in power."²⁶ To Judd, however, no "reasonable person" could draw any conclusion other than that the Japanese were "shrewd enough to see that since it had proved most difficult to knock the Chinese [Nationalists] out by direct assault, then the best way...[was]...to weaken China...[by allowing the]...Communists to continue their work of disrupting and disunifying and discrediting the government of China, [and thus]...breaking it down from within."²⁷ Judd found Japan's greatest and most real "secret weapon" against China, and therefore against the United States, was the Chinese Communist bloc, which was "ably assisted" by some Americans, "sincere, but...greivously misguided."²⁸ These Americans, whom Judd felt were assisting the communists "willingly" or "unwillingly" in circulating "propaganda against the Government of China," were individuals in the United States War and State Department. In contrast to later belief as manifested in Asia-First sentiment of the late 1940's and early 1950's Judd believed that the Japanese must be "beaten on the mainland of Asia," which meant "huge ground forces." Late in World War II he asserted

²⁶ United States Relations with China, p. 575, (Memoranda of Raymond P. Ludden and John Stewart Service, February 14, 1945).

²⁷ Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 498.

²⁸ Ibid.

that the United States could not "beat a people just by air attack"; however, as an Asia-Firster in 1952 he argued that the Chinese Communists could be rapidly defeated solely by air-sea power and Chiang's invading forces from Formosa. This, however, is but one of the numerous contradictions which crept into the argument of those "friends of China" who are collectively known as the "Asia-Firsters," many of whom sought to explain Chiang's fall in terms of a "Great Conspiracy" within the United States State Department.

The term "Asia-First" came into common use in 1949, perhaps as a reaction to the charges of China's friends that the Administration was continuing an "Europe First" policy. Opposition to the Administration policy of neglecting Asia in favor of Europe was perhaps the most concrete concept which they held in common. Despite the nebulous character of the group they accepted other hypotheses in common but with varying intensity. As friends of China they accepted the validity of American military strategy of World War II, which was to concentrate America's principal effort on Europe while making the Pacific a secondary theater of operations. They accepted the tenet that during the Second World War the Nazi forces were unquestionably the strongest of the Axis combination. Thus the Pacific could be cared for after the defeat of the Axis in Europe. They felt, however, that the Truman-Marshall-Acheson Administration tactic of repeat-

ing this priority in the diplomatic field was wrong.

By 1949, the Asia-First element felt the United States had become the number one enemy of the Soviet Union. The United States, they reasoned, was the only barrier to the Asiatic expansion of Russia, whose empire at the time extended from Western Germany to the Pacific. They accepted the tenet that had it not been for direct American intervention and American dollars much of Western and Southern Europe would have succumbed to Kremlin domination. But, because the United States was much closer intellectually to Europe than to Asia, they argued, American major strategic interests were being sacrificed by American diplomats. It was American ideological emotionalism which fostered American preoccupation with Europe. The Russians, however, who were not emotional in their policies as was the United States, realized that America would soon again neglect the Pacific. The Soviet Union, they reasoned, impelled the United States by means of the cold war and paramilitary activity to direct its efforts toward Europe at the very time when America's real interests lay in the Pacific.

The Asia-Firsters charged that the rumors of an imminent Russian attack, periodically coming out of Europe, forced the United States to neglect the Pacific. While waging a cold war in Europe, the Soviet Union was helping to keep the shooting war going in China. This group believed that

the United States would be far more vulnerable to Soviet attack if the Soviets obtained possession of the great arc extending from the Kurile Islands to the Indian Ocean, than if she simply took over all Europe, their logic being that the Soviet Union would invade the United States through Alaska. Thus they charged that American diplomats in an effort to hold off the Russians in Europe overruled military leaders who wanted the opposite and were letting Asia sink by default to communism.²⁹

Manchuria was a strategic area, the Asia-Firsters contended, because it was the Soviet's gateway to Japan through Korea. Thus Korea was of strategic importance because of its proximity to the Japanese Islands. They declared that with the Russian advance on the mainland of Asia, America's position in Japan would deteriorate more rapidly. Japan would ultimately fall to Russian domination because of the importance of mainland Asia as an outlet for Japanese industrial goods, and because of the importance of the area to Japan as a source of raw materials. Japan's reliance on commercial intercourse with the Communists would soon force

²⁹See Constatine Brown's article, as read into the Congressional Record by Judd, "Europe-First Policy Has Weakened United States in Pacific," reprinted from Washington Sunday Star, January 2, 1949, U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 12, A23-24.

Japan to accept the Communist's form of government.

By mid-1949 the Asia-Firsters felt that war was clearly being threatened in Asia--nothing less than a third world war. To avert this catastrophe the situation in Asia must immediately be "treated as a warlike situation," Judd frequently asserted. The prevailing policy of the Democratic Administration, however, made war inevitable between the United States and the Soviet Union. The feeling that the Administration had written off not only China but all Asia continued to grow, to crystallize at a later time. First, however, Asia had to be convinced that the United States had no imperial ambitions, and second, that the United States would not allow Asia to succumb to Soviet imperialism.³⁰

³⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., XCV, Part 15, A5522. Most prominently identified with the Asia-First movement and the China lobby were Senators Patrick McCarran, Democrat of Nevada; and Joseph McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin; Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire; William F. Knowland, Republican of California; and William E. Jenner, Republican of Indiana. Military members of the lobby included General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, General Patrick Hurley, and General Clair Chennault. Civilian officials of the movement included Ambassador William C. Bullitt; Pennsylvania Governor George A. Earle; Walter Robertson, Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Clare Boothe Luce. Private citizens included Alfred Kohlberg, an importer of Chinese lace handkerchiefs; Henry R. Luce, Publisher of Time, Inc.; William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester Union-Leader; and author Freda Uteley. The most influential member of the Asia-First movement in the House of Representatives was Walter H. Judd.

In contrast with Europe, the American approach when intervening in the Pacific in general, and in China in particular, had never been as complete. The Asia-Firsters demanded a whole-hearted pro-Nationalist intervention. They sought a top-priority American commitment to the success of the Nationalist regime. The Administration, however, due to prevailing conditions in China, felt it could only continue the half-century-old sentimental verbalization about the "territorial and administrative integrity of China." Despite all its noble protestations, the United States had never committed itself to the unification of China under any particular regime to the point of running much risk of war on account of China; perhaps a possible exception could be found in the months just prior to Pearl Harbor. But this perhaps resulted more from the anxiety about the fate of the British Empire and the rubber and tin of Southeast Asia than from a pressing concern to save China or the Nationalist regime.³¹

In the years following Pearl Harbor, when China came more to the forefront in the American press, the decaying Nationalist regime began losing the admiration of many Americans, even some of its old friends. The United States,

³¹Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 121.

devoted to winning the war in Europe first, was unable properly to assist Chiang in establishing control over all of China and Manchuria. The unexpectedly sudden end of the war further prevented the United States from doing incidentally for Chiang what was desired during the year prior to V-J Day. Not surprisingly, then, the United States was unwilling to do for Chiang Kai-shek after the war that which the Europe-first priorities did for Europe. Indecisiveness about Asian strategy had characterized American policy throughout the war because of the complex situations which existed in Asia and which did not exist in Europe. As a direct result, American support for the Nationalists took on the same low-priority status after the war, without turning into total abandonment.³² By late 1948 and early 1949, with Western and Southern Europe relatively safe from Russian domination, and Chiang's surrendering the Presidency of the Republic of China, the Asia-First element became more vocal in their demands for top priority for Asia in general and China in particular.

The Asia-Firster was willing to accept Hurley's dictum that "America's failure in China...[was] the result of America's surrender of principles in the Secret Yalta agree-

³² Ibid.

ment."³³ "Clearly and unmistakably," Hurley charged, "the fundamental principles that have made America the greatest unit on the face of the earth, and on which our policy in China was based--individual rights and self-government--were surrendered in secret agreements at Yalta."³⁴ By 1949 Hurley felt free to charge: "American diplomats and the imperialists and Communists who opposed self-government and liberty contended that the policy that I was making effective in China was my own policy and not that of the United States." Hurley's own failure and mistakes in China were far enough in the past to allow him to ask: "Why did the American policy in China fail? What is the cause underlying the Communist conquest of China? What is the cause of the failure of the Government of the Republic in China?"³⁵ Hurley proclaimed, despite his inability to explain it, that there was a "vast discrepancy between our announced foreign policy and our actual foreign policy."³⁶ Judd saw in Hurley "the agent in China of President Roosevelt's successful policy of supporting the Chinese Government, and who resigned rather than be the tool of those who were determined to change that pol-

³³U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 12, A1344.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. A1345.

icy to one of forcing peace and unity with the Communist rebellion in China."³⁷

On March 7, 1949, Judd declared that it was "popular nowadays for the architects and apologists of American foreign policy in China during the last few years to try to explain its catastrophic failure by laying all the blame on the inept, incompetent, inefficient, and corrupt Chinese Government and on the immoral Russians." It is not that simple, Judd asserted: "It is not enough to announce that the Chinese have lost the will to fight." The important questions to Judd were: "First, Why have the [Chinese] lost it [morale to fight] after almost 20 years of valiant resistance against Japan and more than 20 against Communists; and second, How can it be restored."³⁸ Both Judd and Hurley were willing to accept their view that American "Communists and fellow travelers" alone were responsible for the condemnation of the Republic of China in our foreign affairs."³⁹ Likewise, Judd was willing to accept, as were many of the Asia-Firsters, Hurley's observation that the United States was "operating in a power bloc," and "There is but one thing certain about a power alliance, and that is historically

³⁷Ibid., p. A1344.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., p. A1345.

speaking, power blocs have always led to war."⁴⁰ Judd and the Asia-Firsters did not condemn "power blocs" per se; they condemned only those which included Communist powers. This "power bloc" as described by the Asia-Firsters had its conception in the supposedly "secret agreement" at Yalta, the conference which set in motion the forces which were ultimately to lead to China's fall to "international Communism,"⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ That part of the Yalta Agreement which Administration critics and Asia-Firsters delighted in referring to as the "secret agreement" which pertained to China and Japan included:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved:

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

- (a) The southern part of Sakhalin, as well as all the islands adjacent to it, shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

- (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored,

- (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin. Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History (7th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 492-93.

a preliminary step in the eventual move to try for the conquest of the United States by the Communist bloc.

What did this agreement do to China? The Asia-First group charged that at Yalta the United States, in violation of the Atlantic Charter, agreed to the aggrandizement of Russian territory to include the Kurile Islands, half of Sakhalin, and the surrounding islands. Furthermore, it charged that in violation of both the Atlantic Charter and the territorial integrity of China, the United States agreed at Yalta to the internationalization of the port of Dairen. The United States also agreed to give Russia the "pre-eminent interest" in Dairen which Russia immediately translated into exclusive right. In addition, the United States agreed to give Russia a half interest in the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways. This the Soviet Union immediately construed to mean an exclusive right to the control of the railways. As if all these concessions to the Soviet Union, in violation of the Atlantic Charter, were not enough, the Asia-Firsters asserted, the United States further agreed that all these concessions to Russia by China would be concurred in by China and the American President would "take measures in order to obtain concurrence on advice from Stalin."⁴²

⁴²U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 12, A1344; see also Commager, Documents of American History, p. 493.

Thus Judd and his cohorts charged that at Yalta the United States surrendered not only the principles of the Atlantic Charter, but also every element of the traditional American policy in China, and greatly threatened America's security. President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta, they asserted; he was duped. Had he not supported Chiang loyally for five years? Had President Roosevelt not contributed greatly to the prestige and world influence of China by insisting on granting China great-power status? Also, had he not insisted that China should be one of the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, with veto power? It then had to be someone near the President who was sabotaging the traditional spirit of the United States toward Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The group, however, could not cite exactly the names of the individuals whom they considered responsible for the so-called American diplomatic debacle at Yalta. They completely rejected, perhaps with more logical reasoning, the view that a motive for the Yalta concession was a desire to hold Russian East Asian gains to the limits which the Czars had formerly held. They further rejected the idea that President Roosevelt and his advisers sought at Yalta Russian support for Chiang Kai-shek, or at least for a coalition between the Nationalists and Communists in which the Kuomintang would preponderate over the Chinese Communists. But to Judd, Yalta was only the

beginning for "those who were determined to change" Roosevelt's original policy "to one of forcing peace and unity with the Communist rebellion in China--a policy which led to conquest by the Communists."⁴³

To the Asia-First element, the Yalta agreement was not the sole reason for the plight of Chiang's China. American Communists, both at home and abroad, they saw as the source of the propaganda which branded the Republic of China as a corrupt regime. Hurley could simplify the charges against the Kuomintang regime to: "Our Communists and fellow travelers in the United States condemn the Republic of China because it is too weak after its years of vicissitudes to punish its malefactors."⁴⁴ The Asia-Firsters believed that this was but part of the story. They would readily agree that the Republic of China was weak, inefficient, and corrupt, but they were thoroughly convinced that Chiang was the choice of the populace, and without doubt he was best for American interests. Thus, they could continue to argue that Chiang's regime could be nothing but weak, inefficient, and corrupt, after nearly forty years of revolution and civil war, illiteracy and poverty, oppression and exploitation,

⁴³U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 12, A1344.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. A1345.

and seven years of war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was viewed as the successor of Sun Yat-sen, and as such was ordained to lead that element in China whose purpose it was to establish in China "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Chiang Kai-shek chose to sustain the ideals of individual liberty and self-government against imperialism and communism--but these could not be gained overnight, the Asia-Firsters argued.

To the great dismay of Judd and many of the pro-Chiang element, Hurley resigned his post as Ambassador to China on November 27, 1945, amid growing criticism in the United States Foreign Service circles regarding the role that he was assuming in China.⁴⁵ Hurley's replacement, General

⁴⁵ It appeared at the time of Japan's surrender on August 14, 1945, that the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist forces were nearing a compromise. The following day, August 15, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched a memorandum to Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an, requesting that he come to Chungking to discuss "many international and internal problems." Out of the ensuing six weeks conference among Chiang, Hurley, and Mao came the agreement that a Political Consultative Conference, eventually set for January 10, 1946, should be called. When Mao returned to Yen-an on October 11, it was reported that the two sides were in general agreement, except on the government of areas liberated from Japanese control by the Chinese Communists. Mao, however, said "there are great difficulties, but they can be overcome." Fighting between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists, aided by American forces, continued. United States Relations with China, p. 38.

George C. Marshall, held the title of Special Representative of the President in China, with the personal rank of Ambassador. Immediately after release from his post, Hurley attacked the State Department and professional Foreign Service men in China by asserting that old hands of the Foreign Service in China were supporting the Chinese Communists and that the United States was permitting itself to be "sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism."⁴⁶ Hurley, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1945, cited five career diplomats who he considered were undermining United States policy in China. He identified them as George A. Atcheson, Jr., John S. Service, John Davies, Fulton Freeman and Arthur Ringwalt.⁴⁷

Prior to Hurley's resignation there was already a growing demand that American forces still overseas be returned home immediately. Both Judd and Hurley opposed the removal of American forces from China, believing that they should be retained until the internal problem was settled by victory for Chiang. On October 11, 1945, Mike Mansfield, a Democrat from Montana, who had served in East Asia as a

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 30.

Marine during the early 1920's,⁴⁸ urged from the House floor: "Now that the war with Japan is ended the best thing that we could do would be to withdraw all our forces from China just as soon as we possibly can and to allow the Chinese to settle their own internal affairs."⁴⁹ The defeat of Japan did not terminate American responsibility in Asia, however, because to Judd the war in Asia was not yet over. He declared that the "first reason" why the United States must continue its "long-standing" policy of support of the Nationalist Government of China was "national honor." This included not only expelling the remaining Japanese from China, but the restoration of Manchuria to Nationalist control: "whether we win the war there so it will stay won will be determined by what pattern ultimately dominates in the development of China." He opposed the removal of American marines and supplies from China until Mao's forces were defeated and the country firmly back in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek. To Judd it was of "urgent necessity" to the future security of the United States to prevent a seri-

⁴⁸ Mansfield, speaking of Judd on the House floor in April 1944, said: "I have a high regard for the gentleman and consider him one of the outstanding authorities on the Far East in the entire country." U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, Part 3, 3552.

⁴⁹ U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 7, 9629.

ous civil war in China.⁵⁰ Thus he urged the United States to continue its support of the Chiang regime,

...the same government our other allies have promised to support. Russia, for example, has pledged both moral and material assistance to that government, so she certainly cannot and will not object to our assisting it too.⁵¹

Judd apparently was willing to take seriously the Sino-Soviet Agreement of November 27, 1945; however, he viewed all agitation or demands throughout the United States for withdrawal from China as part of the plot of American Communists to aid the Chinese Communists. He rejected the argument of those Americans who opposed active intervention in China's internal affairs with his commonly stated analogy:

If some should claim that to support the Chinese Government is intervening in China's internal affairs, surely they know that it is not possible for any nation with such power as ours to escape having enormous influence on one side or the other in any major issue in the world, whatever we do or don't do. If our influence is not on one side, then automatically it is on the other. If we refuse to assist our Chinese ally, we thereby assist the rebellion which is trying to overthrow that ally.⁵²

Thus Judd argued that if the United States did not continue its present policy in China it would be an inter-

⁵⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 9, A107.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. A108.

⁵²*Ibid.*

vention on the Communist side. He supported President Truman's action when the President reaffirmed American commitments to the Chiang Kai-shek Government on December 15, 1945. Judd felt that this would "enable General Marshall and all of us to cut through the fog of claims and counterclaims and get the facts as to who in China really wants unity and who does not."⁵³ At this time Judd stated that if the Chinese Communists agreed to becoming a political party without an autonomous army, and "Chiang refuses to establish a democratic government with legal and equal status for all parties, then he is exposed, and ought to be." Likewise, if Chiang was willing to establish such a government, and the Chinese Communists were unwilling to give up their separate army and government and become a "loyal opposition instead of an armed rebellion, then their pretenses are exposed."⁵⁴ Later, however, Judd was to charge that this Presidential address was a "sellout." Judd held the sincere belief that it was "Chiang's desire to achieve a unified democratic China without further warfare."⁵⁵ Judd apparently believed that Chiang was in complete control of the Nationalist forces and that he had a free hand in determining the decisions of the Na-

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

tionalist Government. He repeatedly stressed the idea that unless there was clear evidence that the Nationalist Government was not acting in good faith, then "every consideration of honor and of intelligent, legitimate self-interest requires" that the United States continue, without wavering, the support of that Government in finishing the war. At the time, he asserted, the United States must insist that every effort be made to achieve "unity and democratic reform in a strong, independent, friendly China." Throughout his Congressional career Judd refused to sway from the conviction: "If there are risks in supporting Chiang Kai-shek, there are far greater risks in not supporting him."⁵⁶ Judd maintained that Chiang Kai-shek and most of the Kuomintang leaders labored with steadfast determination to establish a real democracy in China at the earliest practicable moment.⁵⁷ The Generalissimo was, in Judd's thinking, the best alternative for a pro-American China. Thus fully committed to Chiang Kai-shek, Judd was unwilling to sanction any move by the United States which would jeopardize the Nationalist regime.

Despite the agreement to organize immediately a coalition government as provided by the Political Consultative

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 11, A2282.

Conference which opened on January 10, 1946, at Chungking, fighting continued between the Nationalist and Communist forces. On February 15, while the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee was meeting to consider the resolution adopted by the Political Consultative Conference of January, the Chinese Communist Party demanded joint control of Manchuria along with the Nationalist Government. On the same day Marshall, returning to the United States from China, reported that the situation in Manchuria was "extremely critical."⁵⁸ While in the United States Marshall appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report on his activities in China.⁵⁹ Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut, declared in 1951, in regard to Marshall's appearance and the Truman China policy as formulated in 1945-1946: "there wasn't a single word of criticism, as far as I have been able to pursue...from any member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat or Republican, regard-

⁵⁸ United States Relations with China, pp. 39-40.

⁵⁹ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 447. This was Marshall's answer to Senator McMahon's question in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Service and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 569-70. Hereafter cited as Senate Committee on Armed Service and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings. Tsou declares that the veracity of Marshall's statement has never been challenged by anyone." Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 477.

ing the policy that was followed in China, nor a single suggestion of a change of policy that is contained in the hearings of this committee over the years that I have been able to examine." Later on the same day McMahon declared: "I make it without fear of contradiction, that in the years between '47 and '49 there was not a single, solitary suggestion made for the formation of policy, change of policy, or disagreement with policy [on China] by any member of this [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee."⁶⁰ Even though neither Democrat nor Republican in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee condemned the existing China policy, Judd was voicing opposition to the "American policy enunciated by Secretary of State Marshall in regard to China." The crux of Marshall's activities, as Judd viewed it, was the withholding of real assistance to China until internal difficulties with the Communists were settled. Judd had reached the conclusion by 1947 that the "Communist aim is not to compromise with the Chinese Nationalist government but to take over control of China." Judd thus argued that the Marshall plan for long-range aid to Europe is "doomed to fail if the Communist threat in China is not eliminated."⁶¹

⁶⁰Senate Committee on Armed Service and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, pp. 1905-06.

⁶¹Minneapolis Star, November 28, 1947.

Bitter criticism and dissent by Judd on the Truman policy came later--much later--when it became clear that the Nationalists could not withstand the Chinese Communists' onslaught. On May 17, 1946, Judd read into the Congressional Record a statement entitled "Manchurian Manifesto" which was signed by himself and fifty-nine other Americans. Although the statement made no direct attacks on Marshall's policies and activities in the Pacific, Judd did declare that some individuals interested in Asia were having difficulties in keeping silent with respect to recent developments in China. They were, however, "hoping against hope General Marshall could somehow achieve unity in China without sacrifice of the principles" for which the United States and China fought the war. Judd expressed the sentiment that neither he nor the individuals signing the "Manifesto" wanted to embarrass Marshall or to give "any possible ground for any group of Chinese or for Russia to claim provocation from America as an alibi for refusal to cooperate loyally toward genuine unification in China."⁶² The "Manifesto" declared that although the ominous crisis which was unfolding in Manchuria had not reached the diplomatic showdown stage, it promised the signers' support of "the demand of the Chinese people

⁶²U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 11, A2763; Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 447.

for a complete revision of the Yalta Agreement."⁶³ The "Manifesto" did, however, sharply criticize Russian action in Manchuria as a "flagrant violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and the Yalta Agreement."⁶⁴ This was one of the first indications that Judd was growing suspicious of the Russians.

The first real sign of open opposition to the Truman policy from the Republican camp in the House did not come from Judd but from Clare Booth Luce, of Connecticut, who on July 26, 1946, inserted in the Record a letter sent to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. The letter was prompted by rumors of an alleged statement of Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, supposedly made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 19, "promising American training and supplies to Chinese Communist armies prior to their incorporation" into the Nationalist army.⁶⁵ The group urged that no aid or support be given to the Chinese Communists because such a move they felt was unwise and contrary to America's best interest. Mrs. Luce, speaking for the thirty-eight signatories, stated that the recent appointment of Dr.

⁶³U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 11, A2764.

⁶⁴Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 447.

⁶⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 12, A4495.

John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University in Peiping, as United States Ambassador to China, had inspired hope among many American friends of the Chinese people. She further commented that "Dr. Stuart's task will not be made any easier and may be rendered impossible...if our policy toward our Chinese ally continues to blow hot and cold, varying with every different whim of Washington bureaucracy."⁶⁶

The letter also criticized President Truman's statement of December 15, 1945, the statement which Judd had hailed as a noble gesture, as "an invitation for the Communists to blackmail the Central Government," for it appeared to give the Chinese Communists a virtual veto power by which they could prevent any American aid to Chiang unless the Chinese Communists were accepted. The communication, however, declared that the criticism of President Truman's policy implied "no reflection on General Marshall."⁶⁷

In contrast to Republican sentiment in the House, the attitude of the Republicans in the Senate was still favorable to the Democratic China policy. On July 8, the New York Times quoted Owen Brewster, Main Republican and a member of the Special Committee to Investigate the National

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. A4494-95.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. A4495.

Defense Program, as saying: "the Republican Party will go along with General Marshall in the Chinese situation."⁶⁸ Only a few isolated complaints about Truman's Asian policy came from the Republican camp, but the President was having difficulties in other quarters. Labor troubles, rising cost of living, and a hostile Congress on domestic issues were all causing the President's prestige to sink even lower. This discontent resulted in a resounding Republican victory in the election of 1946 and in a Republican controlled Congress.

To complicate matters further for the President, on November 19 the Chinese Communists broke off further negotiations with the Kuomintang and rejected all American mediation. By the end of the month fighting had resumed and China was braced for full-scale war. On December 4 the Chinese Communists notified General Marshall that they would not negotiate until, as they charged, the "illegal" National Assembly, which had convened on November 15, and which had been boycotted by the Communists and a majority of third-party representatives, was dissolved. They also demanded that the Nationalist troops be withdrawn to positions they

⁶⁸ New York Times, July 8, 1946, p. 10; Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 447.

held on January 13, 1946.⁶⁹ Marshall, realizing the Chinese Communist strength, met with Chiang on December 1, and warned him that the Communist forces were too strong to defeat militarily. He further suggested that negotiations offered the only sensible way to avert a complete collapse of the country's economy. On December 18, however, President Truman reaffirmed American belief in a "united and democratic China," but was unwilling to commit himself or the United States beyond asserting that the United States would continue avoiding involvement in Chinese civil strife while "helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country."⁷⁰

The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and President Truman's request for \$400,000,000 in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, on March 12, 1947,⁷¹ was a most opportune time for "friends of China" in Congress to challenge the President's policy toward China.⁷² During House debate on the President's message on March 12, Judd took the occasion to criticize Marshall: "Whatever our inten-

⁶⁹ United States Relations with China, p. 41.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCIII, Part 3, 1980-81.

⁷² Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 449.

tions were, has not our policy resulted in weakening our ally, the Government of China and strengthening the Communist minority?"⁷³ Judd asked Massachusetts Democrat John

McCormack:

Does not the gentleman feel also that as we stand today at this crossroad we should add to our sense of grave responsibility a sense of regret that in some degree we have been assisting a Communist minority in China in its efforts to overthrow the Chinese Government, which with all its weaknesses has steadfastly refused to yield to such internal and external pressures as today threaten Greece and Turkey? ⁷⁴

McCormack, former majority leader, had by this time modified his stand of full support for Chiang Kai-shek, and was urging immediate aid to Greece and Turkey. The Democratic leader answered Judd with: "I can assure the gentleman there is no assistance being given to the Communists in China. I believe that when there is more representative government established there, that affirmative action along the lines that the gentleman and I would agree upon should be extended over there."⁷⁵

Judd, who had received a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee with the opening of the Eightieth Congress in 1947, had the opportunity to question Acting Secretary of

⁷³U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCIII, Part 3, 1984.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

State Dean Acheson on American China policy,⁷⁶ during hearings on the assistance to Greece and Turkey, on April 18, 1947. He asked Acheson how he could explain "what seems to be a contradiction in foreign policy." "If," Judd asked, "it is a wise policy for us to urge, for example, the Government of China to unite with organized Communist minorities there, why is it a wise policy to assist the Greek Government to fight against the same sort of armed Communist minorities in Greece?"⁷⁷ Acheson replied (surely, with all due causticity) that he did not think it was as Judd stated: "In China, as you know far better than I because you are an expert on that matter, [sting!] the area controlled by the Communists is an area which the Communists have controlled for many years, perhaps up to 20 years....In that area they have a government, for years, which has defied the authority of the Central Government and maintained its own authority."⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Marshall had been recalled from China on January 6, 1947, to report in person on the China situation. The following day President Truman announced nomination of Marshall as Secretary of State, replacing James F. Byrnes. He took office on January 21, 1947. During March and April he was representing the United States at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

⁷⁷ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 16. Hereafter cited as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistance to Greece and Turkey Hearings.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

The following day, however, Acheson corrected this mistake by pointing out that the Communists forces did not move into Shensi Province until 1935 or 1936,⁷⁹ and further declared that "those people who lightly describe our attitude toward China as a hands-off policy do not accurately describe it."⁸⁰ The Acting Secretary of State described to Judd the essence of lend-lease aid, surplus property, services, and loans, which the United States had provided to the Nationalist Government since September 2, 1945, which amounted to \$2,369,000,000. Judd did not question Acheson's statistics.⁸¹ Acheson concluded his remarks to Judd by explaining that the position of the Chinese Nationalist Government was not the same as that of the Greek Government. The former was not approaching collapse, Acheson asserted, nor was it threatened by defeat by the Communists at the present time, because the war in China was progressing much as it had for the last twenty years. On March 21, during the hearings, Judd again attempted to make the China question the center of the issue until Acheson retorted:

You talk as though the Chinese did us a great favor to bend their efforts to defeat the Japanese. That is not the case at all. Any nation that is worthy

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 48.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

of the name will spend all its efforts in defeating its foreign enemy. We did not have to go to China and urge them not to dissipate their efforts in internal warfare when they had an enemy occupying three-quarters of their territory or half of their territory. ⁸²

Later in the year, on November 12, 1947, during House hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, Judd asked Marshall's opinion on Acheson's testimony of April 17. ⁸³ Marshall simply responded to Judd's question whether this description was still accurate with: "No: I do not think it is. There has been a great deterioration." ⁸⁴ Marshall did not comment further on Acheson's statement; however, Acheson's conclusions did seem a reasonable appraisal of the China and the Greek situation in early 1947. Throughout these hearings Judd was most concerned that three elements which he deemed necessary for success in the Greek-Turkish program be provided: money, correct planning, and the right kind of personnel to administer the program. ⁸⁵ He maintained that

⁸² Ibid., p. 49.

⁸³ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Emergency Foreign Aid, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 24. Hereafter cited as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings.

⁸⁴ Tsou charges in his volume, America's Failure in China, p. 499, that Marshall severely criticized Acheson's description of the Chinese situation as not being serious in comparison to the Greek situation. This charge cannot be supported by evidence in the Hearings.

⁸⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 101.

technical experts from private business or professions should be used extensively to carry out the objectives; though he felt that both Government and private personnel had a role in administering the program, "it ought not to be dominated by regular Government employees, who have become conditioned to a certain pattern of thinking, as all of us know."⁸⁶ Judd was charging here that Government employees deliberately prolonged any job that they undertook to insure their employment. Judd supported the proposed aid because he felt that the need was obvious, but emphasized that he considered that the appropriation of the money should give more than some "psychological stimulus."

Judd viewed the aid, however, as a "stop-gap" measure, whereby the United States would have time to "correct"⁸⁷ or redirect its efforts to deal with such situations in the future.⁸⁸ It appears that Judd felt that President Truman's proposals for Greece amounted to a function of the United Nations or the International Bank, while aid to China was an obligation of the United States to insure American security,

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 155.

⁸⁷Judd's concept of the United Nations appears on the surface to be in contradiction of his other political concepts. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

⁸⁸House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 82.

and a response to the "law of history." This law of history developed over a period of decades from the endless stories related by returned missionaries of their success and the task yet to be carried out, which fostered the sentiment that salvation of the Chinese was the special mission of the United States.⁸⁹ This emotion made its way into endless speeches by politicians of the modern era of which Judd was a pioneer. America found it easy to see behind the voice of Judd a selfless, altogether dedicated man who had seen China suffer and who had suffered with it.⁹⁰ The impact not only in religious but in political circles was tremendous. Was not the religious faith of the Generalissimo a product of the American missionary? Judd spoke frequently of Chiang's Christian faith and his prayer habit. Thus within such a sphere Judd could rationalize:

In a sense, if one wants to be cynical, Chiang Kai-shek has made only two mistakes. One was that he did not give up at the end of the first three months of the war...The second mistake...is that

⁸⁹ Eric F. Goldman, writing on this subject, states: "Over the years the attitude was spoken from a thousand pulpits by missionaries returning from China with fervid reports of how many more Chinese had chopped off their pigtaails, learned to wear pants, or marched to the baptismal font." Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 116.

⁹⁰ Ibid.; Charles Wertenbaker, "The China Lobby; III---Voices In the Wilderness," The Reporter, VI (April 15, 1952), 13.

he did not completely clean out the Communists in 1938 and 1939, when some of his generals wanted him to.⁹¹

This was a theme which Judd never tired of and which colored his thinking and speaking for years to come. Under such circumstances Judd collected and read into the Congressional Record articles of anyone whose views on China remotely approached his own.

On May 23, 1947, for example, Judd inserted in the Congressional Record an article written by Frank W. Price, of the Price Committee with which Judd had associated himself during 1938-1941.⁹² On inserting the article Judd commented: "So much of what has come out of China in the last few years has been superficial, primarily journalistic, or inspired propaganda with a purpose, that it is a pleasure to read something from one who knows what he is talking about."⁹³ Price declared that "China's liberals are moving into a key position," and "are working for a unified, democratic, modernized, and prosperous China, independent in its foreign

⁹¹Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 500.

⁹²Frank Wilson Price, "China's Liberals Get Their Chance," The Christian Century, LXIV (May 14, 1947), 622-24. See also Frank Wilson Price, "How Strong are China's Liberals?" The Christian Century, LXIV (June 18, 1947), 764-66.

⁹³U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIII, Part 11, A3438.

policy but cooperating fully with the United Nations."⁹⁴ It was this liberal element, Price asserted, that Marshall strengthened, but which he has not been properly honored for. He felt that the "liberals are the men and women who will ultimately bring about a Chinese solution of China's problem."⁹⁵ Dr. Price, who saw Chiang as a sincere and honest friend of this force, had great hope that this liberal element would gain control of the government with Chiang at its helm. He, however, cautioned that the narrow-minded conservatives who had opposed coalition government were once again moving into the inner councils of the Kuomintang party. But he felt that the progressive wing of the Kuomintang was ready to fight as hard as ever for its principles, "even if it has to break away and form a new party."⁹⁶ Price expressed his belief that the Generalissimo was an individual sincerely dedicated to constitutional and democratic government.

In contrast, Carsun Chang, one of the "liberals" of whom Price spoke, wrote in the early 1950's, that John S. Service's report to the State Department dated June 29, 1944, accurately and fairly well summarized the situation in

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. A2438-39.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. A2439.

China.⁹⁷ Service reported that the "Generalissimo shows a...loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views." He further declared that Chiang's "growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be sage as well as leader...have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals who enjoy in China a position of unique influence."⁹⁸ Chang points out that because the "Generalissimo is emotional, his policy changes with his temper."⁹⁹ Furthermore, to Chang the attitudes of Chiang Kai-shek had always been "strange" in regard to coalition government: "When he [Chiang Kai-shek] did not care for the idea of democracy or constitutional government, he dealt with the 'outside parties' as if they were enemies or criminals, and would not even allow them to enjoy freedom of press, association, or assembly." But, Chang continued, when Chiang "felt he needed a coalition, he would suddenly ask them [outside parties] to join his government and take up this or that portfolio."¹⁰⁰ Any minister, Chang charged, who was in "Chiang's favor...could go to his office and get a large

⁹⁷ Carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952) p. 98.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 99-100.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 233.

sum approved for expenditure," but those "ministers who were not close to him had to suffer."¹⁰¹ Chang viewed Chiang Kai-shek as an individual who had "confidence only in his relatives, in his brothers-in-law, H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, and their subordinates," and a few other select personalities. Tutelage under Chiang, Chang asserted, "was not even rule by the party as a whole but [had] degenerated to rule by personal whim."¹⁰²

Judd refuted all Chang's charges. By thus accepting the tenet that Chiang Kai-shek was basically honest and desired a truly democratic government for China, he had to find an explanation for Chiang's lack of success outside China. Thus with true conviction Judd could assert that one "prolific source of misinformation" about China "has been those American military and civilian officials who failed in China, but who are not willing to admit frankly their own miscalculations and mistakes, and instead seek to justify themselves by placing all the blame on the Chinese." To Judd any "sensible person" would give "more credence to the reports and views of those who succeeded [in China] than those who failed and quite understandably are deeply hurt

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁰²Ibid.

inside.¹⁰³ Was not the State Department and the Democratic Administration the most logical scape-goat?

The Democratic Administration in Judd's thinking failed in projecting the United States into a position of world leadership; "if you cannot escape the world and you cannot run the world, cannot buy it, what alternative is there left except to join the world, yes, lead the world." This was the "great job pressed upon America," because to Judd the world was "in economic, moral, and political chaos and ruin," and the United States was the "only area that is still reasonably sound." The United States was the "sanctuary of the universe," the only country with the "moral character," or "moral reputation" to lead the world.¹⁰⁴ By mid-1947, when Judd was making these assertions he felt that even though it was too late to save Eastern Europe short of war, "which the United States wouldn't use," it was not too late to save Asia, though the United States had already turned Manchuria over to the Soviet Union "in a secret conference" at Yalta.¹⁰⁵ Judd had not yet arrived, but was moving rapidly on his own initiative toward the "Great Conspiracy"

¹⁰³ U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 12, A4490.

¹⁰⁴ National Education Association, Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1947), 46.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

camp as an explanation for current United States relations with China. Nor had he yet accepted the "pro-Communist" theory which declared that the sympathies of many administrators were with the Communist forces in Asia, but not necessarily in sympathy with the Communist cause in Europe. Judd failed or refused to comprehend the Administration's fear that the civil war in China had all the potential of a giant abyss from which the United States could not retreat once it further involved itself, and which could imperil American efforts at resisting communism in Europe, which did not have the suicidal implications of the Chinese situation.

Judd could not accept the possibility that major differences existed between Europe and China. George F. Kennan charges that nothing that could be pointed to "in the way of differences between the problems and situations of the two areas--neither the primitiveness of the existing industrial base in China, nor the unpromising nature of the political background, nor any of the other gaps that existed in China's ability to absorb and use effectively outside financial capital--could shake his [Judd's] belief, and that of many other people, that the principles invoked to govern our relationship to Europe ought to have universalized valid-

ity."¹⁰⁶ Marshall attempted to impress Judd with this concept during hearings on European Emergency Foreign Aid during November 1947; however, Judd replied to Marshall that China's problem is "primarily military."¹⁰⁷ To Judd's questioning whether military assistance would be given to the Chinese Nationalist Government similar to that given to the Greek Government, Marshall replied: "We sent 40 officers to Greece with a few men to help with the ordinary administrative procedure...also [the United States] sent certain material to Greece"; however, the United States had in "China...hundreds of officers with the Chinese Army, to assist the Chinese Government in their military organization." The number "approaches 1,000," Marshall declared.¹⁰⁸

Judd, who had just returned from China the week before the hearings, related to Marshall that the Chinese were "going through a process of reevaluation of their position." He asserted that he had been asked by "a good many thoughtful and eminent Chinese people," if the United States took such a position with respect to European nations which are threatened by Communist minorities and "does not take such

¹⁰⁶ George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 353.

¹⁰⁷ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 23.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

a position with respect to China when it is threatened by a Communist minority," if the reason is "because the Chinese are of a different color than the Europeans?"¹⁰⁹ Marshall scoffed at Judd's request to give the Chinese leaders "flat reassurance" that "racial reasons" were not the reason why the United States did not give China the full, unlimited, and no-strings-attached aid which they apparently desired. The Secretary retorted that "the people of China have been very critical of their own government," and that a great deal had to be done first by the Nationalist leaders in correcting given situations before it would be possible for the United States to do much for China. Judd's reply was:

It is very difficult for the responsible leaders in that country to throw away the support they have unless they are sure they will get our support in its place. It is very important that we make it clear that if they do meet certain conditions we will certainly come in and help.¹¹⁰

Judd spoke as if the absolute domination of China was one of Chiang's irrevocable rights. Judd's clarion call rationalized and accepted the partially corrupt Chiang regime because he saw only two alternatives possible for China-- Chiang or Mao. It is most difficult to ascertain exactly what Judd wanted or expected the United States to do for

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

China. No rational, logical or constructive program was advanced by the Minnesota Representative. It appears that he expected miracles from State Department officials while he spoke only in generalities of how these miracles might be executed. With credulous acceptance Judd viewed Chiang as genuinely desirous of reform.

On the second day of the hearings, Judd told Marshall: "We have repeatedly told the Chinese Government that unless they do so and so we will not help them. Have we told them that if they do so and so we will help them, with cooperation?"¹¹¹ On this occasion, as was so frequently the case, Judd was over dramatizing the procedures which the Democratic Administration employed in working with Chiang Kai-shek. The State Department, to Judd's thinking, continuously failed to afford Chiang the prestige due the head of a sovereign state. Judd continuously chose when there were differences of opinion between the State Department and Chiang Kai-shek to believe Chiang rather than State Department officials, and in this sense he deserves the title "apologist" for Chiang. Neither Judd nor Chiang would support or accept any American policy that might thwart, limit, or endanger the Generalissimo's position in China. There is much basis for the charge against Judd that he would "strain the hypo-

¹¹¹ Ibid.

thetical gnat--while swallowing the camel" in his belief in Chiang Kai-shek. Judd refused to accept the possibility that the very thing for which Chiang stood--arbitrary government--was the very basis of discontent among the Chinese populace. To Judd, however, Chiang had served the best interest of the Chinese masses, whether they realized it or not, since he rose to power. Thus, it was ingratitude and misunderstanding that led to the discontent, because Chiang had overcome major obstacles in the past, and would in the future, and would provide for the Chinese a democratic government. Furthermore, to Judd, the best interest and security of the United States rested upon support of Chiang Kai-shek.

During mid-1947 Chiang Kai-shek requested three different large-scale loans which were "absolutely necessary" for China's salvation.¹¹² The Truman Administration rejected the Chinese request because of the prevailing opinion that any large-scale aid to China would be largely wasted. However, to conciliate Republican critics of its China policy and win support for the European program, the Administration had to make some gesture toward China, giving assistance that would be "subtle enough to avoid appearance of open

¹¹² Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 452; United States Relations with China, pp. 364-68.

intervention in the Chinese civil war and inexpensive enough not to be a drain on American resources."¹¹³ Perhaps the most significant concession made to pacify the Republicans was the announcement on July 11, 1947, of the selection of General Albert C. Wedemeyer for a "fact-finding" mission to China. The General later reported that he agreed to go under the impression that he "had been appointed not simply to give a superficially 'new look' to our China policy but to provide the basis for a fundamental change."¹¹⁴ The General stated in 1951 during hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Service, that his selection was at the "instigation of Congressman Judd."¹¹⁵ Wedemeyer, however, wrote in 1958 that Marshall "admitted that pressure in Congress (from Congressman Walter Judd, Senator Styles Bridges, and others) and from other sources accusing to the Administration of pursuing a negative policy in China were compelling a reappraisal of U.S. policy."¹¹⁶

Wedemeyer's recollections often conflicted with those

¹¹³Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 453.

¹¹⁴Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), p. 383.

¹¹⁵Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, pp. 2296, 2312.

¹¹⁶Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 382.

of other American officials, particularly Ambassador Stuart, regarding his mission, regardless of charges which might be hurled at either side. Wedemeyer was most careful at a later date to leave the impression that Chiang was genuinely interested in seeking out and correcting existing evils within the Kuomintang, an impression which cannot be supported by responsible documentation. On September 2, however, the Nationalist Premier Chang Ch'un reported in an exclusive interview with the United Press that there would be "no change in either the domestic or foreign policy of the Chinese Government as a result of the Wedemeyer Mission."¹¹⁷ A chief reason for such a reaction against Wedemeyer may have been that he "failed to sweeten his criticism by any hint of the positive recommendations for large-scale aid which he had by that time decided to make."¹¹⁸ A more fundamental reason, however, was that any "sweeping reform would have militated [against] the vested interests of the ruling groups and probably would have destroyed the whole foundation of its power."¹¹⁹ In reality Wedemeyer, like so many other Americans, could not imagine a China without

¹¹⁷ United States Relations with China, p. 815, (Memoranda, "The Consul General at Shanghai [John P. Davis] to Secretary Marshall," September 2, 1947).

¹¹⁸ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 455.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 455-56.

Chiang Kai-shek at its helm. The General rejected the alternative of replacing the Generalissimo, as he feared such a move might lead Chiang to seek a compromise with the Communists which might give them a dominant position in the Government. Wedemeyer rejected what he termed a "no assistance" policy and the "wait and see" policy because he feared that a long period of further disintegration could end in the emergence of the Communists as the dominant group.¹²⁰ Thus Wedemeyer "placed all his hope on the ruling group's undertaking the necessary reform."¹²¹

Wedemeyer reported to President Truman on September 19, 1947; however, his report was not made public until 1949. The mission and report, for the most part, came to naught in modifying or changing the Administration's policy. The Secretary of State feared that Wedemeyer's program would expand American commitments to China and might even result in direct American military intervention. The chief reason given by Marshall for his suppression of the Wedemeyer report was Wedemeyer's recommendation of a guardianship or a trusteeship for Manchuria. Marshall felt that this was an impractical gesture and that "any such recommendation, if made

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 456; United States Relations with China, pp. 778-79.

¹²¹ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 456.

public at that time, would be highly offensive to Chinese susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and representing the Chinese Government as incapable of governing Chinese territory."¹²² Without doubt the suppression of the Wedemeyer report was one of the most unnecessary as well as one of the most unfortunate actions of the Administration. Had the report been published, the resulting public debate and reaction would have clarified many of the basic issues for the Administration. The report, however, was suppressed on the basis of an issue which was not central to the question facing the United States, which was whether the United States should give large-scale, long-term assistance to China.¹²³

It has been suggested that the Administration might have suppressed the report because Wedemeyer came back from China "emphatically interventionist," and the Administration was "not disposed to abet Walter Judd by letting the report be published, even with official disclaimers and for the information of Congress."¹²⁴ Senator Vandenberg, however, in writing a confidential letter to Senator Knowland, on Decem-

¹²² United States Relations with China, p. 260.

¹²³ Tsou, America's Failure In China, pp. 460-61.

¹²⁴ Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 260-61.

ber 11, 1948, states:

I never actually saw the Wedemeyer Report. But I listened to a complete paraphrase of it from General Marshall and I was satisfied that its release would have been a serious blow to Chinese-American relations. It is my opinion that some of his recommendations would have gotten us into serious trouble--even the fact of their proposal.¹²⁵

To pacify mounting Republican demands, however, the Administration found it "necessary to prepare a program for China which would, on the one hand, ward off the rising pressure for large-scale military assistance and, on the other, strictly limit American commitments."¹²⁶ In late October 1947 the State Department set about to formulate a China aid program which the China White Paper called a "Redefinition of American Policy."¹²⁷ The "new" program called for aid over a fifteen-month period during which the Chinese Government would have a further opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to receive aid and make effective use of the assistance.¹²⁸ The State Department felt "that the Chinese Government's requirements for military material from foreign sources should be met through purchases from its own

¹²⁵ Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.) The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 527-28; Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 462.

¹²⁶ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 462.

¹²⁷ United States Relations with China, p. 269.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 270.

resources, largely freed for such use through the proposed program of economic aid, and that the existing United States military advisory groups in China would enable the United States to extend advice and assistance within the framework of these consideration."¹²⁹ The "Redefinition of American Policy" program resulted in the China Aid Act of 1948, which was presented to Congress in February and passed on April 2, 1948.¹³⁰

More immediate aid for China came, however, on October 27, 1947, when the American Government concluded an agreement with China for \$27,700,000, to be used at the discretion of the Nationalist government. This amount had been earmarked by Congress during the Spring of 1946 for post United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation relief.¹³¹ Also during October the State Department informed the War Department that it agreed to the participation of the Army Advisory Group in the training activities of the Taiwan divisional training center. During the following month the first group of American advisers arrived at Taiwan for permanent duty.¹³²

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 271

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 367; Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 463.

¹³²United States Relations with China, p. 348.

General David G. Barr, assigned to direct the Advisory Group, was instructed to "make his advice available to [the] Generalissimo on an informal and confidential basis," but not to "accept responsibility for Chinese strategic plans and operations."¹³³ This was the origin of "limited assistance." During the following year similar installations were established on the mainland, but only the training center at Taiwan produced satisfactory results. The most obvious reason for the limited success of the training centers was the failure of the Chinese to attempt to implement the program effectively, despite Chiang's directive that a modern training and replacement system be made operative.¹³⁴

The major aid program of the Administration was, however, yet to be announced. During hearings on Interim Aid for Europe, on November 10, 1947, the Secretary of State commented that "only the Government and the people of China can solve their fundamental problems and regain for China its rightful role as a major stabilizing influence in the Far East...but...we can be of help...and...we should extend to the government, and its people certain economic aid and

¹³³ Ibid., p. 324.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 348-49.

assistance."¹³⁵ The following day the Secretary reported that about \$300,000,000 would be requested by the Administration for China over a period of fifteen months.¹³⁶

During hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, on November 14, Judd told his colleagues: "I think we have got to win in Asia...or will ultimately lose in Europe."¹³⁷ To Judd China was the key to Asia, just as he considered Germany to be the key to Europe. "If China is taken by Communists," Judd asked, "how long can India, Malaysia, the East Indies, even the Philippines, resist the pressure?"¹³⁸ He informed his colleagues that Japan could not become self-supporting unless she "can have access to the raw materials and the markets of Asia, particularly of China and Manchuria."¹³⁹ Judd expressed the feeling that "I cannot myself vote to put \$20,000,000,000 into holding the line on one front and then ignore another front equally vital to our future."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Interim Aid For Europe, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 7.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

¹³⁷ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 239.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Judd believed, however, that the drive to "hold the line in China" was deliberately being sabotaged. He reported: "In addition to the carefully planned and executed attempt to destroy the Government in China" from within China, there was an "equally skillfully executed plan to destroy the Government of China abroad; that is, to discredit it, by a systematic, organized propaganda campaign, in the United States and elsewhere."¹⁴¹ He felt that the propaganda in the United States was led by about twenty or thirty writers and lecturers and commentators, along with other individuals who became Asian advisers to the State Department or "experts" on the "staff of organizations supposedly dedicated to enlightening the American public on Asiatic affairs or foreign policy."¹⁴² Some of these persons compose "what has become widely known as the 'Red cell' in the State Department, the Far Eastern Office," Judd charged.¹⁴³ It has been openly reported, Judd continued, "that some of these 'experts' both in and out of the Government are members of the Communist Party, although I have no personal knowledge of that."¹⁴⁴ He felt, though, that they had consistently fol-

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 243.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

lowed the Communist Party line with respect to the Chinese Communists. He charged, without naming persons, that "one of them had openly boasted," of having disposed of Grew, Hurley, and Hornbeck, "who were the three who knew the facts about the Communists' wiles and who tried to carry out Roosevelt's policy of supporting the Central Government of China."¹⁴⁵ Judd based his condemnation of the Truman Administration's China policies on what he considered to have been the traditional policy of the United States. For the United States not to aid the Chiang Government because his Government was "portrayed as unworthy of support, is not only being victims of distorted propaganda; it is ignoring our own history and our own interests."¹⁴⁶ Judd was always most astute in his effort to impress upon his audience or his colleagues that it was in the interest of the United States alone that he supported Chiang.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 250.

¹⁴⁷ On one occasion Judd responded to the complaint that the Chiang Government was so bad that it did not deserve American help with: "No foreign country deserves a dollar of help. If I want to give for charity out of my own pocket, I'm entitled to do that, but I have no right to levy taxes to take money out of your pocket to take care of my charity. A government is not a humanitarian institution." Walter H. Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid? We Help Our Enemy and Deny Our Friends," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (March 1, 1951), 298. However, to Judd, China was a responsibility of the United States--supposedly for security and national interest reasons.

Judd now proclaimed his new position that the traditional policy of the United States toward China was reversed in President Truman's December 15, 1945, address, which he had previously hailed as a noble gesture; Judd now asserted that this speech had doomed Marshall's mission before he started. Judd could not learn who, according to his logic, included the "hooker" which assured the Communists that if they failed to cooperate the United States would withhold all aid from Chiang. On Town Meeting of the Air, December 27, 1945, Judd had applauded Truman's December 15 address. It was the sentence--"As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country--" which Judd believed convinced the Chinese Communists they could block American assistance to China. Americans who did not "understand Communist jargon" approved and "it sounded innocent enough"--but "the left wingers," who did understand it, "cheered," Judd declared, because they realized obstructive Communist tactics could prevent the needed reforms from being carried out.¹⁴⁸

By late 1947 one can note a fundamental change in Judd's

¹⁴⁸ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 245.

tactics in arguing for China aid. He began to speak more freely and openly about corruption within the Nationalist Government. The charge of "inefficiency" has been consistently leveled against the Chinese Government, Judd declared, "as if that were an adequate reason for withdrawing American support from an ally."¹⁴⁹ Without naming General MacArthur¹⁵⁰ Judd reported:

A great American out in the Far East said to me, 'For the first time in the history of our relations with Asia, we have endangered the paramount interests of the United States by confusing them with an internal purification problem in China. It may prove to be the greatest single blunder in the history of the United States.' ¹⁵¹

Without doubt a basic motive for the new technique in Judd's speaking, that is, the open manner in which he admitted graft and corruption within the Kuomintang group, was an aftermath of the Wedemeyer mission which demonstrated that no sweeping reforms would be undertaken by the Nationalists. Thus Judd, by attempting to play down the need for reform and emphasizing the historic interests of a free China as a security factor to the United States, endeavored to justify aid to China.¹⁵² Attempting to illustrate his point, he

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁵⁰ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 467.

¹⁵¹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 250.

¹⁵² Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 467.

stated: "I will admit that there are corrupt people in the Republican Party, and I do not think members of the Democratic Party will claim that there are no corrupt persons or machines in that party," but this "does not mean that the parties as such are corrupt."¹⁵³ Judd pointed out that graft was a "century-old problem" in China and that it was not created by the Chiang Government--then asserted: "We haven't too good a record ourselves."¹⁵⁴

General MacArthur echoed Judd's sentiments in a cable to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, dated March 3, 1948:

I can say without the slightest hesitation that a free, independent, peaceful, and friendly China is of profound importance to the peace of the world and to the position of the United States....The international aspect of the Chinese problem unfortunately has become somewhat clouded by demands for internal reform. Desirable as such reform may be, its importance is but secondary to the issue of civil strife now engulfing the land, and the two issues are of impossible synchronization as it would be to alter the structural design of a house while the same was being consumed by flame.¹⁵⁵

Such support strengthened Judd, who had spent part of the fall of 1947 in China, Japan, and Korea with a team of For-

¹⁵³House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid Hearings, p. 248.

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p. 256.

eign Affairs Committee staff members,¹⁵⁶ and had returned to the United States determined to include China in any emergency aid bill, as well as in the forthcoming Marshall aid legislation.¹⁵⁷ Judd continued to operate on the premise that: "We are not justified in doing anything for China unless we do enough to enable China to resist the threat to her national existence."¹⁵⁸

The Republican leaders in Congress were divided over this issue. The Vandenberg faction in the Senate desired to wait, but several House Foreign Affairs Committee members led by Judd and Vorys demanded immediate action.¹⁵⁹ The Foreign Affairs Committee reported out its interim aid bill on December 2, 1947, which authorized \$7,000,000 less than the President had requested. However, it added China to the list of recipient countries. The House Report stated that

¹⁵⁶U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, pp. 2041-42. Hereafter cited as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program Hearings.

¹⁵⁷U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, Emergency Foreign Aid, Report No. 1152, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, pp. 3, 6. Hereafter cited as Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid, Report No. 1152, 1947.

¹⁵⁸Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 262.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

the objective of including China was: "to initiate the aid without which China cannot rally her own strength to stabilize her currency, reform her administration and win her civil war, the first step toward resumption of economic and political progress."¹⁶⁰ The report suggested \$60,000,000 for immediate aid to China.¹⁶¹ The Senate Report on interim aid, however, completely ignored China. Vandenberg did not want to burden European aid with Chinese demands. H. Bradford Westerfield asserts in his volume that a man who worked closely with the Foreign Affairs Committee informed him that "Vorys privately pleaded with him (Vandenberg) that it was necessary in order to build up the low prestige of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with Marshall Plan legislation in view, and that the House would be impressed if its committee succeeded in putting over a proposal which the administration was resisting and which Vandenberg did not favor."¹⁶² The resulting Conference Report tends to support Westerfield's charge, since the Senate yielded to the major

¹⁶⁰Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid, Report No. 1152, 1947, p. 4.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁶²Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 263.

demands of the House bill.¹⁶³

Emergency interim aid as requested by the President was provided in the resulting Foreign Aid Act of 1947, which was approved on December 17, 1947.¹⁶⁴ The legislation authorized \$597,000,000 for aid to Austria, China, France, and Italy. The act, however, provided that any funds that might be made available under any other act passed thereafter relating to China would cause funds reserved under this act for China to be used for aid to the other three named countries.¹⁶⁵ As affecting China, this 1947 act was but a bare token gesture to pacify the Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The House Appropriations Committee, chaired by John Taber, a New York Republican who lacked enthusiasm for spending in China, simply omitted China from appropriations. Styles Bridges, however, a strong supporter of the Nationalist Government and chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, succeeded in earmarking \$20,000,000 for China. At Vandenberg's suggestion this was lowered on the Senate floor to \$18,000,000 to fit the post-UNRRA relief act passed the preceding spring. This amount was later accepted by

¹⁶³U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Conference, Conference Report, The Foreign Aid Act of 1947, Report No. 1161, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 8.

¹⁶⁴U.S., Statutes at Large, LXI, Part I, 934-41.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 939.

House Conferees. Despite the meagerness of the appropriation, this accomplishment of the "China bloc" indicated that the United States was moving toward a more comprehensive program for China, in the form of large-scale aid.¹⁶⁶ The China bloc felt pride in their victory over the Administration; however, their successes were always susceptible to a setback.

While Congress was considering interim aid, while Wedemeyer was evaluating the China situation, and while the State Department was drawing up a new China aid program, events in China took a severe turn for the worse for the Nationalist forces. During the second half of 1947 the Communists took the offensive on a nation-wide scale. By the end of the year they had entrenched themselves in the large area between the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers--bordered on the west by the Han River and extending east to the Yellow Sea. They had also established themselves in a position whereby they could constantly interrupt railroad traffic between North China and Manchuria.¹⁶⁷ The Kuomintang, meanwhile, in a further attempt to eliminate opposition, outlawed the Democratic League in September. This move only played into Communist

¹⁶⁶Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 263-64.

¹⁶⁷United States Relations with China, p. 317; Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 463.

hands, as it drove some of these liberal democratic, but non-Communist, opposition groups into active collaboration with them.¹⁶⁸ The Democratic League had long been the recipient of vile and unjust denunciation by the conservative forces in China and the so-called friends of China in the United States because it had opposed the totalitarian tactics of the Kuomintang regime. Judd spoke on several occasions against the Democratic League because it was a threat to Chiang's position; besides, Marhsall had worked with them while in China.

On December 19, 1947, Judd took the House floor to denounce General Feng Yu-hsiang, commonly known as the "Christian General," who was touring the United States under the auspices of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern policy.¹⁶⁹ Judd declared that Feng was "abusing the courtesy extended to him as representative of a foreign government by making violent and untruthful attacks upon the Republic of China--our first ally in the war against Japanese aggres-

¹⁶⁸ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 461.

¹⁶⁹ The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy was cited as Communist by Attorney General Tom Clark, letter to Loyalty Review Board, released April 7, 1949, U.S., Congress, House, Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, House Doc. 398, p. 48.

sion."¹⁷⁰ Judd described Feng, without substantiation, as a "member of the clique of dissidents who attempted to gain control of China by undermining Chiang Kai-shek, while protesting loudly that Chiang is the only leader who can save China." He continued that Feng "actively participated in the work of Communist-front organizations, like the misnamed Democratic League."¹⁷¹ Judd's charges against the Democratic League echoed that of the Nationalist leaders, as the Kuomintang was openly unsympathetic and unfriendly to the League.¹⁷² Contrary to Judd's charges, which cannot be substantiated, responsible Asian experts and historians conclude that the League was a truly democratic group with "good intentions and constructive ideas, but they lacked one thing most essential in Chinese politics: an independent army."¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCIII, Part 9, 11746.

¹⁷¹Ibid.

¹⁷²Chang, The Third Force in China, p. 114.

¹⁷³Dun, J. Li, The Ageless Chinese (New York: Scribner, 1965), p. 499; Carsun Chang, one of the founders of the Democratic League, who later fled China, asserts that the "Democratic League, including Chang Lan and Lo Lung-Chi, who later joined Mao, were believers in democracy, but through continued persecution by Chiang Kai-shek they were forced to join the communists," or flee for their lives. Chang, The Third Force in China, p. 265. Chang further declared in regard to his own convictions that: "I am more convinced than ever that I did the right thing...in taking the side of Constitutionalism and Democracy. Most of the members of the

In response to Judd's charges, one of his most severe vocal critics in the House, New York American Labor Party Representative Vito Marcantonio, attacked Judd with: "I cannot resist the temptation of stating to the gentleman from Minnesota that for the last week he has been attacking the Democratic League of China and the Christian general of China simply because those two...have seen fit to attack Chiang Kai-shek." Judd, Marcantonio continued, had "reached the point that if a Biblical character jumped out of the Bible and attacked Chiang Kai-shek I am afraid the gentleman...would attack the Bible." Judd, he said, "will tell you that we must aid this Hitler of China to defeat the Soviet Union...just as others had advanced the same line to justify aiding and strengthening Hitler...and...the world is still suffering from the results of that advice."¹⁷⁴ Judd answered

Democratic League who collaborated with the Communists, like Huang Yen-pei, Chang Lan, Lo Lung-chi, Liang Shu-min, and Chang Pai-chun are either Vice Presidents of the Government at Peking, or Ministers, or members of commissions, or members of the Political Consultative Conference. Sometime I wonder to myself whether those erstwhile colleagues of mine of the Democratic League are contented with their present lot. I am sure they are not, for they are like birds whose wings have been clipped. It seems strange that I should be the only one among the founders of the Democratic League to stay outside the charmed circle of Peking. I remain faithful to my convictions, and, as a free agent, I shall continue to fight for a free, independent, and democratic China until the battle is won." Chang, The Third Force in China, p. 187.

¹⁷⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCIII, Part 9, 11762.

Marcantonio by retorting that he had "on many occasions criticized the Government of China and twice to Generalissimo Chiang himself, once about 6 weeks ago, in an hour and three-quarters discussion with him." Judd declared that his concern was not to defend Chiang; he did not need any defense, as his role in "history is secure." Judd asserted that his concern was to save China, "if possible, as a free nation and on the side of the United States against the tide of communism, intrigue, and tyranny sweeping over much of the world."¹⁷⁵

Despite Judd's spirited defense of Chiang Kai-shek and his clarion call for immediate economic and military assistance to the Nationalist forces, the following year, 1948, held poignant disappointment for China's congressional friends. The concessions which the Administration, and above all, Congress, were willing to make to the Nationalist forces did not match the military and territorial losses which they suffered. President Truman threw the China aid problem into the lap of Congress; Congress was unwilling to take the challenge, and its half-way policy proved no more successful than did the Administration's caution in refusing to allow the country to become engaged in all-out entanglement in the China civil war which could have imperiled the

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

Administration's program of resisting communism in Europe.

Not until mid-February, 1948, did Marshall's proposal for a China aid program reach Capitol Hill, when President Truman recommended an authorization of \$570,000,000 to provide assistance until June 30, 1949. This amount constituted an increase of \$270,000,000 over the figure Marshall had suggested in November, 1947. In his forwarding message the President cited America's traditional attitude toward aid to China and expressed the sentiment that the continued deterioration of the Chinese economy was a source of deep concern to the United States. President Truman related the plight of the United States in granting this aid to China: "We have hoped for conditions in China that would make possible the effective and constructive use of American assistance in reconstruction and rehabilitation. Conditions have not developed as we had hoped, and we can only do what is feasible under circumstances as they exist."¹⁷⁶ The Administration's objective in increasing the amount suggested by Marshall in November 1947, was to provide China with additional American dollars whereby China could purchase civilian-type commodities which were not provided in the Administration's

¹⁷⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report, Aid To China, Report No. 1026, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Aid To China, Report No. 1026, 1948.

China aid relief, and to allow the Nationalist regime to purchase abroad its own military supplies. Thereby the United States would not be increasing its own military commitment in China--the opposite of which Judd had been laboring to obtain.¹⁷⁷

During February, 1948, the House Foreign Affairs Committee renewed hearings entitled, "United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program."¹⁷⁸ Secretary Marshall told the committee on February 20 that "in consideration of a program of assistance to China, it should be recognized that for the main part the solution of China's problems is largely one for the Chinese themselves."¹⁷⁹ The State Department held that the great difficulty facing the United States in determining a basis and procedure to justify a program of assistance for China lay in the conditions which existed in China--military as well as economic. The political, economic, and financial conditions in China, he said,

¹⁷⁷ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program Hearings, p. 1546; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 264.

¹⁷⁸ The House Committee on Foreign Affairs started hearings on United States Foreign Policy For a Post-War Recovery Program on December 17, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Hearings were renewed on January 12, 1948, and continued until mid-March 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Part II, p. 1545.

were so uncertain that it was impossible to develop a "practical, effective, long-term over-all program for economic recovery."¹⁸⁰ Marshall admitted, nevertheless, that it was desirable that the United States render "assistance to China in her present critical situation in order to help retard the present rapid rate of economic deterioration and thus provide a breathing space in which the Chinese Government could initiate important steps toward more stable economic conditions."¹⁸¹

The Secretary had, however, earlier questioned the value of what he was now advocating. Prior to President Truman's message to Congress on February 18, the Secretary had read a statement to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations in executive session, and reported that there was "a great deal that directly bears on the problem which is not in the public interest of this country, and particularly of the Chinese Government to state for the open record."¹⁸² Marshall declared that the United States "must be prepared to face the possibility that the present Chinese Government may not be successful in maintaining itself against the Communist forces or other opposition that

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²United States Relations with China, p. 380.

may arise in China."¹⁸³ He pointed out that from the foregoing statement, "it can only be concluded that the present Government cannot reduce the Chinese Communists to a completely negligible factor in China," and to "achieve that objective in the immediate future it would be necessary for the United States to underwrite the Chinese Government's military effort, on a wide and probably constantly increasing scale, as well as the Chinese economy."¹⁸⁴ To defeat the opposition Marshall concluded that the United States would "have to be prepared virtually to take over the Chinese Government and administer its economic, military and governmental affairs."¹⁸⁵ To Marshall and the administration this would constitute a course of action of such magnitude that it would be impossible to estimate the final cost, and it would involve the United States Government "in a continuing commitment from which it would practically be impossible to withdraw, and it would very probably involve grave consequences to this nation by making of China an arena of international conflict."¹⁸⁶ The Secretary could not therefore recommend any attempt to underwrite the Chinese

¹⁸³Ibid., p. 382.

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Ibid.

economy and the Chinese Government's military efforts, because it constituted too great a burden on the United States economy and too great a military responsibility.¹⁸⁷ Marshall saw the Chinese Government as being not only weak but lacking in "self-discipline and inspiration," and thus there existed little if any "evidence that these conditions can be basically corrected by foreign aid."¹⁸⁸

Marshall informed the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Administration's proposed program of aid for China provided economic assistance in the amount of \$570,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1949. Of this amount, \$510,000,000 would be used to cover minimum imports of essential civilian type commodities, chiefly foodstuffs and raw materials, and \$60,000,000 would be for key reconstruction projects. The Administration's program concentrated on those commodities believed to be of maximum aid to Chinese civilian economy and those which would insure the greatest aid per dollar spent.¹⁸⁹

Marshall thus gave up what Acheson, in testimony on

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 384.

¹⁸⁹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Foreign Policy For a Post-War Recovery Program Hearings, Part II, p. 1546.

June 4, 1951,¹⁹⁰ called the last chance for the United States to intervene with armed forces in China.¹⁹¹ Acheson declared that there Marshall "laid before the Congress" the matter of military intervention in China, and the "Congress understood it perfectly, and the Congress had what I think is the sound judgment not to do that."¹⁹² At this time, however, the "actual strength" of the United States "army and air force was only 898,000 men with 140,000 deployed in the Far East."¹⁹³ Viewing each House as a whole, it can be concluded that the House of Representatives thought one way in regard to Marshall's program, and the Senate thought the other way, the Senate taking the view which coincided with that of the Administration. The attitude in the House was due in no small part to Judd's endless speaking and the prestige he had built up among his colleagues.

Without doubt Marshall realized throughout 1948 that his program would not be wholly effective in checking the

¹⁹⁰ Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, p. 1869.

¹⁹¹ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 473.

¹⁹² Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, p. 1869.

¹⁹³ Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 473.

advance of communism in China.¹⁹⁴ But, likewise, he realized withholding all assistance and withdrawing completely were impossible. To Marshall it would have been against United States interests "to demonstrate a complete lack of confidence in the Chinese Government and to add to its difficulties by abruptly rejecting its requests for assistance," because the "psychological effect on morale in China" would be serious.¹⁹⁵ Marshall, however, conceded that the United States was already committed by past actions and by popular sentiment among Americans to continue to do what we could do to alleviate suffering in China and to give the Chinese Government and people the possibility of working out China's problems in their own way.¹⁹⁶

Judd opposed what he considered Marshall's "negative" attitude and continued his campaign to gain total commitment to China--Judd's theme was that only if China is saved can Europe be secure from communism. He had also added a new twist to his argument: "If China is not to be free, then it would have been far better for her to be under Japan

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, p. 1868.

¹⁹⁵ United States Relations with China, p. 387.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 383.

rather than Russia."¹⁹⁷ Equating Chinese Communism with Russian Communism, Judd declared that if China were not to remain free, then the war against Japan was not only "useless," but it was "criminal"--"because we are left with less security than before we resisted Japan."¹⁹⁸ Thus, Judd felt that if the Soviet Union was to be the strongest force in Europe it would have been better for the United States to have allowed Japan to dominate Asia--rather than to have Russia the strongest power in Europe and Asia both.¹⁹⁹ Judd proclaimed that events in Asia as they stood then were much less likely to get the United States into war than events in Europe.²⁰⁰ To Judd perhaps the best single hope of preventing what he considered World War III was to "keep Russia compelled to divide her forces, her attention, her efforts between her east and her west."²⁰¹ But, Judd continued, if the Soviet Union could beguile the United States into looking in the other direction until China fell, as he felt,

¹⁹⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 9, A57.

¹⁹⁸ The American Association of School Administrators, Official Report 74th Annual Convention (Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1948), p. 32

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

"all the left wingers and their dupes have tried for several years, and successfully, to persuade us to do," then Russia could concentrate all her attention and efforts on defeating recovery in Europe. Judd felt that under the prevailing circumstances of that time Russia could probably defeat the European program. He stressed the point that his greatest concern was for his own country. Thus, in the long run the United States needed Europe and Asia "worse than they need us." Nearly "everyone in Asia sees that clearly," Judd continued, and they "wonder why we fail to, why a nation with all the aces insists on playing them so badly or even throwing them away." If China and Asia go down, Judd asked, how much more would it cost the United States--"in money and resources and men--to keep Western Europe free or even ourselves" free?²⁰² To save money, "not to waste it," Judd declared, the United States "must make a real effort to keep China independent" and "pro-American." He felt that an "intelligent and immediate program of aid to China consisting of moral support, surplus munitions, American personnel for military training, and advice at all levels, dollars to balance China's international payments, help stabilize her currency, and loans for specified development projects could not cost more than a billion and a half dollars." Judd's

²⁰² Ibid.

argument continued: "If that billion and a half for China should make the difference between success and failure of the proposed seventeen billion for Europe, it would seem to be a good investment."²⁰³

It was not until March 23, 1948, during discussions on the China Aid bill, that Judd really attempted to answer, on the House floor, what he meant by military assistance to China. He felt that munitions, training, and advice were equally essential if the Nationalist forces were to fight a successful war against the Chinese Communists. Thus Judd believed that the United States should make available to China an ample supply of munitions. The other kind of military assistance China had to have, according to Judd, was military training and advice in planning and conducting operations--this Judd contended would not cost the United States "very much in money." Judd informed his colleagues that the "Chinese are traditionally not students of warfare," and that their "basic training is inadequate to give them ability to adapt imaginatively, especially the officers."²⁰⁴ Furthermore, Judd felt that the training which

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 35.

²⁰⁴ U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 3, 3332; General Joseph Stilwell, who spent nearly two decades in China between the First and Second World Wars, believed that the Chinese soldier when properly equipped and trained made the best soldier in the world.

American military personnel "originally gave them, in a sense, disqualified them for the kind of warfare they must now carry on." The United States "trained the Chinese to fight the Japanese, either for jungle warfare in Burma or positional warfare in east China, and accordingly had supplied the Chinese with heavy machine guns, heavy artillery, tanks, and other war equipment, which was obsolete in fighting the Communists." Now, Judd emphasized, the Chinese "have to fight a totally different type of enemy, the guerrillas, on very different terrain."²⁰⁵ Thus the Chinese Nationalist needed "light equipment, mobility rather than heavy power." He further maintained that American military advisers should be allowed closer to the front lines so that they could "understand the problem and give advice on the ground."²⁰⁶ This was a major focal point of difference between Marshall and Judd. Marshall opposed such American involvement, because he feared or perhaps realized that this would be the fatal step which would commit American forces in taking the offensive in defeating the Communists--that such a move would lead to huge land forces being sent to China.

Not only Judd, but Vorys and other members of Chiang's

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶Ibid.

Congressional supporters, sought increased American military commitment including armament, munitions, training, and advice. They desired to transform some of the Administration's proposed economic aid into military aid and then to have it administered in a manner somewhat like the Greek-Turkish program, which would include increased involvement of American officers in the supervision of smaller and smaller Chinese military units. The technique and demands of the China bloc, however, "precluded the use of any single clear model" in granting economic and military aid to the Nationalist forces.²⁰⁷ Judd chose to describe the entire proposed foreign assistance bill of 1948, as "primarily a national defense bill." He felt that no one could "rightly justify this bill," or title IV, the Chinese assistance title, "or any other part of it, on a basis primarily of humanitarianism or charity."²⁰⁸ Such measures, Judd declared, "could be justified in this present world situation and in the present strained state of America's finances and supplies only if they are essential from the standpoint of the security of the Nation." According to Judd it "was not to divert attention or assistance from Europe that the aid-to-China

²⁰⁷Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 264.

²⁰⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 3, 3872.

sections were put into this bill...[but]....to strengthen and support the programs in Europe." Thus Judd declared that "we do not believe that Asia is more important to our security than Europe, but we do not believe it is less important."²⁰⁹ Judd quoted MacArthur to reenforce his statement:

It would be utterly fallacious to underrate China's needs or her importance. For if we embark upon a general policy to bulwark the frontiers of freedom against the assaults of political despotism, one major frontier is no less important than another and a decisive breach of any will inevitably threaten to engulf us. ²¹⁰

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which Judd was a member, desired to produce a China aid bill which would have the European Recovery Program as its core. The House committee reported that its "decision to treat the whole problem of the restoration of war-torn economies, to include China as well as Europe, came not only from logical considerations but also from the painful experience of the committee in receiving from the administration a long succession of 'piecemeal' programs, each with a separate timetable of emergency, without any adequate total program,

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Ibid.

either as to scope or commitments."²¹¹

The House Foreign Affairs Committee did not hold hearings because it had gathered testimony separately on aid to China; however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held executive hearings on aid to China. During the course of the hearings the committee heard the views of Marshall; Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State; W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; and their assistants.²¹² Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recalling the executive hearings, commented on June 4, 1951: "We agreed...that we should not get our nose in the door and put troops ashore and all that."²¹³ He continued: "The result was that we agreed on a certain amount of money, and the House followed another policy, and the result was a compromise between the two Houses, as I recall it."²¹⁴ McMahon, after

²¹¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Report No. 1585, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 6.

²¹²Executive hearings were held on February 26, March 19 and 20, 1948; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Aid to China, Report No. 1026, 1948, p. 3.

²¹³Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, p. 1903.

²¹⁴Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Aid to China, Report No. 1026, 1948, p. 3.

having re-read the secret transcripts of the executive hearings, reported "without contradiction" that: "The discussion...showed a complete, unanimous agreement in the committee that the Chinese situation was just hopeless."²¹⁵ The State Department's view was so prevalent in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it has been charged, that when the committee reported a separate China aid bill, "the report which went to the floor with the bill [foreign assistance bill] was bitterly critical of Chiang Kai-shek."²¹⁶ Committee chairman Vandenberg, chagrined at this blunder, ordered a more diplomatic substitute report prepared the following day.²¹⁷ Vandenberg, speaking for the bill on the Senate floor, pointed out:

The Committee on Foreign Relations wishes to make it unmistakeably clear, in this, as in all other relief bills, that there is no implication that American aid involves any continuity of obligation beyond specific, current commitments which Congress may see fit to make...We do not--cannot--underwrite the future....It is a duty to underscore this reservation in the case of China because we find here many imponderables as a result of the military, economic, and social pressures which have understandably undermined her stabilities, and prevented or postponed the internal reforms which even her surest friends

²¹⁵ Ibid.; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 265.

²¹⁶ Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 265.

²¹⁷ Ibid.; New York Times, March 28, 1948, p. 4.

readily concede to be not only desirable but essential for the Chinese people and for the Nationalist government. ²¹⁸

No member of the upper House questioned Vandenberg's point of view. A few, however, gave only moderate vocal opposition to the bill because they felt that it went too far. Wayne Morse, then an Oregon Republican, asked: "what assurance have the taxpayers of America that by spending more and more millions of dollars for food and supplies for relief in China they are doing anything more than again filling the pockets of the group which is today in charge of the Nationalist Government in China?"²¹⁹

The resulting foreign aid authorization bill, on which Congress completed action on April 2, 1948, provided \$338, 000,000 in economic aid for China. An additional \$125,000, 000 was added to the bill for the Chinese Government to use as it saw necessary, which presumably meant for military purposes. As far as the China aid provision is concerned, it followed the general form of the text of the bill passed by the Senate. Aid to China was consolidated in a single title--Title IV--known as the Chinese Aid Act of 1948. The following day, April 3, 1948, President Truman signed the

²¹⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 3, 3668.

²¹⁹Ibid., p. 3669.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.²²⁰ The problem of aid for China, however, was not yet solved. The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard Thorp, reported to the House Appropriations Committee on May 18, that it was the Department's view that Congress intended by the provisions of the China Aid Act to leave expenditures under the \$125,000,000 grant entirely to the Chinese Government, without any conditions, except for possible administrative controls determined by the President. Thorp pointed out that: "Legislative history indicates that the phrase in the act 'on such terms as the President may determine' refers to procedural terms and not the screening of requirement or supervision of use."²²¹ This tended to indicate to the House Republicans--or to the China bloc--that the Administration felt no special "responsibility for initiating, and very little for supervising, grants of aid to China under this section."²²²

The House Appropriations Committee, however, aided the China bloc in a last effort to pin down the Administration

²²⁰ Ibid., pp. 4035, 4063, 4080; U.S., Statutes at Large, LXII, Part I, 137-59.

²²¹ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill For 1949, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part II, 1948, p. 412.

²²² Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 266.

on military assistance for China. The committee declared that the history of previous aid to China was not very favorable and that this appropriation was being recommended with the insistence that the Administration establish and maintain procedures for the complete supervision of appropriated funds and thus insure their effective use.²²³ The Administration compromised to the extent of promising it would supervise Chinese procurement under the \$125,000,000 section of Title IV if other sections of the act were not altered--specifically the section of Greece and Turkey.²²⁴ But \$60,000,000 was cut from the total amount provided for in the China Aid Act of 1948 by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.²²⁵

The double victory for the Administration, which sought to cut losses in China, was made possible by Republican leaders--Republican leaders especially outside of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Seduction by State Department officials could have been easily alleged, but regardless of any possible allegations, a Republican Congress was at last

²²³U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Report, Foreign Aid Appropriations, 1949, Report No. 2173, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, pp. 7, 9.

²²⁴Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 266.

²²⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 7, 9293-94.

definitely involved in a China aid policy, although at the time to many it would have seemed too little, too late. Had the Administration, nevertheless, shown greater "vigor and determination" in administering what Congress had provided, it might still have been able to minimize the paralyzing effects of rigidly partisan recrimination when Chiang's government abandoned the mainland late the following year.²²⁶

Not until November 1948 did substantial shipments start to reach China as provided for under the military section of the China Aid act. Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, testified on June 19, 1951, that there were various causes--"a number of things rather than any specific thing"--which delayed movement of supplies to China. But Badger indicated that perhaps there was not present "the old drive" to indicate "a realization in this particular case that it was important."²²⁷ Several days later during the same hearings General David G. Barr, United States Army, commenting on Badger's testimony, expressed the belief that diplomatic channels did not delay assistance to China a "great deal." He reported that after the Department

²²⁶Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 267.

²²⁷Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East Hearings, p. 2749.

of the Army was "permitted to go to work in assisting the Chinese and to actually sell to the Chinese the transfer of funds, this entire system was changed at the insistence of Admiral Badger; a completely new list was submitted to the Department of the Army by Ambassador Koo on the 29th of September which destroyed or nullified all the work that had been done on this previous list."²²⁸ (Barr had given the Chinese assistance in the preparation of their first requirement for \$125,000,000 worth of equipment. Barr charged that at about the same time the first list of equipment was completed, Badger promised the Chinese that the equipment would be transported in American vessels, free of charge. Under this arrangement shipping costs would be diverted to additional supplies. Thus Barr declared that all of these things had to be reconsidered and had to go through the necessary agencies for readjustments, so that changing the requirements at that time operated to delay the arrival of the equipment in China.²²⁹

During the period between the passage of the China Aid Act and the arrival of American supplies in China, the Chinese Communists had generally assumed the offensive in the civil war. They had completed their conquest of Manchuria

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

and were readying themselves for the southward march, which proceeded most rapidly from a military standpoint in 1949. Without doubt the only action that could have prevented or delayed a Communist take-over in China at that time would have been full intervention by the United States. Dean Acheson, who became Secretary of State on January 21, 1949, with the inauguration of the second Truman administration, could sanction such a move no more than could Marshall. From the time he accepted the China mission assignment to the end of his tenure as Secretary of State, General Marshall "adhered consistently to the postulate that the United States should not intervene in the Chinese civil war with her armed forces."²³⁰ Acheson adhered to basically the same principle; however, perhaps in contrast to Marshall he underestimated the relative strength of the Chinese Communists at an early date. But Marshall's realistic evaluation of the Chinese situation--the relative military and political strength of the Nationalist and the Communist forces--led the Secretary of State to conclude that the Chiang regime could not win the civil war without American military intervention. The General thus saw no solution for saving China after his unsuccessful attempt to fulfill Sun Yat-sen's

²³⁰Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 492.

dictum--the establishment of a coalition government between the Nationalists, the Communists, and the "Third Forces."²³¹ With China thus lost, Marshall could find no substantial reason for not moving ahead to aid Europe, to supply American resources and efforts where they could do the most good, where they would be more effective and efficiently employed. Yet it was this realistic evaluation of the world situation which served to damn Marshall in the eyes of Judd and his cohorts, the Asia-First element who believed that Chiang should be redeemed and a democracy established in China under his tutelage.²³²

²³¹ See Carsun Chang's volume, passim, cited above.

²³² The year 1948, in review, was a tragic year for the Nationalist forces as well as for China's Congressional friends. The China Aid Act had provided neither enough aid nor the desired kind of aid. But perhaps a greater blow came on November 8, 1948: Thomas E. Dewey was defeated for the Presidency of the United States. Chinese officials and Republican friends of China proceeded on the assumption that with Dewey's election "extraordinary measures" would be taken toward giving military aid to China. In August, 1948, in a timely gesture intended perhaps to dramatize the sincerity of Chiang's regime, the Nationalist Government announced a program which sounded like "drastic economic reforms." The move, however, came too late. The American public voters, by a rather thin margin, and without a majority of the popular vote, retained Truman's leadership for another four years in early November, while in late November, Chiang's highly demoralized Mukden garrison surrendered that well-fortified city to the Communist armies. This was the beginning of the end--the end that was to come swiftly.

On December 1, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, despite her obvious coolness toward President Truman which had developed over the months, arrived in Washington to make a desperate personal plea to the President for immediate help. In her

Yet neither Marshall nor Acheson could, or perhaps would, follow a policy of total and prompt disengagement in China. Perhaps Marshall, like Ambassador Stuart, would have favored an entire withdrawal from any participation in China's internal affairs, to drifting along with no strong program except an opportunistic one of "wait and see."²³³ Stuart, however, favored giving "active assistance especially in the way of military advice to the Nationalist Government, in the expectation that the needed reform would be undertaken...[and]...condition further aid at each stage upon

pleas for aid, Madame Chiang asked for \$3,000,000,000 over a period of three years, and renewed the already rejected request for a military mission to China headed by a high-ranking officer, and for a forthright declaration of the determination of the United States to halt the expansion of communism in Asia. (For additional information see Tsou, America's Failure In China, p. 492). All she accomplished was knowledge that the American President was unwilling to commit himself to the all-out effort that would have been needed to save her husband.

The low tide of Kuomintang morale at this time was manifested by a series of remarkable concessions which Chiang was willing to make to the United States in hopes of obtaining additional economic and military assistance. The Generalissimo went so far as to offer to appoint United States officers to command Chinese units under the guise of advisers, and to accept a high ranking United States officer as his personal military adviser. Apparently the President felt that a second "Stilwell affair" would develop. On January 8, 1949, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu handed a note to Ambassador Stuart expressing the desire to renew mediation between the Nationalists and Communists which had been given up in 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek considered his power invincible. Wertenbaker, "The China Lobby," pp. 18-20.

²³³ John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 178-79.

evidence of this."²³⁴ Marshall, however, saw in such suggestion a gradual drift toward further military involvement. The "rule or ruin" policy of Chiang Kai-shek and his cohorts afforded Marshall or Acheson little if any recourse, and Chiang could always improvise the necessary excuse for delaying needed internal reforms to furnish Administration critics with sufficient ammunition to chide vehemently the President. Marshall, without an alternative, was forced to conciliate Republican opposition to his China policy, and in order to insure full authorization for his European Recovery Program was forced to grant China limited assistance after a period of partial withdrawal.

Thus, by "indifference if not by intention," it has been charged, "the administration...utterly bungled its chance to show that an aid program of 'GOP proportions' could not save Chiang."²³⁵ The State Department's attitude that the only way China could be saved would be by complete United States intervention combined with the half-way policy of Congress, failed to produce a feeling of urgency within the Administration. The limited activity in both the Executive and Legislative branches in regard to China--and a degree of failure in both--gave key Republican lead-

²³⁴Ibid., p. 178.

²³⁵Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 268.

ers, such as Judd, Vorys, Bridges, and Knowland, ample ammunition to charge, despite the too-little too-late policy of their own Republican-dominated branch, that they had done their best to preserve China's integrity and freedom, while the Democratic Administration sabotaged their efforts, and thus gave Chiang the final push. Against charges of such proportions even State Department-minded Republicans such as Vandenberg and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee "were hardly likely to offer any public defense of their failure to implement effectively the delicate compromise they had effected on China to placate both Walter Judd and General Marshall."²³⁶

Despite McMahon's statement that not a single word of criticism from any member of the Foreign Relations Committee--Democrat or Republican-- was uttered in executive session, nor a single suggestion ever made for a change of policy in China during the period 1947-1949, the President, Marshall, and Acheson were left to absorb "whatever public blame was America's for Chiang's eventual defeat."²³⁷ Perhaps the passive acquiescence of the key Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee gave the State Department a sense of contentment which prevented a feeling of urgency

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷Ibid.

for China. Regardless, the State Department did not "manage by its 'self-sufficiency' to preserve a free hand to frame a new policy for a new China."²³⁸ Thus with the growing mutual suspicion between the Far Eastern Division and the congressmen, especially Republicans, the collapse of all Nationalist China in 1949 "brought a wave of partisan bitterness which paralyzed American policy toward China."²³⁹ The cry of "treason" arose from Capitol Hill and resounded to every corner of the country--a cry which Judd was to echo henceforth.

²³⁸Ibid.

²³⁹Ibid., p. 269.

CHAPTER V

WALTER H. JUDD: GRAND INQUEST OF THE DEMOCRATS'

CHINA POLICY

The collapse of Nationalist China in September of 1949 brought to the American scene a wave of partisan bitterness which paralyzed American foreign policy toward China, until the United States found itself at war in Korea.¹ During August, 1949, The China White Paper, an account of United States relations with China, with special consideration given to the period 1944-1949, was released by the United States State Department.² The Secretary of State, in the

¹Bradford H. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 268.

²Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951). p. 534. Forrestal writes in his diary that during a cabinet meeting on November 26, 1948 General Marshall read a paper which had originated in the State Department, which advocated going to the American public to explain the inadequacies of the Chiang Government. The paper declared that the Administration had two alternatives: to go to the public and explain the Chinese situation, or to continue to do all that was feasible to support Chiang and accept the embarrassments that would accompany the disintegration of China. With the President's approval, however, Marshall rejected this recommendation on the ground that such a public statement would administer the final coup de grace to the Nationalist Government.

letter of transmittal to the President, blamed the Nationalist debacle on the inept leadership of the Kuomintang regime rather than insufficiency of American aid. In reacting to the White Paper, the cry went out from Judd, from the entire Asian clique, that surely less than honest diplomacy was involved--"if Chiang had not been sold out in 1940," then why had he been "sold out in 1949?"³ Thus, this document set off a new wave of unlooked-for criticism by the Executive Department, more severe, more intense, than any which had previously been directed at the Truman Administration by the Republicans. This criticism resulted in a new era for the China friends which was to crystallize into more positive demands, demands for militant assistance for Chiang Kai-shek, demands which evolved into a program which included a "preventive war" in Asia as the only alternative to

³ Edwin O. Reischauer asserts in writing about Chiang's demise on the mainland that: "It would be a mistake to attribute the Communist triumph in China primarily to what America either did or did not do....To some people it may seem easier and more reasonable to attribute our errors in Asia to inexcusably inept and sometimes disloyal individual Americans, rather than to insufficient knowledge and understanding....But unfortunately this interpretation of our failure, though often put forth with vehemence, is so far from the truth that only our own frustration could have given it much credence." Edwin O. Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955) pp. 12-13.

a Third World War.⁴ The final answer to these demands was to come from a Republican Administration with the Eisenhower victory in 1952; the answer provided was surely less than what Judd had envisioned.

The China White Paper was to Judd an "insipid" apology for a most "insidious" policy carried out by the Truman Administration in China. It was, Judd proclaimed, a "miserable" attempt to cover up the treachery which grew out of the conspiracy of a "few dozen pro-leftist writers, lecturers, and State Department men led by Alger Hiss," of the Far Eastern Division from 1939 to 1944, (Hiss was in the Far Eastern Division for only a short time in 1944) "when the policy pattern and the propaganda line which lost China to Russia were being established."⁵ Such an attitude was easily

⁴As did Judd, Frank Wilson Price feared that the China situation would produce World War III; "If China's liberals fail today I can see China turning back to one party dictatorship or swinging over to communist totalitarianism. Either of these dangerous possibilities would hasten the outbreak of World War III." Frank Wilson Price, "How Strong Are China's Liberals," The Christian Century, LXIV (June 18, 1947), 766.

⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 15, A3575. Alger Hiss declares in his book that he had "no connection with our China policy after 1944, a time when Chiang's pre-eminence was undisputed. My only functions before that time relating to China had been assisting in removing discriminatory aspects of our immigration policy, in negotiating a treaty of friendship with China, and in expediting lend-lease aid to China." Alger Hiss, In The Court of Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

accepted by those who viewed international affairs in absolute terms; for those who denied the responsibility of both parties involved regardless of the decision of international significance which came from the White House regarding unilateral affairs, to cooperate to make the joint venture successful. But for a few Congressmen it was more simple to take the strong partisan stand and blame the Democratic Administration for the internal trouble which had plagued China for decades. Dean Acheson had asserted in the White Paper that "the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of a government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people."⁶ Intervention on such a grand scale, Acheson declared, would have been "resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would

1957), p. 7. Hiss received his original appointment to the State Department on September 1, 1936, as an assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State. On January 16, 1942, he was promoted to Assistant to the Adviser on Political Relations. For several months in early 1944, he served as Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs. On May 1, 1944, he was promoted to the Office of Special Political Affairs, where he was involved in United Nations activities. Register Of The Department of State 1946, (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1947), p. 268.

⁶Department of State, United States Relations with China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1949), p. XV.

have been condemned by the American people."⁷ But there were those Congressmen who could only explain the steady deterioration in China by finding an imaginary conspiracy in the United States State Department.

With the publication of the China White Paper Judd sharpened his attack on the State Department and the Truman Administration in general. He saw in the White Paper "1,000 pages...dug out of the past to try to justify the colossal defeats" which the State Department had suffered in Asia since World War II. He viewed the Government document as a collection of only those pieces of evidence which the State Department considered to be in favor of its position in China "coupled with unabashed special pleading for that position."⁸ Judd contended that selection of material for the White Paper was made, "not for the purpose of arriving at the whole truth or of laying the most substantial basis for policy," but rather to conceal the fact that the State Department possessed a responsible appraisal (the Wedemeyer Report) of the Chinese situation and recommendations for a policy completely at variance with the appraisal and policy of the State Department.⁹ A New York Times editorial, on

⁷ Ibid., pp. XV-XVI.

⁸ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 9, 11882.

⁹ New York Times, August 22, 1949, p. 20.

August 22, asserted apparently on the basis of the writer's evaluation that Judd was "a person of outstanding integrity" and because he "would not make charges lightly" such contentions "must necessarily add to the already considerable mistrust with which the White Paper had been received."¹⁰ The White Paper, Judd declared, released the Wedemeyer report two years too late. By suppressing the report and failing to follow Wedemeyer's recommendation, Judd declared, the Administration "assumed a responsibility for the disaster in China which it can never escape."¹¹ Judd accused the State Department of deliberately withholding "documents and facts" in the White Paper, omissions which he felt must be revealed.¹² There were sixteen documents, reports and statements which Judd charged should be secured by the State Department and released.¹³

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 9, 11882.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ The documents, facts, and Judd's comments on them, which Judd charged the Administration withheld from publication in the China White Paper were:

"First. The 1944 to 1949 top secret report on the Chinese Communists prepared by the Military Intelligence Service of the American Army--and reportedly suppressed by General Marshall. I have had a copy of its conclusions for almost 4 years but naturally have never disclosed them. Now, however, after the State Department releases scores of other

secret documents on the subject, I have no hesitancy, in fact, I regard it as my duty to make the report public.

"Second. The document containing F. D. R.'s secret offer at Tehran to give Stalin 'rights' in Manchuria--just 1 week after he made contradictory promises to Chiang at Cairo--and an explanation why the offer was made. It is impossible to appreciate or evaluate the Yalta blunder except in terms of the Cairo commitments which are conveniently omitted.

"Third. The full text of Potsdam agreements with Russia on China.

"Fourth. F. D. R.'s famous telegram to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek delivered by General Stilwell about September 19, 1944.

"Fifth. The previous message from General Stilwell to General Marshall in Washington soliciting the President's dictatorial telegram to Chiang.

"Sixth. Chiang's answer to F. D. R. demanding General Stilwell's recall;

"Seventh. F. D. R.'s message to Chiang in March 1945 requesting him to place Communists on the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference;

"Eighth. The full reports, not just selected extracts, from American Foreign Service officers in China, especially in the years 1944-45, notably by Messrs. Davies, Service, and Ludden, wherein they showed themselves pro-Communist and against the Chinese Government which was our ally and assumed we were supporting, not working against, it;

"Ninth. Directives to Ambassador Hurley and his reports and recommendations;

"Tenth. The Henry Wallace report to F. D. R. on China in 1944--allegedly written by Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, who accompanied Wallace on his trip. The white paper says this report is not in the State Department files. It must be produced from wherever it is and published;

"Eleventh. After F. D. R.'s death, the telegram from Washington to Ambassador Hurley in China instructing him to disregard the Roosevelt policy of support for the Chinese Government and to act toward the Chinese Communists as Henry Wallace had;

"Twelfth. Some explanation why no reference is made in the white paper to the Lauchlin Currie, Owen Lattimore, and Donald Nelson missions to China, their reports and recommendations;

"Thirteenth. Full directives by General Marshall or other officials to the American military advisory group in Nanking limiting the assistance and advice they might give to the Chinese Government forces;

Had the documents which Judd cited been included in the White Paper its general nature would have been altered very little, if any. The so-called "deliberately omitted" documents were no more damaging to the Administration's policy, as Judd attempted to present them to be, than other material included. But to Judd, apparently for argument's sake, it was impossible "to judge the case [which] the administration strives to make for itself" without the so-called missing pieces of evidence.¹⁴ Judd's action in demanding that certain documents be made public was perhaps more of a device to embarrass the Administration than to get at the "truth" as he termed it. For the most part, the documents which Judd demanded were not essential in determining or accounting for the course which the United States

"Fourteenth. The original text of General Wedemeyer's... statement of August 1947, in order to compare it with the version actually released after it has been transmitted to General Marshall, then at the Rio conference, and doctored by someone there on in the Department here;

"Fifteenth. The full text of Acting President Li Tsung-jen's recent letter to President Truman whereof Secretary Acheson had reproduced only three paragraphs, the motivation for which cannot be understood without the rest of the letter.

"Sixteenth. The explanation of why nothing from General MacArthur or SCAP has been included. Is it possible that they never were asked to present their views as to what they think necessary in Asia in order to keep Japan independent and solvent? Or were their views disregarded?" Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

pursued in China. It was the very thing which Judd demanded for China which the Administration feared and would not allow--complete entanglement in the Chinese civil war. Judd viewed the situation in China as "essentially similar" to that which the United States faced in Greece. This was not a logical conclusion in regard to the two countries, and if Judd ever came to the conclusion that the situation in China was essentially different from Greece, he never admitted it. Judd charged that the Democratic Administration since F.D.R.'s death had not tried "to win the war in China," but only "tried to end it."¹⁵ Despite Judd's acceptance of Wedemeyer's recommendations for China in general, he seemingly refused to accept the General's admonition that "military force in itself will not eliminate communism," and that further aid to China should be based on domestic reform.¹⁶ But Judd was to charge at a later date, by innuendo, that even the Wedemeyer report had to be "doctored"¹⁷ by the State Department or some minor governmental official. Regardless of Judd's charges, Wedemeyer asserts in his report: "To regain and maintain the confidence of the people,

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ United States Relations with China, p. 258.

¹⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 11882.

the Central Government will have to effect immediately drastic, far-reaching political and economic reforms."¹⁸ To Judd's charge that the spread of Communist power in China was the fault of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, President Truman and the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dr. Ting'u F. Tsiang, Nationalist China's representative in the United States, commented that while he "respected Mr. Judd's wisdom he did 'not share all of his political animosities.'"¹⁹

While condemning Acheson for the White Paper, Judd inserted into the Congressional Record the summary of a secret report, which he asserted had been made by the Army Military Intelligence Service in 1944-45, of the Chinese Communist movement. He declared that he had possessed the report for nearly four years.²⁰ Judd termed the report "secret" but did not specify how he obtained the report or why the "classified" material had been turned over to him. Neither Judd nor the summary of the report indicated at whose direction the study had been made, its purpose, its final disposition, or who had compiled the summary. The

¹⁸ United States Relations with China, p. 258.

¹⁹ New York Times, October 10, 1951, p. 4.

²⁰ For text of this summary report see: U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 15, A5501-03.

"secret document" stated nothing new or startling in terms of objectives of the Chinese Communists. But apparently Judd did not have all the information about what he was releasing, or he sought to obtain political advantages from it and continued to operate on the theory that had the report been followed then in his words "today's catastrophe might not be upon us."²¹ Judd charged: "it cannot be that this report was not available to our State Department, especially when General Marshall was its Secretary." How, Judd queried, "could anyone have read its conclusions and then followed policies in China based on suppositions wholly contradictory to those conclusions?" Further, Judd asserted, "on what possible excuse can the document have been omitted from the white paper which is supposed to give our people a full and balanced picture of the situation in China and why we did as we did." Setting aside the question of validity of the release, Judd found it a convenient weapon in his attempt to discredit the Administration and embarrass Secretary Acheson. To Judd, "no fair-minded person" could have read this document and then tried to justify the Administration's China policy as Secretary Acheson had sought to do in his letter transmitting the White Paper.²²

²¹Ibid., p. A5501.

²²Ibid.

The Secretary of State, during a press conference on August 24, endeavored to answer Judd and other critics of the White Paper. He declared with a note of finality, the New York Times related, "that there was 'not an iota of truth' in charges and insinuations that the State Department had deliberately omitted important documents from its White Paper on United States-Chinese relations." The Secretary further declared that "these charges and insinuations, which implied bad faith on the part of the State Department in making public the history and rationale of its policy with China, "are not supported by any evidence." They could not be supported, he asserted, "because there is not an iota of truth in them."²³ He stated that the documents which Judd cited were not in the State Department's files, or were not considered important to the over-all China situation, or they did not give substantially different meanings or impressions from extracts of other material which had been included in the White Paper.²⁴ "Calmly," the Times related, "but with a hint of exasperation at the insistence of the charges, Mr. Acheson presented an analysis of sixteen allegations of 'dishonesty' in the White Paper."²⁵

²³ New York Times, August 25, 1949, p. 25.

²⁴ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess, 1949, XCV, Part 11, 15091.

²⁵ New York Times, August 25, 1949, p. 25.

Secretary Acheson also made available to reporters, on August 25, a two-volume War Department report of 412 pages on China and a thirteen page summary of that report, which Judd had previously read into the Record as a startling expose. The summary, Acheson asserted, "had heretofore not been seen by the State Department." Acheson specifically answered Judd's charges regarding this summary and report. It was the opinion of the State Department that Judd had seen only the summary when he made his charges, and that the "summary" did not adequately cover the full report, but in many instances "drew conclusions that were the direct opposite of those offered in the master volumes."²⁶ In his analysis of the sixteen charges made by Judd against the State Department White Paper, Secretary Acheson declared:

The report of the military intelligence division of the War Department entitled 'The Chinese Communist Movement' dated July 1945, states the fact of which the department was always aware that the Chinese Communists were Communists. It also stated that some of the keenest observers go so far as to predict the ultimate ascendancy of the Chinese Communists in China if the present reactionary groups are allowed to continue in power.

It fully confirms the view of the Department that the conduct of the ruling clique in the Kuomintang [the Chinese Nationalist Government party] had caused the Government to lose its popular following. It confirms the view expressed in the 'White Paper' that during the war against Japan the Government in

²⁶ Ibid.

Chunking was devoting more attention to strengthening its internal position than to fighting the common enemy.

It states that 'unity between the Chinese political parties is the key to a solution of China's problems.' It argues in favor of agreement between the Chinese National Government and the Soviet Union. ²⁷

It was not, however, until nearly two months later that Judd publicly replied to Acheson's news conference. He then charged that if "those in charge of American policy in Asia failed to secure and study" the War Department report which he had released, "then they were guilty of something worse."²⁸ Judd thus did not charge the Administration or the Secretary of State as such with having "pro-Communist" leanings, but by snipping and innuendoes he implied that they chose to listen to "pro-Communists" over certain military men--men who agreed with his assessment of the China situation. There were the Generals Stilwell, Marshall, and Barr, Judd declared, who said that nothing could be done for China. There were, however, in contrast to these three, MacArthur, Chennault, and Wedemeyer, who advocated the course that China would be saved; and there were eight Admirals, "Hart, Yarnell, Barbey, Leahy, Cooke, Kincaid, followed by Badger and then Radford, who said it

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 11, 15091.

could and must be done." Thus, Judd asserted, those individuals in the War and State Department and in the Executive branch who said nothing could be done for China "should be removed from office or take themselves out of...[the]... predicament where they...[had] to struggle with something" they could not succeed in accomplishing.²⁹

Judd then reported that he felt "constrained" to release another document. Since his first expose he had not achieved the desired results, and since the State Department chose to ignore his demands, Judd became more reckless in his charges. His release on October 19, 1949, was the full text of a memorandum by John S. Service, a foreign service officer assigned to China, which had been submitted to General Stilwell on October 10, 1944. Service, at the time, was stationed at the Communist Headquarters in Yen-an. The "Service memorandum" is summarized in the White Paper,³⁰ and the full text does not reveal any additional insight into Service's evaluation of the complex problem which faced the United States in China at that time. Judd, however, apparently believed that by inserting Service's report and

²⁹Walter H. Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid? We Help Our Enemy and Deny Our Friends," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (March 1, 1951), 298.

³⁰See: United States Relations with China, p. 574.

an address by Wedemeyer,³¹ he could win Congressional sympathy for his cause by offering a comparison of the ideas of a man whom he considered a patriotic American with one whose ideas had to be less than patriotic--Service had charged that the Kuomintang would not allow needed reforms "because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own undemocratic power."³² Judd charged that Service illustrated "the conniving against highest officials of the Government of China...carried on even during the war by representatives of our Government."³³

Judd continued to berate Service and the State Department by inference: "After Mr. Service was transferred from China...he was involved in the Amerasia case...[a] notoriously pro-Communist magazine.... Since then he has been promoted several times and is now Chairman of the Committee within the State Department which makes recommendations for all promotions."³⁴ Judd then made the caustic statement that mistakes of the Service nature would in the armed for-

³¹Wedemeyer's address was made at the Double Ten celebration of the Chinese Republic, Roosevelt Hotel, New York, on October 10, 1946; U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 11, 15091-94.

³²Ibid., p. 15092.

³³Ibid., p. 15091.

³⁴Ibid., p. 16092.

ces "produce a court martial," but in "the State Department they earn promotions."³⁵ By such tactics Judd apparently felt that the State Department would be forced to assume the role in China which he desired.³⁶

John K. Fairbank, on October 20, 1949, took the New York Times to task for giving credence to Judd's charges without presenting the other side of the story. Fairbank pointed out that the "United Press report of the same day [October 19, 1949] quotes the department press officer, who pointed out that the White Paper on China had already published the 'most forceful' parts of Mr. Service's document." This point was omitted from the Times news article. "Your report further implies," Fairbank continued, "that in the Amerasia case Mr. Service was one of those who 'escaped' indictment, a phrase which suggests that you consider the law to have been thwarted by its own procedures." Commenting on Service's position in the State Department, Fairbank declared that Service is not, as Judd alleges, "chairman of the State Department Promotion Committee." Fairbank defend-

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ New York Times covered Judd's charges on October 19, 1949. New York Times, October 20, 1949, p. 24.

ed Service's reports of 1943 and 1944³⁷ as "farsighted" and "courageous"; he praised Service for his foresight of the "disaster" which the United States would experience if the country "relied entirely on the Kuomintang to maintain our position in China." Service's warnings, Fairbank continued, "were distasteful to Ambassador Hurley and were disregarded, but the disaster in China has now occurred nevertheless." Fairbank in closing gives an expression of Judd's influence on the China policy: "It ill becomes Congressman Judd, whose intense partisanship for Chiang Kai-shek has been regarded by many as contributing to our present predicament, to read into the Congressional Record just before adjournment an 'exposure' of a document, the main points of which had already been published."³⁸

Judd was unwilling at this late date to accept the strength or popular support of the Chinese Communist movement. In 1953, however, he could charge: "One of the gravest errors ever made by our Government, under the never-ending hammering of Communist-inspired propaganda,

³⁷For text of Service's reports see United States Relations with China, pp. 564-76.

³⁸Letter to editor, "Mr. Service and the White Paper," John K. Fairbank, Cambridge, Mass., October 20, 1949; New York Times, November 2, 1959, p. 26.

was to underestimate the strength of the Chinese Communists."³⁹ He still believed it possible "for Communist expansion in China to be stopped by a change in American policy."⁴⁰ One of the most persistent overriding fallacies of the Asia-First element was their refusal or their inability to judge and accept the might of the Chinese Communist forces and the popular support which they had amassed in China. On August 19, 1949, Judd commented: "It appears the State Department prefers not to make a change" in its policy toward China; if this be the case, "then the communization of Asia and World War III are inevitable."⁴¹ Not only with Judd, but with the Asia-Firsters, the inevitability of World War III became a most common byline--they never tired of repeating the phrase.

No longer was it difficult for Judd and the Asia-First-er element to accept the thesis that Marshall's mission of 1946 was a deliberate move to embarrass Chiang Kai-shek, to undermine his prestige, and to strengthen the Communists. Only as part of a sinister plot could they see Marshall publicly calling upon Chiang Kai-shek to take the Chinese

³⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 9, A1180.

⁴⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 15, A5445-46.

⁴¹Ibid., p. A5446.

Communists leaders into a coalition government. Such a proposal, they proclaimed, coming officially from a country that was historically China's friend denoted that more than honest and sincere diplomacy was involved. Thus, Judd declared, on VJ Day the United States had "almost every ace and every trump in the Pacific," and still "lost the game." In Judd's mind Marshall stood condemned: "Whoever was the author or architect of the policies for establishing a coalition with the Chinese Communists, General Marshall was executor of the policies."⁴² The Administration's policies in China, Judd asserted, demonstrated how "immature" the State Department officials were in the political and ideological fields.⁴³

The legislative branch had fought a losing battle with the State Department, Judd stated time after time. Had the Administration adopted and "vigorously pursued" policies in Asia similar to those in Europe, then the United States could have prevented the "catastrophe beyond estimation" not only to American security but to any prospect of having a balance of power in the world. With Communists in control in China the world balance of power was broken, Judd felt,

⁴²U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14960.

⁴³U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 14, A3668.

and thus the United States could no longer exert sufficient influence on the Soviet Union toward cooperation rather than conquest.⁴⁴ Judd, however, believed that Chiang Kai-shek could be returned to the mainland and that China could be restored to Nationalist control with relative ease. If not, he asserted, "it means inevitable war with Communist China."⁴⁵ Because a third world war was inevitable if China went Communist, to the Asia-First thought process, "preventive war" gradually became their group cry. Thus, Judd as he had done only a decade before, took up the mantle to warn the American people of the inevitability of war. But unlike his earlier venture his 1949 prophecy was to prove less accurate.

Despite the activities of the China friends in the United States in trying to goad the Administration to take a firmer position in China, the deterioration of the Nationalist regime prevented any beneficial American assistance. Chiang Kai-shek went into "retirement" on January 21, 1949. General Li Tsung-jen, who in 1948 had been named Vice President over Chiang's objections, assumed the position of acting President of the Republic of China. On the surface

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 11, 14960.

it appeared that Chiang's self-removal had disposed of the major obstacle to the success of a more effective American policy in China. A closer observation of the Chinese political development demonstrates that this was not the case. The Generalissimo had, prior to the announcement of his so-called retirement from the presidency, transferred the Republic's liquid assets of gold bullion, silver bullion, and foreign exchange notes, from Nanking to Formosa.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 497; New York Times, February 15, 1949, p. 7. Chiang's shipment of the above cited assets to Formosa was the subject of a heated debate between Tom Connally (D-Tex), the avid pro-Administration China policy advocate, and William F. Knowland (R-Calif), the extreme anti-Administration China policy critic, in September, 1949. The exchange of words between the two Senators resulted from an amendment to the mutual defense assistance legislation offered by Knowland to give \$150,000,000 to the Nationalist Government.

Connally, opposing Knowland's amendment, declared on September 7: "When it comes to having our Government give something more to China, we shall consider that in the committee....I do not think it is fair for the Senator to be making speeches on the floor of the Senate for popular consumption, in an effort to stir up the ragged battalions of those who would throw \$2,000,000,000 or \$3,000,000,000 more into the rat hole in China in order to resuscitate and bring to life Chiang Kai-shek, who has deserted his people and has gone to Formosa with \$138,000,000 in gold in his pocket, money which does not belong to him. It did belong to the Chinese Government, but he has absconded with it. Why do not they spend the \$138,000,000 before they call on us for another hand-out?" U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 10, 12640.

Two days later, September 9, Knowland challenged Connally's statement that Chiang had absconded with the \$138,000,000. Knowland expressed his contempt for the Administration forces by declaring: "I am becoming a little bit 'fed up' with persons being 'whispered to death' by the

Furthermore, Chiang had requested that after December, 1948, all future American shipments, as provided by the Chinese Assistance Act, be delivered to Formosa. Thus, even during his so-called retirement, Chiang controlled Formosa and the party machinery of the Kuomintang with an iron fist, and he did interfere with governmental affairs and political policies by behind-the-scene maneuvers and through his personal followers. Chiang also "retained actual control over the navy and air force and two major army groups on the mainland, whose active cooperation and effective employment were indispensable for a successful defense of the Yangtze."⁴⁷ The Yangtze was considered a formidable barrier to the advance of the Communist forces, who had neither a navy nor an air force, and who lacked experience in amphibious warfare.

Department of State or with information being given out from time to time to undermine and to pull the rug from under the non-Communist forces in China, because every time that is done, in my judgment, it means aid and encouragement to the Communist forces in that great country." Immediately following Knowland's remarks Connally reported: "'I want to apologize. I made an error in my statement at that time. I said that Chiang Kai-shek had taken \$138,000,000 in gold. I was absolutely in error. He took more than \$300,000,000 in gold to Formosa. I did not say he took it to spend for himself. I said it belonged to the Nationalist Government of China. He resigned his position in the Nationalist Government. He is supposed to be a private citizen, and yet he takes the gold that belongs to the treasury of the Nationalist Government.'" Ibid., p. 12758.

⁴⁷ Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 497.

With North China lost to the Nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek in "retirement" the United States faced the alternative of defending the Yangtze with American forces or further withdrawing from China. When due consideration is given to other pressing problems facing the Administration in the late 1940's it is clear that the Administration had little choice. Furthermore, there was a serious question whether American intervention at this time could have changed the course of events in China. American assumption of a more positive role would have required countless men, monies, and resources which the American public was apparently unwilling to furnish. Only a minority of those Americans interviewed in several national surveys favored strong measures to resist Communist expansion in China.⁴⁸ The American Chamber of Commerce of Tientsin, China, expressed similar feelings in March, 1949. On March 12, the Consul General at Tientsin forwarded to the State Department the text of a memorandum from the Chamber of Commerce which strongly opposed further aid to the Chinese Government. Three days later the Consul General commented: "Americans in Tientsin feel that the only result of further U. S. aid to a Government which has proved so ineffective that most

⁴⁸Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), p. 105.

[of] our previous aid has passed to the Communists will be to further strengthen the Communists....They feel that our global policy of opposition to Communism should not oblige us to support a hopelessly inefficient and corrupt government which has lost the support of its people....They feel that the present situation must be solved by the Chinese and that for the time being we should adopt a hands-off policy."⁴⁹

To Judd, however, a "hands off" policy in China would eventually result in the conquest of the United States by the Communist forces. Judd's thesis was that there were four areas of the world where two ideologies--Democracy and Communism--were contending for the "mastery of men's minds." Judd still held the concept that Communism wins initially by force--not by propaganda. To Judd, however, the future of the world depended on which one of these ideologies--Democracy or Communism--was victorious in each of these four areas. The first area was Germany, which Judd viewed as decisive to the future of Europe. "As Germany goes so will go Europe," Judd declared.⁵⁰ The second crucial area

⁴⁹United States Relations with China, pp. 299-300.

⁵⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCV, Part 9, 12293. Judd recommended "highly" Freda Utley's book, The High Cost of Vengeance (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1949), as a "sharp penetrating study."

were the countries of the perimeter area of Germany on the South and West. The third vital area was Asia. He accepted and expounded the "domino theory" for Asia. If a single Asian country was lost to the Communist camp, Judd believed, then all other Asian countries would follow.⁵¹ By 1949, Judd was expressing frequently the thesis that if Asia was not to remain "free" in the "democratic camp" then it would have been better to have Asia under the Japanese than under Russian domination. This argument resulted from his fear of a strong Russian influence in both Europe and Asia. Judd apparently rejected nationalism, which has been a great force in world history, feeling that the Chinese Communists were committed to making the Soviet Union the strongest force on earth. At this time Judd felt that a strong Japan in Asia could be used against Russia's absorbing all of Asia, and thus it would have been better for the United States to have Japan the strongest power in Asia than to allow Russia to be the strongest power in both Europe and Asia.⁵²

"It isn't that we don't care about Europe when we say you've got to pay attention to Asia," Judd argued, "it's

⁵¹Walter H. Judd, "Which Direction in Foreign Policy," Midland Schools, LXIII (December 1948), 12.

⁵²Ibid., p. 13.

because we do care about Europe."⁵³ To Judd a Russia with satellites all along her Asiatic frontier would have security against the West; then she could turn attention to Europe and defeat American security there. Thus, to Judd the "best hope...of preventing war with Russia" involved keeping China "in the ring so that the Soviet Union has got to divide its forces, its energies, and its efforts between two widely separated fronts."⁵⁴ In turn, the fourth and last crucial area in Judd's argument was the United States. Why the United States? Because in the United States "those who mold our policies will determine what happens in Europe and Asia--and whether we are to be free," Judd declared. The great mistake, Judd argued at this time, was that the United States ever assumed that the Soviet Union was a "peace-loving democracy."⁵⁵

Despite the fact that Judd had once accepted the good intentions of the Soviet Union, he could expound with apparently no qualms what he believed at the time, regardless of having believed something else at another time. Despite the reality that arguments of the vast majority of politicians vary with the changing international climate, Judd's

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

vindictive and self-righteous indictments placed him in a unique political category. Judd apparently found it convenient to charge that it was Acheson's "negativism," a "defeatism," which allowed Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts to proclaim the establishment of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, and to complete their conquest by the end of the year. Judd, like Wedemeyer, found it more comforting to blame the Administration for the defeat of the Chinese "spirit" to stay the spread of Communist forces into South China than to accept the possible reality that the Chinese peasants lacked an alternative in opposing Communism. Both men (as was true of the Asian clique) failed to realize or failed to accept what might be termed the Chinese peasants' alternative--Communism did offer the Chinese peasant a hope for a better tomorrow, while Chiang seemed to offer nothing more than another forty years of despotism. John K. Fairbank's account of Communist victories in China varies widely from Judd's. To Fairbank what the "nationalist troops lacked was something worth fighting for as an alternative to Chinese Communism."⁵⁶ Thus, Fairbank concluded: "On balance, I am afraid we must put the Communist victory in China down as a case of self-determination, not of outside

⁵⁶John K. Fairbank et al., Next Step in Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 18.

aggression."⁵⁷

With China in the hands of the Mao forces, the Secretary of State, on January 12, 1950, proceeded to approach the Asian problem in terms of American military strategy. Speaking before the National Press Club, Acheson pointed out: "There is in this vast area what we might call a developing Asian consciousness, and a developing pattern... based upon two factors which are pretty nearly common to the entire experience of all Asian people."⁵⁸ One of the factors was a "revulsion against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the normal condition of life." The other was the "revulsion against foreign domination," and whether the foreign domination took the "form of colonialism" or whether it took the "form of imperialism," the Asians are through with it, Acheson asserted.⁵⁹ He said that national independence to the Asian had "become the symbol both of freedom from foreign domination and freedom from the tyranny of poverty and misery." The Secretary of State then presented his interpretation of why the Nationalist regime

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Dean Acheson, "Relations of the Peoples of the United States and the Peoples of Asia: We can Only Help When We are Wanted," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVI (February 1, 1950), 239.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

fell: "What has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended." The Chinese people did not bother to "overthrow" their government, Acheson asserted, they simply "ignored" it--the peasants "completely withdrew their support" from the Chiang Government, and when their support was withdrawn, the "whole military establishment disintegrated."⁶⁰ Thus, to Acheson when there was added to the "grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command" the "total lack of support in both the armies and in the country," the Chiang regime could not continue. It was not the Communists that created this situation, Acheson asserted, but they were "shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing into victory and power."⁶¹

Judd, however, viewed the demise as resulting from America's great folly of putting "reform ahead of security" in China. Thus, to Judd the Administration's "pre-occupation" in China was to produce economic recovery and development, based on the thesis that "Communism wins by propaganda, that people voluntarily choose Communism--and especially in countries where people are in poverty."⁶² In contrast

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 240.

⁶² U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10558.

to other occasions when it was expedient to dramatize propaganda as a powerful weapon, Judd scoffed at Acheson employing it in explaining the Communist conquest of China. Here Judd left no room in his logic for degrees of the effectiveness of either propaganda or arms. He viewed all problems in absolute terms. Judd's argument was that Communism "never...won a country by propaganda"--Communism only wins by "force of arms." He could thus assert that "The really powerful and successful propaganda comes after, not before, the conquest."⁶³ Judd apparently refused to accept to any degree the view that the civil war in China was "a war of ideas" coupled with a "war of armaments" rather than a war of military might alone.⁶⁴

Acheson's willingness to use military might in Asia was entirely too limited to satisfy Judd or the Asia-First element. The Secretary of State spoke of the "defensive perimeter" of the United States in the Pacific as "running from the Aleutian Islands off Alaska, to Japan, to Okinawa

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ In 1952, however, during House debate on appropriations for the Voice of America, Judd found it convenient to take the opposite point of view: "But we cannot defeat ideas with arms," he asserted. "We can defeat ideas only with better ideas, more skillfully and successfully presented." U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIV, Part 7, 8894.

south of Japan, and on to the Philippines."⁶⁵ Acheson made plain that the United States would fight if any of these points or any areas east of them were attacked. "So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned," Acheson declared, "it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." Should an attack occur outside the "perimeter," Acheson continued, "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitment of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression."⁶⁶ It was folly for the United States, he declared, to attempt to furnish all the components to solve the problems in China and the southern part of Asia. But, "if the will and if the determination exists and if the people are behind their government, then, only in such a situation could American assistance be effective, and only then could it lead to an accomplishment which could

⁶⁵Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 152.

⁶⁶Acheson, "Relations of the Peoples of the United States and the Peoples of Asia," p. 241. —

not otherwise be achieved," Acheson asserted.⁶⁷

Answering his critics who pointed out logical inconsistencies in American foreign aid and assistance, Acheson explained that to demand exactly the same relationship toward every country was not a "helpful way of discussing foreign policy," and it was "a very false trend." The United States, he declared, must act in regard to a "foreign nation strictly in regard to American interests or those wider interests which affect American interest."⁶⁸ Thus, "if it is to American interests or those wider interests which affect it, to do one thing in one country and another thing in another country," then this was the policy which the United States should follow. Acheson saw in his critics the failure to realize that the problems which faced China were quite different from the problems which plagued Greece. Thus he charged the Asia-Firsters were attempting to "bounce" one problem off of "another problem" without facing the issue or problem directly or in a realistic manner.⁶⁹ This

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 241-42. It was generally agreed by military men with knowledge of South Korea that the area would not be tenable if there were any real effort by Russia to take it. General Marshall expressed such sentiment during late 1948; U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 1, 651.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 244.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

speech, Judd later declared, invited a Communist attack on South Korea.⁷⁰

On June 24, 1950, approximately six months after Acheson chided the Asia-Firsters and Judd about their unrealistic attitude on American aid and assistance, the massive attack on South Korea by North Koreans was launched.⁷¹ Three days later--June 27--President Truman announced that he had ordered United States air and naval forces in East Asia to assist the South Koreans; furthermore, he instructed the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. The following day, in compliance with President Truman's request, the Nationalist Government ordered its forces to cease attacks on the Chinese mainland. The President had instructed the Seventh Fleet to see "that this is done"--an order later dubbed as the "leashing" of Chiang Kai-shek.⁷² The United Nations Security Council approved the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur as United Nations Commander in Korea on July 7, after having endorsed the President's action on June 27. Whatever Congressional bipartisanship had characterized

⁷⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10558.

⁷¹Eastern Standard Time. Early in the morning June 25, Korean time.

⁷²Congressional Quarterly Service, China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966 (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1967), p. 53.

the early months of the Korean conflict quickly disintegrated after the Red Chinese were discovered aiding the North Koreans in October, 1950. The Korean conflict, however, was not the only factor in the ever widening split between the Executive and Legislative branches, or among the legislators. Earlier in the year Joseph R. McCarthy, a Wisconsin Republican, set off the most devastating "witch hunt" the country had ever experienced, which only further complicated the execution of a rational Asian policy.

McCarthy was but one symptom of a greater condition which blanketed the country. In 1950, during Vandenberg's last illness, attempts at bipartisanship ground to an abrupt halt as the nation came under the grip of "a strange, un-American malaise, compounded of personal insecurity, economic doubts, and anti-Communist fears."⁷³ A growing number of Americans sought simple answers to the complicated problems facing the nation--these Americans likewise, chose to follow the leaders who provided the simplest solution. Out of the resulting anxiety Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., saw arising a "New Isolationism" which was later referred to by some historians and journalists as "neo-isolationism." Schlesinger felt that the "New Isolationism" was real and that it was

⁷³ Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, McCarthy, The Man, the Senator, the "Ism" (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), p. 381.

bent upon what promised to be a fundamental attack on the foreign policy to which the United States and the free world were committed.⁷⁴ President Truman hinted at what Schlesinger was saying when he wrote: "There were some [Americans by late 1950] who wanted to pull all our troops out of Korea, turn out back on Europe, and build up a 'Fortress America.'⁷⁵"

Schlesinger declared that "a new isolationist formulation was bound to come--a new triangulation by which the old emotions would try to make terms with the new realities and issues in the form of up-to-date doctrine and program."⁷⁶ Some observers saw in a December, 1950, speech of Herbert Hoover the "setting off" of one phase of the discussion which evolved into the "New Isolationism." Hoover had asserted in his address that the United States should withdraw to the defense of the American Continent: "The foundation of our national policies must be to preserve for the world this Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western civilization."⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," Atlantic, CLXXXIX (May, 1952), 35.

⁷⁵ Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope: Memoirs, vol. II (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 414.

⁷⁶ Schlesinger, "The New Isolationism," p. 36.

⁷⁷ Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1956), p. 26. "Such politically divergent figures as former President Hoover, and the late Senator Brien McMahon, Democratic Chairman of the Joint Congression-

Hoover further declared that the United States did not need Europe for its defense. General MacArthur set off another phase of discussion with his speeches following his recall in 1951, demanding in April, 1951, "a cut in the size of projected military forces, a reduction in the military budget, and a more aggressive war in Asia," and added "subsequently that our reduced forces should be committed to the protection of the Suez Canal."⁷⁸ The "supreme emotional link" of the "New Isolationism" with the "Old Isolationism," Schlesinger declared, was its dislike of allies and its desire for unilateral action by the United States."⁷⁹

The new isolationism wanted "other nations to establish their own strength first in order to prove themselves worthy of American aid," excepting only "Chiang Kai-shek or Franco." The "vital dangers to American freedom and survival," according to this group, were not external; they were internal, and of the internal dangers two were of decisive importance: the dangers of excessive government spending,

al Committee on Atomic Energy, both claimed that the defense budget could be reduced by billions, while our security was being improved, by developing our atomic capability and air power to the full at the expense of 'conventional' land forces." New York Times Magazine, "Dissection of the 'Fortress America' Idea," August 17, 1952, p. 7.

⁷⁸Schlesinger, "The New Isolationism," p. 36.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 36-37.

and the danger of Communist penetration within the country.⁸⁰ Government spending, in the new isolationist view, was the "overriding issue of national survival," and likewise, McCarthyism was an "indispensable part of the new isolationism, because without it the new isolationism would be "almost indistinguishable from a policy of appeasement."⁸¹

Thus the new isolationists or the neo-isolationists wrote Europe off in their program by giving "lip service" but employing a "mental reservation" in supporting programs of some commitment in Europe, for they had the apparent intent of eventual withdrawal.⁸² The group, however, "had to implement its more aggressive program toward the Far East (it has been said that a neo-isolationist was one who wanted to fight in China) without challenging its domestic program of reduced expenditures."⁸³ China, the neo-isolationists contended, had to be made safe for the United States through support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist cause. The safety of the United States, however, had to be achieved at "minimum cost and without [direct] American responsibility

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 37.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 38.

⁸²Ibid., p. 37; Graebner, The New Isolationism, pp. 25-26.

⁸³Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 27.

or involvement."⁸⁴ In China America's traditional policy of the Open Door had been subverted by Communist victory, and thus America must once again regain the right to "venture forth" without, however, the additional costs of making Asia safe for such American ventures.⁸⁵

Expectations for China presented the new isolationism with its chief challenge. The new isolationists accepted the hypothesis which Judd had been expressing for years that Chiang Kai-shek was preferable to anyone else in maintaining America's safety in Asia; thus Chiang had to be returned to power; and Communism as a direct threat to American democracy and safety must be driven from the Asiatic scene. But to execute such a venture required a price, "and this price might be so high that it would destroy the domestic program of reduced expenditures and perhaps American security everywhere"--thus, the existence of Red Chinese power had to be explained away or denied. The defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, if against the United States' interest, then could not have been beyond America's power to prevent.

⁸⁴ Ibid. For examples of articles which express this point of view, and read into the Record by Judd see: Constantine Brown's articles, U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 12, A4930, and Edgar Ansel Mowrer's article, U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 8, A934.

⁸⁵ Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 27.

Therefore, it was concluded that since the United States did not prevent the demise of the Nationalists on the mainland, the real "threat" to the country's security throughout Asia must lie at home.⁸⁶

It was thus Senator Joseph McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, who "supplied the rhetoric" which bound the Asia-First orientation of the new isolationism to the cherished goal of limited expenditures.⁸⁷ The Senator's need for a campaign issue, and the resulting sensational charges, provided the new isolationism its needed nationale. By raising the charge of untold Communist subversion within the country, McCarthy produced the argument which would provide the reason for European withdrawal, concomitant with aggressiveness in Asia without burdening military commitments. Since the United States did not accomplish the objective of subduing, or did not sufficiently aid in staying, the Communist takeover in China, it meant but one thing--that the United States State Department was full of Communists. The Asia-First or neo-isolationist did not accept the possible tenet that "Asia had unleashed a new energy,"⁸⁸ in the form of socialism against Western imperialism.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

Judd moved in rapidly to share the limelight of the early period of McCarthyism; however, he later regretted the uniformity he had attempted to present between McCarthy and himself. McCarthy made his first defamatory attack on February 11, 1950, charging that there were fifty-seven Communists working in the State Department. Then came the charge, on February 20, that the State Department contained not only fifty-seven Communists, but some eighty-one employees whose loyalties were "questionable" and who were being protected by their superiors. Only after the Senate had voted unanimously for an investigation by the Foreign Relations Committee was McCarthy forced to cite names. He accused Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, who had headed the China White Paper compilation, as having "an unusual affinity for Communist causes."⁸⁹ Other alleged "security risks" included Owen J. Lattimore of Johns Hopkins University, former personal adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and director of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and John S. Service, a veteran foreign service diplomat; both men had advised the State Department in formulation of East Asian policies.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966, p. 49.

⁹⁰ Ibid. See pp. 48-55 for a chronological account of McCarthy's activities in the early 1950's and Anderson and May, McCarthy, The Man, the Senator, the "Ism," passim.

In contrast to McCarthy, who was forced to name names or face the possibility of contempt charges by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Judd took the more cautious approach when striking out against the Administration and State Department. Judd could assert, without the reprisal which McCarthy was experiencing, that had the responsible people in charge of the China foreign policy listened to "those who were willing to study thoroughly the Chinese Communists and their doctrines instead of reading the propaganda of the Fairbanks, Lattimores, Edgar Snows, and the Far Eastern Division of the State Department," then Chiang Kai-shek would not have fallen, and they could also see that the "Communists are in the process of making China a

McCarthy later charged that Lattimore was Russia's "top espionage agent in America." On April 6, 1950, Lattimore "confronted McCarthy before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. To McCarthy's charge that Lattimore was the architect of the country's policy of abandoning China to the Communists, Lattimore said: 'I wish I had more influence. If I had, I think the Communists would not now control China.' Lattimore called McCarthy a 'base and contemptible liar' and said he was 'either a fool or an enemy of his country.' He dared the Senator to accuse him off the Senate floor of being a Communist or Soviet spy. McCarthy answered that he would not repeat his charges without Congressional immunity unless the Government gave him Lattimore's loyalty files. Two weeks earlier, the Senator had said he would quit when the day came that he was afraid to repeat outside the Senate any charges he had made in the chamber." China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966, pp. 45,50.

colony of the Kremlin."⁹¹ Judd boasted on April 14, that he gave McCarthy "much" of the material used by McCarthy in his initial charges. He added, however, he did not think that McCarthy was handling the case very well. He cited McCarthy as "a fighting marine who just waded in instead of reconnoitering." Judd declared that McCarthy was trying to convict the State Department "on evidence the department has and he does not." Judd said he argued vainly for two hours to persuade McCarthy "not to make certain charges," because he was trying to convict the Administration on their own evidence. "Do you think the government is going to produce the evidence from its files?" Judd asked. "Of course not!"⁹² Judd asserted that the information he gave to McCarthy came "from individual FBI and State Department men." The Department of Justice cannot be depended on to "dig into the dangers cited by McCarthy," he added. The Republicans in Congress are supporting McCarthy's "objective" and admire his "courage", Judd concluded.⁹³ He further asserted that he had helped line up Louis Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker, as McCarthy's chief witness.

⁹¹U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 14, A2488.

⁹²Minneapolis Star, April 15, 1950.

⁹³Ibid.

"The country owes a great deal of gratitude," Judd continued, "to another former Communist, Whittaker Chambers, who probably ruined his career by becoming chief witness to help convict Alger Hiss," former State Department official, of perjury.⁹⁴

Only five days later Judd modified the story of his relationship to McCarthy. On April 19 he reported that the information he had turned over to the Wisconsin Senator was not sufficient to prove the charges that there were Communists in the State Department. He further departed from his original story by stating: "When McCarthy had made his charges and had been challenged, he contacted me and I gave him what material I had from the previous investigation..." (Judd was referring to an investigation conducted by the House Foreign Relations Committee of the 80th Congress.) He continued that he "deplored" McCarthy's "blanket charges" and that McCarthy had, "in effect, issued a verdict before witnesses have been on the stand." He added that he told McCarthy it was incomplete information which he possessed and that it should be investigated further before any direct charges are made. "Rather than look for Communists," Judd said, Congress should "investigate" key State Department

⁹⁴ Ibid.

officials "on the basis of their record in foreign affairs."⁹⁵ Earlier Judd had commented in typical McCarthy fashion that "Whether the Hisses, the Jessups, the Lattimores and the Achesons are or have been members of the Communist party, I don't know or care...but look at their record of failure." But to Judd, whether it was "stupidity" or "disloyalty," these individuals should be disqualified from continuing in office.⁹⁶ At the same time Judd indicated that the "Communism charges should be exploited by Republicans in this year's elections." In the past, he asserted, "Republicans have been guilty of failing to expose the errors of the Democratic national administration."⁹⁷ Despite Judd's suggestion that the Republicans should "expose" the Democrats, the Democrats retained control of both Houses in the Congressional election of 1950 (the Senate, however, by only a majority of two). The year 1951, however, produced the most vicious attacks on the Administration as the demand for an expanded Asian war grew.

During February, 1951, Judd, speaking to the Executive Club of Chicago, informed the club members that he was now

⁹⁵ Minneapolis Star, April 19, 1950.

⁹⁶ Minneapolis Star, April 15, 1950.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

"trying to prevent World War III."⁹⁸ As he had spoken in the period 1939-1941, he spoke again in 1951: "while we try to prevent war [World War III] we must be prepared to win it if it comes." He spoke as if he doubted whether there was time to make adequate preparations. Judd declared that the United States was "less secure" in 1951 than it had been when the nation had been founded. To Judd's mind the basic assumptions on which the policies were made which led to the difficulties facing the country in 1951 were the "abandonment" by Truman (and Roosevelt, during the latter period of his Administration) of the basic assumption or concept or policy which had been the United States' for almost a hundred years, which was designed to give the United States "security" on the West.⁹⁹

Judd, ignoring the widely accepted economic interpretation of the Open Door, chose to describe the Open Door policy as a pragmatic move by the United States--a policy not "based on sentimental feeling for the Chinese," but on the thesis that the best "guarantee" of American security in the Pacific was to have an independent, friendly China. The Open Door, Judd asserted, was considered in this light by every Administration down to recent years. What Judd was

⁹⁸ Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 293.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 294.

saying was a classic example of the unique type of thinking advanced by the entire Asian clique and by neo-isolationists: "It did not matter" what type of government the Chinese people wanted--this was beside the point. Whether the government of China was democratic or not was none of America's business. What was America's business was whether the leaders of China remained friendly to the United States and were willing to do what America wanted them to do. For China to have a "good government" was "desirable but wholly secondary," Judd proclaimed. Nor did it have to be an "honest government" or an "efficient government." The only important thing, the "key" Judd maintained, "what that the manpower and the resources of the bases of China be under Chinese friendly to the United States, and not under the control of potential enemies of the United States."¹⁰⁰ It is interesting to note here, in light of Judd's stand on China and America's dominant role there over the years, a comment which he made in 1945: "It is unfair to the British and to our allies not to make clear that we Americans will never pledge our men and resources to maintain any empire or to prevent other people from doing the same sort of thing we

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

ourselves did in 1776."¹⁰¹

Judd condemned the Democratic Administration of Roosevelt and Truman¹⁰² for what he considered the abandonment of "sound policy," and being "led by some Pied Piper into concern about whether the Chinese had liberal government and democratic government," and for wanting "to impose the 'Four Freedoms'...on the whole world."¹⁰³ Thus to Judd the Democratic Administrations "abandoned sound policies and went off following a will-o'-the-wisp." This "new assumption" of the Democrats, Judd charged, developed from the idea that the independence and friendliness of Europe was more essen-

¹⁰¹Walter H. Judd, "What Is the Truth about China? The Great Moral Decision of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese People," Vital Speeches of the Day, XI (June 1, 1945), 495. Chang Hsin-hsi, writing about Judd's remarks, said such an attitude was "how the Chiang Kai-sheks, Syngman Rhee, Bao Dais and Ngo Dinh Diems came into power and helped to make Communism popular." He continued: "Dr. Judd was a Christian missionary in China and a medical doctor! If one extends this view of China to the rest of the world, we can see why Communism has grown so rapidly since the end of the Second World War. It has been helped by a series of governments that are sponsored and financed by the United States, whose interests they serve; and by serving the United States they serve themselves and oppress the people of whom they eventually make themselves the enemies. Is it any wonder that they rise to overthrow their governments and go over to the Communists? Mao Tse-tung used to say that Chiang Kai-shek was his friend." Chang Hsin-hai, America and China: A New Approach To Asia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 103.

¹⁰²For an interesting evaluation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen by Judd see: Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 294.

¹⁰³Ibid.

tial to American security than the independence of Asia.¹⁰⁴

At this time Judd's hypothesis was that the Soviet Union, in her desire to control Europe, and because of failures in Greece and Germany, would try to capture Europe by a "flanking movement" through Asia. Such a movement, he felt, would take the Soviet Union through China, Southeast Asia, to Africa, and then on into Europe proper. Judd, in contrast to the "die-hard" group of neo-isolationists, advocated support for Europe--"selective support" which would foster security for the United States. If we did not help Europe, Judd asserted, it would fall into the Soviet Union's lap "like a ripe plum."¹⁰⁵ Aid to Europe, however, must carry the stipulation that the recipient view as an enemy anyone and everyone whom the United States viewed as an enemy. When Great Britain was first considering giving recognition to Red China, Judd declared that it would be very difficult for Congress to support aid programs for Britain in the future as it had in the past, if she gave "official recognition" (to Red China) and thereby enormous assistance to the Communist puppet regime in China, an avowed enemy of the West and a partner of the Kremlin."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 1, 14.

Judd asserted that he did not expect a conflict in Europe, if the United States got "realistic" and got "back on a sound track," meaning to abolish Communism throughout Asia. To Judd, the Democratic Administration, in its "pre-occupation to save Europe," followed the "faulty" assumption that the way to save Europe was to put forth effort in Europe alone, and in so doing, neglected to give adequate attention to basic concepts which he asserted were "stronger deterrents to Russian attack upon Europe than any possible strength" the United States could build up in Europe in the conceivable future. The greatest deterrent to the Soviet Union, to Judd, was what the United States could do to Russian factories and cities and lines of communications in Russia. In essence, Judd believed that the United States could "knock out" Russia before the Communists could retaliate against American movement. Apparently, at this late date of 1951, Judd did not completely ignore Soviet air and atomic power, but he felt that it was not important in Russia's supposed desire to conquer Europe. Why? Russia's use of air or atomic power would destroy Western Europe's industries--a vital factor in Russian expansion. It appeared that he rejected the possibility that the Soviet Union would strike first with air and atomic power to "knock out" American supply and air and ground forces throughout Europe

before using land forces in the conquest.¹⁰⁷

Judd expressed the belief that Russia could move to the English Channel just as fast as ground forces could walk. Thus in Judd's logic, the real deterrent whereby the United States could strike at Soviet bases was to build up in certain areas--"somewhat protected" from Russian land forces--American military strength from which the United States could "pound away" at Russia's "productive capacity," while Russian ground forces were moving to conquer Europe. He cited deterrents to Russian ground forces, behind which the United States should build up military strength: England, by the channel; Spain, by the Pyrenees Mountains; and particularly North Africa, where the Mediterranean was a "must" to protect American bases from Russian ground forces.¹⁰⁸

Judd had moved far away from his former position, held in 1945, that "You cannot beat a people just by air attack... It has never been done yet."¹⁰⁹ Thus, in 1951, Judd believed possible, in fighting Russia, that which he felt unworkable in 1945 and which was "a bitter pill for our military pride to swallow," when it was discovered that air power

¹⁰⁷How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 295.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Judd, "What Is the Truth about China?" 498.

alone would not defeat the Japanese in China.¹¹⁰

Another factor which Judd considered a greater deterrent to a Russian attack upon western Europe was the keeping of resistance forces alive and active in Asia, thus forcing the Soviets to divide their attention, their strength, their energy between widely separated fronts.¹¹¹ Judd never presented an over-all plan for his so-called total victory in Asia; however, he did have simple devices and tactics which he constantly threw out to the general listening public or to his Congressional cohorts. On one occasion he advocated the smuggling into Red China, behind the Communists' lines of "selected groups" to establish a "Department of Dirty Tricks," which he argued would prevent the consolidation of China in Communist hands. This, he felt, would cause the Red Chinese to fail in their "great promises," and thus help break the Communist movement throughout the Orient. If this was done, Judd contended, Stalin would "think a long, long time before starting trouble in Europe."¹¹² Judd consistently maintained that he did not favor the use of American land forces in aiding Chiang Kai-shek in retaking the mainland--Judd's "total victory" could be achieved, he assured

¹¹⁰Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 295.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 299.

the nation, without asking Americans to die in a fight for Chiang Kai-shek."¹¹³

The real key to Judd and the entire Asia-First element in liberating Asia from Communism, however, is found in the phrase "unleashing of Chiang." What was Washington waiting for? Judd asked over and over: "Red China is the enemy of the United States!"¹¹⁴ The Nationalist forces are the strongest allies the United States has in Asia, "and which, for no discoverable good reason," the United States is keeping "imprisoned on Formosa." Such action by the United States only gives the "Chinese Reds full opportunity to concentrate their strength against our forces in Korea." Thus, Judd proclaimed, it is "not only madness" but "it is murder" to leave the Seventh Fleet stationed in the Formosa Straits. "How long, Mr. Acheson, How long?", will you continue to "sacrifice American boys?", Judd cried.¹¹⁵ Judd, who declared that he fought the sending of American land forces to Korea,¹¹⁶ who opposed the use of the atomic bomb in

¹¹³U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 11, A476.

¹¹⁴Ibid., A12.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 299; U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., XCVII, Part 11, 7760. Whether Judd supported or opposed the use of "ground troops" in Korea was the source of considerable debate. On

February 2, 1951, Judd, speaking before the Executive Club in Chicago, said: "I fought against sending ground troops into Korea." He went on to explain that the Communists were the strongest in ground troops and the United States was weakest--thus the United States should use air power. Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 299. In 1962, however, when Donald Fraser declared in a campaign speech that Judd had opposed the use of ground troops in Korea, he was accused of "compounding a misrepresentation." See Minneapolis Star, October 4, 1962. Judd said he had not only urged use of troops in Korea after the 1950 North Korean invasion, but also "begged our government not to withdraw our forces from Korea a year previous to the invasion." "Instead of opposing the use of U. S. forces in Korea, I urged that we make our full strength available to the UN repeatedly during those first dark days," Judd replied. He cited speeches on the floor of the House of Representatives and on the radio at the time of the Korean invasion as evidence of his stand. Fraser replied: "On June 29, 1950, Judd was quoted in the Minneapolis Tribune as saying 'United States combat troops should not be used in South Korea.'" Judd was further quoted in the Tribune "as saying that one reason he opposed use of American combat troops in Korea is that such action would furnish propaganda for the Communists because 'You can't have whites fighting Asiatics.'" Minneapolis Tribune, October 3, 1962. A Minneapolis Republican official entered the conflict and said that the following sentence "should have been sufficient to show [Fraser] how wrong he would be if he made his groundless charges: 'Orders by President Truman for aid to South Korea--including American planes and warships--followed advice given secretly Monday to the State Department by Judd.'" Ramberg, the Minneapolis Republican, said Fraser quoted a part of the story that described Judd advising that U. S. combat forces not be used "at that time." Minneapolis Star, October 4, 1962. This incident is but one example of individuals attempting to pin Judd down on exactly what he had said and what he believed. The argument used by Ramberg appears groundless because it proves nothing. Judd was in the habit of speaking in broad general terms, and nearly any conclusion can be drawn from many of his speeches. Perhaps this was deliberate on Judd's part, that is, if the "prophet" was to play the role. The Minneapolis Tribune quoted Judd on September 19, 1959, on a labor reform bill: "He said he was glad the name of Sen. John Kennedy (D., Mass.) is on the bill because 'We get credit for the bill, but if things go wrong we can share the blame with him.'" Minneapolis Tribune, September 19, 1959. In speaking to a mixed political group, Judd could assert: "Here's one Republican who wants to give Democratic

Korea,¹¹⁷ could nevertheless ask: "If it is right for American boys to be fighting Chinese Reds in Korea, why is it wrong to let or to help Chinese anti-Communists fight them on their own soil?"¹¹⁸ Judd, without doubt, accepted the reality that the Korean venture was sponsored by the United Nations, but he refused to accept the reality that overthrowing the Chinese Communist regime and turning back Chinese Communists in Korea were not one and the same. Thus the Democratic Administration, apparently to his logic, had not made up its mind whether it wanted to "win" in Korea or not. If the United States wanted to win then everything possible should be done to weaken the enemy.¹¹⁹ Judd's solution was simple--all the world needed was "hard-headed doctors," with positive ideas.¹²⁰ Judd often asked, if we do not do everything possible to aid Chiang "then why should

former President Harry Truman 'credit for tying up the Communists for three years in Korea.'" (From speech given to Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs Convention, Minneapolis Star, May 20, 1954. At this time Judd's main theme was that Truman was "soft on Communism," and that he preferred to consult those with "pro-communist" sentiment.

¹¹⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 8, 10558.

¹¹⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 11, A476.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid?" p. 300.

our Government ask Americans to die in fighting" the Chinese Communists in Korea. "How long," Judd never tired of crying out on the House floor, "can this two-faced murderous policy be continued?"¹²¹

In like manner, but with a more belligerent tone, Orland K. Armstrong, Republican from Missouri, could assert that the Chinese Communist regime possessed the "weakest" governmental framework in the world. Armstrong, one of the most vocal advocates of "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek, and of the so-called "preventive war" theory, accused Congress of overlooking one major responsibility in dealing with the Korean conflict--that of declaring war. He charged the majority leaders "to assume their duty in this respect."¹²² Armstrong, like Judd, believed that the "preventive war" would be of short duration and a resounding victory for the United States: "I say to you, and I measure my words again, Communist China could be quickly defeated and the war in the Far East ended."¹²³ Armstrong, as did Judd, proclaimed

¹²¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 11, A476.

¹²²U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 12, A2162.

¹²³U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 4, 4813. A conversation on the House floor between Judd and Armstrong fully illustrates the "preventive war" advocates' thought process: Judd: "Is this what the gentleman is saying? You are not recommend-

with absolute certainty that the Soviet Union would not intervene "at the present time." That, he asserted, "is the almost unanimous opinion of all the military men we talked

ing that we tie ourselves exclusively to Chiang Kai-shek or the Nationalist Government. Rather it is your concern that we get effective help to all the forces opposing our mortal enemy in China. We ought not deny ourselves the benefit of the leaders who has [sic] the largest following and the most forces under his control. But at the same time, does not the gentleman agree, that we should with imagination and vigor support every single group or force on the mainland of China which is making trouble in the rear of the Communists, seeking to make them fail in their aggressive plans, discrediting them and their whole movement in Asia, and diverting some of their strength from Korea, where they are killing Americans.

Armstrong: "The gentleman is exactly correct. Let me summarize the advantages of this plan: It does not require the use of American ground troops on the mainland of China. It would permit the people of free China to regain their homes and liberties. It would save countless lives that will otherwise be lost in this stalemate war in Korea. It would reverse the tide of the Communist aggression and put us on the offensive and the Kremlin on the defensive. I say to you in this closing word, that since there is no substitute for victory, we cannot stop to negotiate with these Red Chinese aggressors. We have to go ahead to victory. In China we find a people who are ready for revolution against Communist aggression. If we win back China, it would give us the first victory over communism since 1945. The courage and strength of free men in the world are on trial today. I beg that we move quickly to give these free men the leadership they need.

Judd: "Some people are saying that if we do the things you have urged it will lead to all-out war with Communist China. Is it not rather a fact that this is the best hope we have of preventing all-out war with China; because if they win in China, they would be able to fight in the Philippines and fight in Japan and fight in Indo-China, and then we would be in trouble? Whatever the risks of the proposals which the gentleman has presented, the risks of any other alternative are infinitely greater." U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 4, 4814.

to." Red China's defeat would be simple and rapid without committing American ground forces, involving only "a naval blockade by the United States...blockading the Chinese coast,...bombing the Chinese military bases and supply lines, and...use of the Nationalist forces...."¹²⁴ With this accomplished in "short order" the Soviet Union would suffer her first great loss--which would be the beginning of the end for Communism throughout the world, the entire Asia-First element believed.

On May 3, 1951, when the China clique was discussing their scheme for unleashing Chiang and pulling off one of the most simple victories in the history of the world, John McCormack could restrain himself no longer. McCormack had been relatively quiet on the China issue since he had withdrawn his support some two year prior. He now asked Armstrong if it was not correct that the Nationalists had held the island of Hainan until several months ago. Armstrong admitted that this was correct. McCormack then asked him: "How many Communists captured the island?" When Armstrong could not answer the question McCormack reported that it had been captured by not "more than twenty or twenty-five thousand." Armstrong retorted: "I believe that Nationalist troops were ready to abandon it and move to Formosa."

¹²⁴ Ibid.

McCormack replied: "No, they had 130,000 troops there, the Nationalists." Judd then entered the discussion"

It had been decided in about December of 1949 by the Nationalist forces in Formosa that they would withdraw from Hainan, but before they could withdraw the first Communist attack came across the little gap of water between the mainland and Haina, and the generalissimo, so I am advised reliably, did not want to pull immediately under the pressure but withdraw gradually. His men stood off all attacks in the process of evacuating. When the twelfth attack came it was accompanied by the infiltration and defection of one Nationalist regiment in Hainan. It was the break-up of that regiment which brought the end. ¹²⁵

McCormack then demanded: "I want to know how many Nationalist troops there were there." "I think the gentleman has correctly stated, about 130,000," Judd replied. Then McCormack asked: "How many Communists were in the attacking force?" Judd expressed doubt that there were any "reliable" figures: he told McCormack that he questioned whether he could substantiate the number 25,000, after McCormack had cited it. McCormack, apparently satisfied that he had made his point, replied: "That may be so, but the number of Communists was considerably less than the number of Nationalists; and the Communists won because the Nationalists had somehow lost the will to fight." Judd typically reverted to 1946-47 and called out the ghost of the Marshall mission to explain why the

¹²⁵ Ibid., 4815. The entire "verbal battle" is found on this page in the Record.

Nationalists had lost the will to fight in 1951:

And why should not they after our repeated announcements that they were finished: Originally the Nationalist troops had plenty of will to fight, but we insisted they cease fire instead. Marshall's criticism when he went over there was because they had too much will to fight. He helped destroy their will to fight, although I do not suggest he realized what he was doing. If you will help the Nationalists a little again, especially with moral support, you will find they will come back almost overnight. ¹²⁶

McCormack said no more, apparently content that if his point was well taken the folly of unleashing Chiang would be exposed.

In the face of all arguments hurled at him Judd remained undaunted in his conviction that Chiang Kai-shek was the best that could be offered to insure a friendly China, and that his sole concern was for the "security" of the United States. Judd apparently found no contradiction in maintaining at the same time that the Soviet Union would not go to war in China while the United States aided Chiang and the Nationalist forces to liberate, what he termed, the freedom-loving and freedom-seeking Chinese masses of the mainland, and that "the Soviet Union and its satellites are at war with the United States and with the whole free world."¹²⁷

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3684.

He could continue to declare that "It is too late for us to strike first" as the "other side has already struck." He felt confident in scoffing at those whom he said did not want to "start a war or strike first." Likewise, in his confidence, he could assert that the only question which the United States faced, and had faced for years, was "how" and "where" and "when" should the United States strike back in order to be most effective.¹²⁸ That is the only decision which the United States has--"unless we are to surrender piecemeal." Thus Judd could state without hesitation that the "urgent question" is not whether there is to be a bigger war later on, but how the country can win the present war. Total victory in Korea, liberation of mainland China from the Communists, and restoration of Manchuria to the Nationalists was to Judd, the "best" way--the "only" way--to prevent the "bigger" war.¹²⁹

As the Korean conflict continued, "unleashing Chiang" became a potent issue among the Asia-Firsters and the congressional China chique. The Asia-Firsters found their hero in General MacArthur who, they said, stood for their whole position.¹³⁰ James V. Forrestal relates in his diary that

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Goldman, The Crucial Decade, p. 154.

throughout World War II the General contended that the Pacific was being "starved" in the interests of Europe.¹³¹ The Asia-Firsters recalled that as early as 1944 MacArthur had declared "that the history of the world will be written in the Pacific for the next ten thousand years."¹³² MacArthur at this time saw Europe as "a dying system," which was "worn out and run down," and destined to become "an economic and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia," while the "lands touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history" for centuries to come.¹³³ The Pacific area, MacArthur was most confident, would in the post-war era become and remain an "industrial and economic sphere of world development." Perhaps MacArthur's strongest criticism against the Democratic Administration during World War II was that they were guilty of "treason and sabotage" by not adequately attending to the Pacific-- preferring to hammer away at Germany.¹³⁴ In 1948 MacArthur expressed the opinion that it would be "utterly fallacious to underrate either China's needs or her importance." He continued: "I can say without the slightest hesitation

¹³¹ Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 17.

¹³² Ibid., p. 18.

¹³³ Ibid. Forrestal notes that MacArthur asserted that "The North African operation was absolutely useless," p. 17.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

that a free, independent, peaceful and friendly China is of profound importance to the peace of the world and to the position of the United States.¹³⁵ Furthermore, MacArthur saw no "substitute for victory" in Asia.

Ironically Judd supported American participation in the Korean conflict for a different reason than that for which the United States had struggled. The Korean conflict which the North Koreans started--and which was taken up by the United States, the United Nations, and the Chinese Communists--was a war of specific objectives and within geographical limits. The objectives as set forth by the United Nations were to repel and discourage aggression in Korea, not to abolish communism from Asia; and to work toward the establishment of an independent and unified Korea. North Korea's military aggression was a direct challenge not only to the United Nations but to the whole concept of a democratic world order. This was the "political challenge" which the Truman Administration was willing to meet, even though to meet it the United States was forced to "re-enter an unsound military position at great cost" to the country.¹³⁶ Edwin O. Reischauer viewed the Korean conflict, to a large extent,

¹³⁵U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, United States Foreign Policy For A Post-War Recovery Program, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2041.

¹³⁶Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy, p. 38.

as a waste of resources: "We entered the fighting not because of South Korea's military importance to us but rather despite the strategic liability of our position there."¹³⁷ The United States, Reischauer continues, entered Korea "not at all because of local military consideration, but purely because of global political strategy." By such an undertaking, the United States simply "sought to check open aggression in Korea solely because we believed that if aggression had gone unchallenged in Korea, our whole long-range program for peace and security would have been undermined."¹³⁸ Reischauer's words, however, would have been totally untenable to Judd, the Asia-Firsters and the new isolationists.

Judd demanded total victory in Korea and Asia. In reality Judd, contrary to his statements, supported a much bigger war to extinguish Communism forever. Judd, as did many Americans, suffered from a sense of urgency which arose from an exasperation with Communism--a fear of it which had continued to smolder since 1917, the year of the Revolution in Russia. His fear of Communism led him to assume that only conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union could end the ideological contest, with Communism abolished from the face of the earth; there can never

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

again be security or relaxation for us, or any people, until the tyrannical [Russian] government is overthrown."¹³⁹

In their self-righteousness and fear, the Asia clique failed to grasp that for nearly half a century the Communist struggle had continued by means short of war--limited war, propaganda, civil strife, and that the struggle would continue in some form until the fallacious tenets and methods of communism can no longer appeal to extensive sections of humanity. The Asia clique and the entire community who supported the conspiracy theory, and who advanced the preventive war theory, would not accept the tenet that whether the struggle of ideology should be peaceful or violent, narrow or broad, rested not only on the actions of Communists themselves, but also with the opposition to communism. Thus the Democratic Administration, realizing this tenet, and willing to resist communism in open conflict only when it chose the road to war, as in Korea and earlier in Greece, took a pragmatic position, and gave aid only when the populace were willing to help themselves. For this approach Truman and Acheson were damned by Judd and by the

¹³⁹ For a rational presentation of what the "preventive war" advocates wanted see editorial from the Christian Science Monitor, "Small War or Big?" in U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 12, A2156, as read into the Record by Senator Clyde R. Hoey, Democrat of North Carolina.

Asia-Firsters, and were accused of being soft on communism.

Secretary of State Acheson told the nation repeatedly that neither the Nationalist forces nor the independent guerillas operating in the China hinterland were "strong enough or active enough to threaten the existence" of the Communist regime on the mainland. The Asia clique agreed with the Secretary to a point: By themselves they were not, but with enough American assistance, with effective military aid to Formosa, they could threaten that regime. Effective military aid to Formosa, according to Judd, included "some top-flight American military spark plugs, like General Wedemeyer, Admiral Cooke, Admiral Badger, with adequate American staffs to train and advise the Chinese armed forces at all levels--and in strategy, tactics, and operations."¹⁴⁰ Also, Judd stated, along with these advisers there should be "a relatively small amount" of munitions,

¹⁴⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 15, A3575. On June 11, 1951, General Wedemeyer discussed a factor which had plagued him in working with the Chinese military: "I had difficulty in indoctrinating my Chinese generals and other commanders with the idea that they had to stockpile munitions and food behind a projected advance. Frequently they would make an attack, and it would peter out because they didn't have, they couldn't give, the succeeding impulse to their attack. They just didn't have the logistical support behind it. I had great difficulty with that when I was there." U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Service and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 2329.

light arms, equipment, and supplies carefully planned for the particular type of operation needed. He further added spare parts and fuel for the Chinese Air Force and Navy, and a few hundred World War II planes, along with perhaps some 50,000 more World War I type rifles and ammunition. Judd, however, excluded American combat troops in describing what he considered effective military aid to Chiang on Formosa. Judd, when quizzed on previous aid to Chiang, employed the patent answer that when military aid was voted by Congress in April, 1948, "the administration systematically sabotaged it by delays, overcharges, and unbalanced shipments."¹⁴¹

Despite popular protest President Truman was willing to take what appeared to him to be a more justifiable course in the direction of limiting war and refusing to allow the fomentation of additional hostilities. The dismissal of MacArthur on April 11, 1951, set off an onslaught of protest against the President, with numerous demands for impeachment.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Senator Joseph R. McCarthy said the dismissal was "perhaps the greatest victory the Communists have ever won." Senator William E. Jenner, the Republican arch-isolationist from Indiana, said "Our only choice is to impeach President Truman"; and Senator William F. Knowland, dubbed by the pro-Truman press the "Senator from Formosa," warned of a Far Eastern 'Munich'; a few Republicans, including Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, and Wayne Morse, of Oregon, and most Democrats, backed the

Judd's reaction was that only a "miracle" would prevent the deterioration of the whole East Asian situation, "with country after country going down like nine pins." Judd could declare, apparently with a clear conscience, that it was the "pygmies" of history, President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, who had to dispose of the "giant MacArthur," because he had "been so consistently right about Asia and they so consistently wrong."¹⁴³ Judd found in the MacArthur dismissal the possible opening of the way "for the

President. China and the U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966, p. 56.

¹⁴³U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3685. An interesting paradox can be deduced from Judd's comment on Philip Jessup: "A citizen has the right to join whatever he wishes, but other citizens have an equal right to draw conclusions about him by observing what he chooses to join and the causes he supports." What Judd said in regard to Jessup might be equally applied to General George Marshall by Judd. Judd further commented that "Senator McCarthy is not the one who discredited Dr. Philip Jessup...He merely reported what Jessup had done to discredit himself." Judd, however, found great comfort in believing and shouting that the Democratic Administration--Truman, Acheson, and Marshall--had humiliated a national hero--Douglas MacArthur. If one takes the position that MacArthur was guilty of military insubordination, then MacArthur indeed humiliated himself. Judd, during the campaign of 1952, stressed General Eisenhower's history of strictly obeying civil authority and the military chain of command. See: U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 4, 4715. Debate in Congress and articles read into the Record followed, with few exceptions, partisan lines in the MacArthur dismissal. See U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 12, A2148-2204, for arguments for and against Truman's position.

Communists to chip away and destroy the faith of the Japanese in us and the United Nations." Thus a settlement in Korea would not end the war; it would just move the war from Korea to Japan. Then, Judd continued, if the United States or the Democratic Administration abandoned Formosa "in a futile effort to buy the Reds off, we do not end the struggle; we simply shift it from Formosa to the Philippines." Judd asked if the United States lets "the Philippines and Japan go," in order to avoid a war with Communist China or Russia, what is the security of the United States? The conflict is simply moved to Alaska and Hawaii, Judd reasoned. Then if the Democratic Administration sells out Alaska and Hawaii in order to get peace, the United States does not avoid World War III. All that is accomplished, Judd asserted, is that "we just make certain that more of it will be fought in the Northwestern States of our own country."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 3, 3685. Judd, summing up the MacArthur recall, declared that "it was one-man Government that finally functioned. One man in the White House, in a sudden decision...decided to dismiss a general who had served his country well and to announce that decision to the press. A false issue is now being trumped up. It is an argument being advanced by the President that MacArthur wants to bring on a large-scale war and that Mr. Truman wants peace....General MacArthur is sincerely convinced that the proposals he has championed means peace....Many observers--not in the Military Establishment--believe an appeasement policy by the President and the Department of State will bring a third world war with all its horrible consequences." U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part

This made sense not only to Judd but the entire Asian clique. Thus indeed theirs was a holy mission--the waging of a preventive war.

The Asia clique, who advocated the American bombing of Chinese cities, which contained great numbers of people not in sympathy with the Communists, would provide ample room for these very same people in the Chinese cities, and elsewhere in Asia, to question whether the United States was indeed the real aggressor. The Asia clique members and Judd apparently never thought of this factor. Judd and his associates spoke and acted as if they alone had all the pertinent facts at their disposal, and they alone were in the position to render the infallible judgment on the future of Asia. In their hearts they knew they were right, and this they found sufficient as the basis of their operations. To Judd the United States was nothing less than the "sanctuary of the universe," and only he and those of like-mindedness had the moral courage or character to direct the United States in leading the world. With the monopoly on morality, they could sit in judgment of the Truman Administration with its State Department influenced by pro-Communists. They could echo Nebraska Republican Hugh Butler's reaction of Acheson: "I watch his smart-aleck manner and his British

clothes and that New Dealism, ever-lasting New Dealism in everything he says and does, and I want to shout, Get Out, Get Out. You stand for everything that has been wrong with the United States for years."¹⁴⁵ Judd, with apparent honest

¹⁴⁵Goldman, The Crucial Decade, p. 125. On July 18, 1951, Judd read into the Record an article by David Lawrence which was perhaps one of the most absurd charges hurled at the Democratic Administration. Lawrence declared that what the Secretary of State said was important "because for all practical purposes, he is President of the United States." To Lawrence, Acheson was "virtually commander in chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force," and he alone defined "their scope of action," and President Truman did only what Acheson "tells him to do." Thus Lawrence declared: "No man in the office of Secretary of State heretofore has had the opportunity to wield such power, first, because no President ever delegated as much authority to him and, second, because no comparable issues fell to a Secretary of State to decide." U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 14, A4785. Lawrence apparently had forgotten that President Truman fired Byrnes in 1947 for continuing to make statements which had not been cleared through the Executive Office. One of the most caustic anti-Truman-Acheson columnists, who turned out column after column, and espoused the clarion call of the Asia-Firsters and the new isolationist sentiment to the nation, was Edgar Ansel Mowrer. Judd consistently read his columns into the Congressional Record during the period of the Great Debate. On January 23, 1951, Judd read into the Record one of Mowrer's columns in which he declared that America's "road" to follow in Asia was "both clear and straight:" "We should continue the war in Korea, if necessary by ourselves, until the Chinese get sick of being slaughtered. We should refuse to discuss the future of Formosa as long as aggression continues anywhere in Asia. [regarding its legal status] We should rearm our friends on the island to make them proof against any sort of attack. We should not discourage them from taking the offensive against Red China whenever they feel capable. We should further bolster Viet Nam in Indochina. Finally, we should announce that under no circumstances will we accept an aggressor government as a member of the UN--preventing its entrance by our veto, if necessary."

conviction, could assert: "We fought for an opposite policy. We were ignored. There is not one drop of the blood of the American boys in Korea on the hands of any Republican. We had no responsibility at any stage of the whole debacle. We were opposing as far back as the decision which brought the Communists into Manchuria, and without Communists in Manchuria there never could have been a Korean attack."¹⁴⁶ Judd had for some time found it most convenient to forget that he had argued as late as 1947 that the United States could work successfully with the Soviet Union. Despite Judd's contentions that the Democrats alone were responsible for allowing Russia to register gains in East Asia, "it seems probable that the Russians would have...invaded Korea regardless of what had been said at Yalta."¹⁴⁷ The

Mowrer's concluding statement captured the entire sentiment of this self-professed "moralist" element. He declared that should the above cited "steps, as is likely, provoke new shrieks from New Delhi, Ottawa, and London, we should gently but firmly tell Messrs. Nehru, Pearson, and Bevin to go roll." U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 11, A473.

¹⁴⁶ U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 6, 7594. Judd described the fall of Manchuria to the Chinese Communists as amounting to a "Pearl Harbor" and presented the "gravest danger" to the United States security. New York Times, November 4, 1948, p. 17.

¹⁴⁷ Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy, p. 18.

Asian clique, however, held fast to the thesis that the Democrats had sold not only Chiang Kai-shek, but all of Asia, "down the river."

A Republican victory in 1952 was therefore absolutely necessary if the United States was to survive as a free world entity. A Republican victory in 1952 held the total solution for all the frustrations held by Judd and the entire community of self-styled "Asian experts."

CHAPTER VI

WALTER H. JUDD: A REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT AND

A REPUBLICAN CONGRESS

For the new Republican Administration Asia was the first logical place to act, in keeping with the party's charges against the Democrats in the presidential campaign of 1952. The supposed "unintelligent" and "near-treason" statecraft of the Truman-Marshall-Acheson Administration had allowed the "unchristian" and "bloodthirsty" horde of Communist aggressors in Asia, whose "only god was force," to run rampant. The American people, Judd could declare, had called upon the Republicans to redeem America's lost prestige and save the United States from the clutches of international communism. This involved not only action abroad but action in Washington as well--"cleaning the traitors out of the State Department." The new President understood what was wrong with the world and could make all necessary corrections.

On January 20, 1953, Dwight David Eisenhower became the thirty-fourth President of the United States. This was the day that Judd had looked forward to; this was the day

when the Executive leadership would stay America's aimless course and redirect America toward the nation's "historic perspective." In his inaugural address, President Eisenhower promised a continued quest for peace without appeasement, and "to give testimony" that "the future shall belong to the free."¹ To "rechart" the course of American foreign policy and launch its world program of "liberation", the Eisenhower Administration made two decisions to prompt the end of the Korean conflict. First, it "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek from his "imprisonment" on Formosa. Then, the Administration decided if its efforts to win an armistice failed, it would blockade the mainland coastline, bomb Chinese bases and supply sources in Manchuria and China, and possibly employ tactical atomic weapons. John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, conveyed this strategy to Nehru, India's Prime Minister, on the assumption that Nehru would relay the plan on to the Chinese Communist government. In late July, 1953, the Korean Armistice was signed.²

¹Dwight D. Eisenhower, "World Freedom and Peace: The Responsibilities of Leadership," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIX (February 1, 1953), 252.

²Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1956), p. 118. Judd and his China Lobby friends apparently disregarded Stalin's death in March 1953 as a possible factor in bringing the Korean War to an end.

To the mind of Judd, Dulles, Asia-Firsters, and new isolationists, it was the new Administration's threat to unleash American air power against Communist China, along with the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek, that induced the end of fighting. The Asia-Firsters refused to accept any other interpretation.³ The Korean Armistice, as undesirable as it was to the Asia-Firsters, however, only reinforced their faith in the utility of advanced warning coupled with the threat of heavy punishment. Judd declared over and over that the United States could "win the fight against communism only by standing firm in its commitments." The Communists are encouraged, Judd would assert, by "any evidence of weakness, hesitation or vacillation," and this only increases trouble. "The Communists pull us to the brink to see how we behave," he said. Every time America stands firm, "no one pulls us over the brink." But, he would continue: "I'm scared of them when they smile, because then we're inclined to think there has been a change in their policy."⁴ Indeed, the sound of the word "liberation," especially when used in conjunction with Asia, greatly pleased the ears of the Asia-Firsters.

³ John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 104-06.

⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, October 17, 1962.

On taking office, however, the Eisenhower Administration made a few lame gestures against the Yalta agreement, but then the dynamic Eisenhower-Dulles policy seemingly forgot about "liberation." Indeed, the new President was soon to stay the hand of the "hard-liners," to forsake "rolling back the iron curtain," for a policy of "peaceful co-existence," little different from containment--surely it was a policy less dynamic than that envisioned by Judd and those who saw in a Republican victory in 1952 the employment of "force and strength" as a panacea for all problems facing the world.

Without doubt Judd's strategy in promoting a Republican victory in 1952 included placing in the White House a military man who clearly understood "power." A military man would further assure the "commies" that the Republicans "really meant business." Who better represents "strength" than the professional soldier? "Strength was the best way to meet the Communist threat," and a man who clearly understood "strength" and the "Communist threat" would take "immediate" and "corrective" measures in Asia.⁵ General MacArthur, the "giant of the East," had not been fully exonerated by the joint Senate Armed Services and Foreign Rela-

⁵ New York Times, November 3, 1952, p. 31.

tions committee hearings into his dismissal.⁶ The removal of General MacArthur was "within the constitutional powers of the President," it was concluded by some committee members, despite "shock to the national pride" regarding the circumstances of his dismissal.⁷ Furthermore, despite feelings that there was no serious disagreement between MacArthur's strategy in Korea and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs did generally agree with General Omar N. Bradley, the Chairman, that MacArthur erred in advocating extension of the war in China.⁸ Nor were all com-

⁶On August 17, 1951, the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Joint Committee to investigate General MacArthur's dismissal voted 20-3 not to make any formal report on the investigation of MacArthur's dismissal. Chairman Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, said a report might renew "bitter discussion of methods for waging war" and "would not help" Korean truce negotiations. Eight of the twelve Republicans on the committee released "conclusions" on the investigation. They were all, with the exception of Smith and Flanders, associated with new isolationism: Styles Bridges, New Hampshire; Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin; H. Alexander Smith, New Jersey; Bourke B. Hick-enlooper, Iowa; William F. Knowland, California; Harry P. Cain, Washington; Owen Brewster, Maine; Ralph E. Flanders, Vermont. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Conduct An Inquiry Into The Military Situation In The Far East And The Facts Surrounding The Relief Of General Of The Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignment In That Area, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 3605.

⁷Ibid., p. 3601.

⁸Ibid., p. 3602.

mittee members convinced that Chiang's loss of China could be contributed solely to the fact that "he did not receive sufficient support, both moral and material, from the United States."⁹

Thus the plausible course for Judd might have been to look to the deposed MacArthur as a presidential candidate. There is, however, no evidence that Judd seriously for any extended period of time viewed MacArthur as that ideal candidate. Judd realized that the General had made military and civilian enemies. Judd's only hope for a more aggressive Asian policy rested with placing a Republican in the White House on January 20, 1953, with a Republican Congress.¹⁰ Thus he sought a "sure winner" who would take the country by storm and receive an overwhelming mandate from the people. Therefore, he looked to the European Theatre for a military man whose record appeared without blemish. Eisenhower, quite contrary to MacArthur, had kept relatively clear of political commitments and issues, and the public had little knowledge of his political views. But his past

⁹ Ibid., p. 3603; Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1967), p. 59.

¹⁰ By mid-1951, many Republicans and news reporters were convinced that General MacArthur did not want the American presidency; however, he gave a contrary impression to many delegates to the Republican Convention of 1952. See the New York Times, June 15, 1951, p. 4.

role as a military man made him nothing less than a great patriotic American who could appeal to the entire political spectrum from populace to elite without regard for geographical location.

Thus the ideal candidate to Judd's mind was General Dwight David Eisenhower--a national hero, a military man, and one who had assured Judd that there "is not East or West: There is East and West."¹¹ Judd asserts that he and Christian Herter organized the "so-called Eisenhower group" in Congress and that the two of them called on the General at Versailles, France, in May, 1951, to urge him to seek the Republican nomination for President in 1952.¹² Judd believed that this was the first such "direct request" Eisenhower received. In fact, Virgil Pinkley, a newspaper correspondent in the North African theatre of World War II, in 1943, had made the earlier serious suggestion that Eisenhower might become a presidential candidate some day.¹³ Similar suggestions increased with the passing of time.

¹¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 10, A3542.

¹²Minneapolis Tribune, October 2, 1955. Eisenhower's memoirs do not bear this out. See: Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate For Change 1953-1956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 3-25.

¹³Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 4.

During November, 1951, Judd again sought out the Supreme Commander of NATO to determine exactly the General's position. Eisenhower related to Judd that "No man who loves his country can refuse the bona fide request of his political party to be its candidate for President of the United States." But the General continued by asserting that he did seek the presidency, nor would he "be maneuvered into appearing to seek it."¹⁴

Thus Judd considered this "his cue" to see that Eisenhower received the "bona fide request" from the Republican party. Furthermore, Judd asserts, the Minnesota write-in vote of January, 1952, convinced Eisenhower that "he ought to reexamine his position."¹⁵ During the first half of 1952, prior to the General's retirement, Judd spoke on behalf of the candidacy of Eisenhower in meetings and broadcasts from "New Hampshire to the State of Washington."¹⁶ Judd's theme during the early months of 1952 was that the "paramount issue confronting all America today, as it was in 1861, is preservation of our heritage of freedom." American freedom he told his audiences, was threatened on two

¹⁴Minneapolis Tribune, October 2, 1955.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 10, A3541.

fronts; first "by ruthless armed communism pursuing skillfully its unchanging goal of world conquest;" and secondly, American freedom was being challenged by "the never-ending expansion of the Federal Government and its power over the life of every American citizen."¹⁷ He supported Eisenhower's nomination, he asserted, because he would more assuredly win the general election than any other candidate whom the Republicans might offer.

Even though Senator Robert A. Taft, at an early date, was collecting more delegates to the national convention, Judd would declare that Taft's capacity to win electoral votes in November was much less than Eisenhower's. Judd's argument when confronted by an undecided Republican or a Taft supporter, was that most of Taft's delegates came from states which regularly voted Democratic in November. In the states which voted Republican in 1948, Eisenhower led two to one in delegates over Taft.¹⁸ It is "foolish" for "us," Judd would tell his audience, "not to nominate our strongest vote getter--because it is essential that we get also a Republican House and Senate--and the strongest possible tick-

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. A3441-42.

¹⁸ U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVII, Part 11, A3940.

ket is necessary to achieve that."¹⁹ Eisenhower, Judd asserted, was the man for President who was best able to organize and carry out the resistance movement against those who would destroy American freedom both "inside" and "outside" American borders.²⁰

When the Republican delegates convened on July 7, 1952, the Taft forces appeared to have control; however, the Eisenhower forces fought bitterly for their "sure winner." Eisenhower received the nomination on the first ballot. The keynote address delivered by General MacArthur declared that the Truman Administration "gave over to Soviet control the industrial resources of Manchuria" and "condemned" the populace of China to "Communist tyranny." He contended that when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War, Democratic leaders lacked the necessary "courage to fight to a military decision, even though victory was then readily within our grasp--a victory which...might well have saved continental Asia from Red Domination." He further asserted that the Democratic Administration had hobbled the Korean War to a "stalemated struggle" and sentenced Korea to "pro-

¹⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVII, Part 10, A3543.

²⁰Ibid., p. A3542.

gressive obliteration."²¹

MacArthur's speech was quite typical of the entire Republican campaign; the Democrats had failed to cope with the challenges facing the United States; the Democrats had coddled, protected, and allowed "pro-Communists and fellow-travelers," to operate unmolested in the Government.²² The Korean Armistice negotiations, in MacArthur's opinion, only served to give the Communists time for military reinforcement. Judd had hammered away on this theme since the negotiations started on July 10, 1951. Eisenhower, assuming a more aggressive and vocal position, echoed this same sentiment in early October, 1952, when he criticized the Demo-

²¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVII, Part 11, A4541.

²²When the Republican National Convention convened on July 7, 1952, Eisenhower had already obtained a release from his NATO duties and transferred to the retired list. Eisenhower no more than mentions that MacArthur gave the keynote address in his memoir. The Republican platform of 1952 charged the Democratic Party with fostering socialism and bureaucracy, and with weakening local self-government. It charged corruption and even treason in high places. Administration policies had led to loss of American prestige, and even worse, had contributed to making enemies among those who once were friends. To the sharply worded attacks was added a less well-defined proposed program. The positive section of the Republican platform advocated less government at the national level and greater local autonomy; less federal control of business; a tougher anti-Communist line in national and international affairs, and reduction of governmental spending and taxation. Richard C. Bain, Convention Decision And Voting Records (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 284.

cratic Administration for allowing United Nations forces to accept the "trap" of negotiations in Korea at a time when the Communist forces were retreating. The negotiation lull allowed the enemy time to reinforce their position, the Republican candidate contended.²³ The Republican candidate continued to make similar charges which filled the self-styled Asian experts with uncontrollable jubilation.

Judd, fully recognized as an "Asian expert," not only among the Republicans, but also among many Democrats in Washington, consulted periodically with the Republican presidential candidate and his general staff. He flew not infrequently to the Republican strategy meetings in Denver and other major cities,²⁴ as well as covering an exhaustive campaign circuit in behalf of the General.²⁵ Judd's faith-

²³ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 62.

²⁴ New York Times, July 29, 1952, p. 1.

²⁵ During the 1952 campaign the Republicans had a highly organized group known as the "Truth Squad." Members of the "Squad" followed national Democratic leaders and "corrected" the "lies" spread by opposition speakers. Included in the "Truth Squad" at one time or another were a number of Senators and Representatives such as: Frank Carlson, Kansas; Francis Case, South Dakota; Homer Ferguson, Michigan; Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa; Eugene D. Millikin, Colorado; Andrew W. Schoeppel, Kansas; Ralph Flanders, Vermont; George D. Aiken, Vermont; Edward Thye, Minnesota; Hugh Scott, Jr., Pennsylvania; Clifford R. Hope, Kansas; Walter H. Judd, Minnesota; Claude Blakewell, Missouri. New York Times, November 3, 1952. p. 31.

ful followers in the fifth district of Minnesota carried out a highly successful campaign in his behalf, to free him for his greater role in getting Eisenhower elected. Perhaps Judd's major contact with the constituents of his own district remained the pulpit, which he filled Sunday after Sunday.²⁶

Whether Judd exerted any direct influence during the campaign on the General-turned-politician, or on his speech writers, Judd's major themes regarding Asia and communism began to appear more regularly in the campaign speeches delivered by the Republican candidate as the election date drew nearer. Without doubt, in part, this change can be attributed to the "breakfast meeting" between Eisenhower and Taft on September 12, 1952. Taft presented the Republican candidate with a long statement in which he set forth his own understanding of Eisenhower's philosophy on a number of issues. Eisenhower's "full agreement" with the "manifesto" may account for his more aggressive campaigning and more severe indictment of the Democrats. At this date, however, Eisenhower clearly recognized Judd's standing among all factions of the Republican Party. Party factionalism was keen among the Republicans; however, Eisenhower clearly demonstrated that he was not going to allow anyone's

²⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, October 23, 1952.

personal demands or feelings to obstruct a Republican victory in 1952.²⁷

Eisenhower assumed the position that "if there must be war" in Asia, "let it be Asians against Asians," with American "support on the side of freedom." Either the General had never agreed with the Truman policies with which he had been involved, or in the interest of party unity or party victory, he agreed to make the most of past failures in foreign policy and secure total new isolationist support.²⁸ President Truman answered Eisenhower by declaring that the Soviet Union would have taken Europe had Americans failed to meet the challenge in Korea.²⁹ Furthermore, the President declared, fifty percent more South Koreans than Americans were fighting in the conflict. The President accused Eisenhower of giving American mothers "false hope" in an "effort to pick up a few votes."³⁰ Soon thereafter candidate Eisenhower pledged to a Detroit audience that "I shall

²⁷ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 27.

²⁸ Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 99.

²⁹ Judd and other Republicans were later to assume the same position; however, in 1952, the Democrats had to be defeated.

³⁰ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 63.

go to Korea" in an effort to bring the war to an end.

Perhaps few Presidents have won the presidency as easily as did Dwight D. Eisenhower. Victory, however, for the Republicans in 1952, seemed imminent from the moment of General Eisenhower's nomination on July 11, 1952. The Democrats, as the party in power for twenty years, could not escape condemnation for the nation's "severe" problems--"the Democrats alone were responsible for the sorry state of the world."³¹ Simple and rapidly executed answers were demanded by the American populace and Judd alike. Few Americans, if any, felt that the "magic" of an F.D.R. or the pluck of a "Give 'em hell Harry" could save the Democrats in 1952. In contrast to the Democrats, the Republicans beheld in their candidate not only a popular hero, but a candidate who offered great hope for remedies of the nation's ills, particularly those relating to Asia collectively--starting with Korea. The November returns, however, revealed a reluctance among the American people to accept the Republican Party with comparable enthusiasm.

The Republicans won control of Congress by only a majority of eight in the House and one in the Senate. Thus, unless the foreign policy issues which constituted the core of the 1952 campaign could be exploited further, the victor-

³¹Minneapolis Tribune, October 27, 1952.

ious Republican Party would suffer defeat at the next congressional election. Eisenhower took office without a dependable majority in Congress, and to make matters more difficult for the President, the balance of Republican power in Congress was still lodged with the Old Guard which had favored Taft for the nomination. Taft himself was for several months the majority leader in the Senate.³² This, in part, accounts for much of the struggle which the President was to experience with his own party in Congress during the first two years of his Administration. Republican leaders, the voting pattern revealed, could not ignore the role of the new isolationism in their new-found victory. The President's employment of new isolationism principles in 1952 tied the old isolationist vote to the Republican Party. It was in these sections where Eisenhower received his most solid support. Yet, it was Eisenhower's acceptance of the Truman-Acheson premises, of collective security, liberal reciprocal trade agreements, the resumption of international diplomacy, and vigorous bipartisanship in policy formulation, that appealed to the overwhelming internationalist suburban and urban middle class. Thus, to the slight Republican congressional majority, foreign policy questions alone "gave promise of future Republican victories when Eisen-

³² Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, p. 84.

hower's personality would not be involved."³³

Eisenhower from the very beginning of his Administration gave ample evidence that he possessed a deep concern for the strength and welfare of the Republican Party organization. The new President's relationship with his own Republican Congress, however, scarcely resembled the honeymoon one might expect upon ending a twenty years' absence. Eisenhower's allegiance to his party was so strong that Taft confounded the predictions that he would head the Senate opposition to the President's leadership and actually became one of the Administration's staunchest defenders.³⁴ The Taft leadership in the Senate, however, was not to last for long, as cancer rapidly sapped his life. Before Taft left the Senate on June 10, 1953, he named William F. Knowland of California as leader in his absence. Taft felt that his absence from the Senate and Knowland's majority leadership would be only temporary; however, both proved permanent.³⁵

It was Robert Taft who had "engineered" the renewed attack on the Truman-Acheson policies. Taft believed that future Republican victories would not result solely by "efficiency, honesty, and frugality in government." Taft recom-

³³ Graebner, The New Isolationism, pp. 112-20.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Taft resigned as majority leader on June 10, 1953, and died of cancer on July 31.

mended that his Republican brethren constantly publicize the contrasts between the Eisenhower Administration and the Truman Administration.³⁶ Judd was fully receptive to this concept, and cooperated fully to bring additional discredit to the Democrats. Thus foreign policy to the "Taft Republican" had by 1953 become the "pawn in a conservative revolution." Judd went along in that he was willing to employ every device or lever to accomplish his objectives in Asia. Campaign strategy for future victories was based on the general concept that the President "held the affection and trust of the American people and that whatever was done to perpetuate past national antagonisms, nothing dared deflate the President's stature." President Eisenhower's initial concept of the Executive Office rendered this congressional objective "totally feasible." His original "broad tolerance toward congressional action permitted Republican leaders a wide range in which to establish the assumptions on which American foreign policy would be founded without destroying the illusion that the President was, in fact, charting the nation's course."³⁷

The President did engender an air of friendliness and respect in his relations with Congress. Eventually, how-

³⁶ Robert A. Taft, "What the G.O.P. Must Do to Win in 1954," Look (April 21, 1953), 44.

³⁷ Graebner, The New Isolationism, pp. 120-21.

ever, as Congress attempted to assert greater influence, the limit to what Presidential amenities could accomplish was reached, and the gap between the President and the new isolationist Republicans began to widen ominously. Judd, although often diametrically opposed to some of the basic concepts of the new isolationists, was willing to cooperate with them because of their high regard for Asia. The President was forced to react against many of his own as he became more aware of what he considered dangerous pressures on the White House in the form of congressional encroachments as Congress attempted to assume the initiative in formulating foreign affairs.³⁸

A major threat to Presidential power and prerogative took the form of the so-called Bricker Amendment, actively sponsored by John W. Bricker, Republican of Ohio. The amendment would have had the effect of limiting the President's power to make executive agreements and treaties and thus of augmenting congressional authority over foreign relations.³⁹ The proposal stemmed from resentment over such executive agreements as Yalta and, as Bricker had said, from a fear that "American sovereignty and the American Constitution... are threatened by treaty law." Behind the proposed Bricker

³⁸ Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, pp. 37, 85.

³⁹ Ibid.

Amendment was the accumulated fear that unless the Constitution was amended formally, the federal nature of the American Government itself would be permanently altered, due to its position in the United Nations, toward a more centralized form at the expense of the states. Although a showdown on the Bricker Amendment did not come until February 26, 1954, Eisenhower was dogged with it from the time he assumed office.⁴⁰

In the evolving pattern of isolationism under the Eisenhower leadership Asia continued to receive "top billing."⁴¹ This concept resulted logically from the acceptance of the view that the Truman Administration had established the pattern for Chiang Kai-shek's demise, and that President Truman refused to "win" the Korean War against the advice of General MacArthur. Judd and other supporters of Chiang Kai-shek openly declared that Eisenhower's election was a mandate that the Administration abrogate the Truman policy toward China and give all possible assistance to the Nationalists.⁴² Indeed, Judd declared in early 1953, the Eisenhower and Republican victory was a mandate of the people

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 232.

⁴¹ Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 121.

⁴² Ibid., p. 124; New York Times, February 1, 1953, p. 44.

demanding "correction" of an "ineffective foreign policy, a war in Korea that the preceding Administration did not want to win, corruptions, entrenched bureaucracy and inflation."⁴³

With popular mandate in hand, on December 2, 1952, Eisenhower ventured forth for Korea. After a three day tour of battlefronts and consulting with military officials, the General concluded in a press conference that he had "no panaceas, no tricks, for ending the fighting." He, however, expressed a concern which had long plagued the Democratic Administration--the "working out a plan" which would produce a "positive and definite victory without possibly running a grave risk of enlarging the war."⁴⁴

In his inaugural address the new President promised a continued quest for peace without appeasement.⁴⁵ Two weeks later, on February 2, 1953, in his State of the Union Address, the President declared that his Administration would apply "America's influence in world affairs with such fortitude and such foresight that it will deter aggression and

⁴³ New York Times, February 1, 1953, p. 44.

⁴⁴ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 63.

⁴⁵ Eisenhower, "World Freedom and Peace," pp. 252-54.

eventually secure peace."⁴⁶ American foreign policy, the President continued, "must be the product of genuine, continuous cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of this Government...[and]...must be developed and directed in the spirit of true bipartisanship."⁴⁷

The President's announcement on the future of the Seventh Fleet, however, was not so stated as to strike a happy chord with the Democrats: "I am...issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China." President Truman's June, 1950, assignment of the Seventh Fleet "had meant, in effect that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China," the new Chief Executive asserted. The President said the order did not imply aggressive intent against Red China on the part of the United States, "but we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea."⁴⁸ On the Republican side of Congress the decision was hailed with "immoderate joy" because it "would unleash Chiang Kai-shek to attack the Chinese mainland," declared an avowed Asia-Firster columnist. The picture was

⁴⁶ U.S., Congress, House, The State of the Union: Address of the President of the United States, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, House Doc. 75, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

one of a tiger let out of his cage." The President's statement was hailed by the Asia-Firsters as the first step in "liberating" the mainland of China. "It isn't necessary to cross all the bridges at once," Judd related, "it is sufficient to the movement that we have crossed the first bridge." Thus, to Judd and the Asia-Firsters, the "days of intellectual retreat of paralyzed tension, of spiritual prostration before the Communist conspiracy are over, and all else will follow in due time."⁴⁹ Judd declared that President Eisenhower's action was but "the first break in the stalemate program of the former administration."⁵⁰

To liberate the mainland the Asia-Firsters needed one of "their own" to map the future course which the Eisenhower Administration would pursue in East Asia. Judd, however, turned down an offer for a high position in the State Department of the new Administration. He believed that he would better serve the Eisenhower Administration and foreign policy as a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Because of the narrow Republican margin in the House, Judd declared, he should remain in the House. In the House he could work for reform legislation, serve as a key

⁴⁹ U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 10, A1181. This is from an article by John Chamberlain which Judd read into the Record.

⁵⁰ U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 9, A1135.

liason man between the House and Capitol Hill with respect to foreign policy legislation, and continue to advise the President on foreign affairs.⁵¹

The man destined to become Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had moved closer in his thinking on Asian affairs to those basic concepts held by Judd, during the years 1950-52, when he served as special consultant to the State Department. Eisenhower met Dulles for the first time in Paris in 1952, following Dulles' resignation from the State Department. The Truman Administration had, in 1950, appointed Dulles as a special consultant to the Secretary of State, in hopes of creating a semblance of bipartisanship in the execution of foreign affairs. The growing gulf, however, which separated Acheson and Dulles regarding a feasible course to follow in Asia was indeed too great to bridge. Thus in early 1952 Dulles resigned.

With Dulles' reputation in the area of foreign affairs, dating back to the Wilson Administration, it appeared obvious that he would serve as chief diplomatic officer of an Eisenhower Administration. The future Secretary of State, however, when discussing his ideas on foreign policy with the future President found differences of opinion. Dulles was skeptical about Eisenhower's views on Asia. He felt

⁵¹Minneapolis Tribune, December 17, 1952.

that there was a tendency to subordinate American interest in Asia to American interests in Europe.⁵² Dulles had already discussed his idea with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then Pacific naval commander, and the two individuals agreed that American strategy in Asia and in Europe should be founded on the theory that potential aggressors must be warned that if they broke the peace the United States would not necessarily move against them at the point of aggression, but might hit back where and when it was deemed most advantageous. Finally, as a result of the Korean War, which then dominated political thought, Dulles and Radford advocated that, if possible, United States troops would never again be employed on the Asian mainland,⁵³ a position which the President fully supported.

Eisenhower, by eventually appointing Dulles and Radford to key posts, apparently had accepted their premise to a large degree. However, the President was continually on the alert lest such concepts give the appearance that the United States was "abandoning Europe and relying for our defense solely upon retaliatory striking air power and Herbert Hoover's 'fortress America' concept."⁵⁴

⁵²C. L. Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 41.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

Dulles, as well as Judd, openly opposed the idea of those who felt that the United States could isolate itself; and by 1953 the secretary seemed to hold that democracy and communism could not continue to exist side by side indefinitely. Dulles' previously published judgment on Red China, however, worried many Republican stalwarts, particularly Republican members of the China bloc. Dulles had argued in 1950 for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations: "I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like...we ought to be willing that all the nations should be members without attempting to appraise closely those which are 'good' and those which are 'bad.'"⁵⁵

However, upon receiving the nomination for Secretary of State, Dulles gave "private" and "official" assurance to members of the China bloc that he no longer favored Peiping's entry into the United Nations.⁵⁶ Dulles' critics felt that

⁵⁵ John Foster Dulles, War Or Peace (2nd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 190.

⁵⁶ Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 198; Dulles in the special preface to the 1957 edition of War Or Peace gives a very weak and unconvincing argument why he changed his mind on recognition of Red China.

this shift only reinforced their initial opinion: that indeed Dulles was a "man capable both of changing his mind with dazzling speed and of employing skillful legal tactics to obscure the fact that he has in reality shifted his position."⁵⁷ Therefore, pro-Chiang Senators subjected Dulles to severe vocal criticism. Judd, however, did not join them.⁵⁸ In analyzing why Dulles shifted position in regard to Red China, one can conclude with Judd, that "Mr. Dulles changed when he learned from experience the hard fact that recognition did increase the prestige and power of a government;"⁵⁹ or one can conclude that Dulles learned between 1950 and 1952, the strength and influence of the China bloc in Congress.⁶⁰ Dulles, to assure his questioners further of the sincerity of his new-found conviction, promised that he would give favorable consideration to any candidate they might recommend as assistant secretary in charge of Far Eastern Affairs.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy, p.40.

⁵⁸ Ibid., see pp. 185-210.

⁵⁹ U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, CVII, Part 7, 9921.

⁶⁰ Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China? A Study in Argument (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 46.

⁶¹ Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 198.

During his first week as Secretary of State Dulles interviewed Walter S. Robertson, whom Judd recommended (despite Taft's protest, for Robertson had been present at Yalta) as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs.⁶² Robertson had served in various capacities in Asia during the previous Administration. In 1945-1946 he held the position of Minister and Counselor for Economic Affairs at the United States Embassy in Chungking. He had opposed a coalition government for China throughout the Truman Administration. Upon returning to the United States he allied himself with Judd, Knowland, and Wedemeyer.⁶³ Robertson had long contended that Mao Tse-tung was but a passing phenomenon and that Chiang remained China's "real" symbol. This greatly satisfied Judd. As Assistant Secretary Robertson could assert to a New York Times columnist that "Mao has no more real influence than the first taxi driver who goes by outside."⁶⁴ Robertson pursued with Judd's constant approval, a vigorous policy of trade embargo, travel restrictions, and similar measures, designed as much as possible to isolate

⁶² John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957), p. 9.

⁶³ Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 155.

⁶⁴ Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 198.

Communist China from the non-Communist world.⁶⁵ Judd loudly applauded Admiral Arthur W. Radford's appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Radford made no secret of his feeling that if it required a fifty year war to destroy Red China, then it should be carried out.⁶⁶ Dulles, Robertson and Radford were but a few of the pro-Chiang men who constituted a strong voice in the top echelons of the Eisenhower Administration demanding relentless opposition to Red China.⁶⁷

Judd's technique to "broaden" American foreign policy into a "global" policy was incorporated into political and economic measures against Red China. On this premise he proceeded to instruct and advise the President. First, the Administration must fully "recognize" that the Communists'

⁶⁵ Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 299.

⁶⁶ In 1960 Radford had urged Nixon, if elected, to appoint Judd as Secretary of State. Minneapolis Tribune, November 21, 1960. When Joe McCarthy was asked to name his candidate for Secretary of State, since he believed the Republic was lost as long as Dean Acheson remained in office, he responded: Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota. McCarthy made this suggestion at the time when he was questioned about the MacArthur removal. Minneapolis Tribune, April 19, 1951. McCarthy and Judd were co-workers in the 1948 campaign for former Governor Harold E. Stassen of Minnesota. Judd placed Stassen's name in nomination at the convention that year.

⁶⁷ Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 155.

immediate goal in Asia was to undermine the weak, and it was America's responsibility to protect the weak. With a Republican Administration, however, Judd could assert that world war was not the immediate danger facing the country. America would demonstrate its strength, no one would pull the United States over the "brink." Secondly, the United States had to "oppose" admission of Red China to the United Nations. Keeping Communist China out of the United Nations was a "diplomatic" victory which the United States had to win, despite the position of America's European allies, along with other military and economic victories, if democracy were to win over communism. Non-recognition of Red China was a policy most vital to the future security of the United States. Likewise, to perpetuate American security, the United States "must find ways to help the enslaved peoples become free," Judd asserted, and the United States "must not build up their enslavers."⁶⁸ The continuing flow of refugees from Communist China, Judd felt, was an excellent force around which the United States could build "to recreate a free China and an Asia that will stand against Communist aggression."⁶⁹

In addition, Judd felt that the United States should

⁶⁸Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1954.

⁶⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 12, A5177.

do everything possible to help produce the circumstances which would encourage a successful revolution within the Soviet Union. Judd held that the purpose of the cold war was to prevent further Russian expansion and the further development of its power until the internal forces and pressures within Russia became so great that a revolution was set off. It's "bound to crack," Judd asserted.⁷⁰ For this reason Judd supported economic aid to Tito and Franco, not because they were democrats or believed "in the kind of world we do," he asserted, but because Tito was making trouble for Russia, America's enemy, and in doing that Tito was saving the United States "considerable trouble." Likewise, he supported Franco because he was not a "threat" to the United States, and to the extent that Tito and Franco could tie up Russian strength, they were "on the side of the United States."⁷¹ Judd sincerely believed that it was possible for the United States, by extending moral encouragement, to destroy the Soviet Union from within; but, not until the "people of the free world repeatedly, effectively, and convincingly make clear to the Russian people that we want them to join us in an honorable peace and with full

⁷⁰Minneapolis Star, June 29, 1950.

⁷¹Walter H. Judd, "How Can We Be So Stupid? We Help Our Enemy And Deny Our Friends," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (March 1, 1951), 295.

cooperation, good will and brotherhood." Not until the United States made this clear to the Russian people could the United States expect the Russian people to rise up and "overthrow the tyranny and despotism under which they suffer," Judd declared.⁷²

Greater encouragement and assistance, Judd asserted, must come from the Administration to challenge the free Chinese on Formosa, because survival of the "whole free world is at stake in Asia."⁷³ To Judd, one "of the gravest errors ever made by our Government, under the never-ending hammering of Communist-inspired propaganda, was to underestimate the strength of the Chinese Communists." But now, in 1953, the Government gave signs of making the mistake of overestimating the strength of the Communist regime. America's "best hope in the Pacific is to exploit and increase its weaknesses...[to] encourage and help the free Chinese to overthrow their oppressors from within."⁷⁴ Judd's fifth point was "greater assistance" to the free Chinese on Formosa and elsewhere "to enable them to smuggle agents and supplies to the mainland" to wage guerrilla warfare. Sixth,

⁷²U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, XCVII, Part 2, 2893.

⁷³Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1954.

⁷⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 9, A1180.

and very important, the United States must manifest "faith" in the oppressed people behind the Iron Curtain rather than in "cynical deals with their oppressors."⁷⁵ Thus, Judd sincerely felt that with the President getting advice from "loyal Americans," the country would return to its "historic perspective."

Despite Republican assertions that the Eisenhower Administration kicked out the "Communists and fellow travelers and security risks, not by the hundreds but by the thousands,"⁷⁶ Judd came to feel that even the Republican Administration failed to rid the State and Defense Departments of Communists and "pro-Communist" influence. He felt that the "pro-Communists" were not all subversive, nor members of the Communist Party. But, to Judd, high officials in the departments were subject to "pro-Communist" influence. In essence, Judd seemed to argue that anyone who differed from his own conclusion was "soft on communism." This was the only way that Judd could explain his opponents' conclusions. Judd, however, refused to charge openly that a "pattern of appeasement" existed in the over-all policy of the Eisen-

⁷⁵Walter H. Judd, "Congressman Looks Inside the State Department: Excerpts from Testimony Before Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security," U.S. News and World Report, XL (June 15, 1956), 96.

⁷⁶Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1954.

hower Administration. He would, however, charge that appeasement existed at the "lower echelons" and officials with "pro-Communist" views influenced top level decisions.⁷⁷ Judd could assert, nevertheless, that the State Department was "a good deal better than it was, but...it has a long way to go," before it is free from "pro-Communist influence. Judd saw the so-called "pro-Communists" as "clever" souls who wrote position papers, which came up to their superiors and became policy papers. Then, to Judd, the policy papers as influenced by the "questionable ones" go on to the action agencies, such as the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council. In this way the "pro-Communists" influenced all major decisions made in the Executive Departments. I don't see how they could come to the conclusion they do if that were not the case," Judd declared.⁷⁸

Judd's simple "black and white" solutions were not always warmly received by the new Administration. Judd and the Asia-Firsters and associates, without being named, received a public rebuke from the new Administration regarding their preventive war theory. Dulles, on January 27, 1953, after meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which

⁷⁷ Minneapolis Tribune, June 1, 1956.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Judd served as chairman, dispelled the preventive war theory. "A few people," the Secretary declared, "have suggested that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and that we'd better have it soon rather than later because they said time is running against us." The President is "absolutely opposed," Dulles continued, "to any such policy and so, of course, am I and all my associates in the State Department and the foreign service." The Eisenhower Administration "shall never choose a war as the instrument" of its policy, the Secretary concluded.⁷⁹

The courses of action in Asia as advocated by Dulles naturally flowed from the collapse of the Truman Administration's policy in Asia--the only alternative to a policy that had failed was its logical opposite.⁸⁰ John Foster Dulles believed, as did the Asia-Firsters and new isolationists, that it was possible to limit the use of atomic weapons to tactical purposes. The result of such tactical employment would be the destruction of airfields, supply installations, ports, and lines of communication--this would cause the en-

⁷⁹ John Foster Dulles, "Enlightened Self-Interest: Encirclement A Deadly Threat To United States," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIX (February 15, 1953), 266.

⁸⁰ Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China 1941-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 490.

emy to surrender.⁸¹ There were, however, those in the Eisenhower Administration who felt that such operations of atomic weapons would inevitably include the destruction of cities. The new President himself concluded that "there is really no definite dividing line between the tactical use of atomic weapons and the mis-called strategic use of them."⁸² Even though the Eisenhower Administration hinted at taking the Korean War into China it appears quite obvious that the President did not have the stomach for expanding the war at this time, that is, if he could obtain an armistice without it.

The resulting Korean Armistice, a weaker settlement than that which the President had demanded and worked for, as signed on July 26, 1953, was surely less than that expected by Judd and the Asian clique. It was indeed a grave disappointment for the Asia-Firsters and the China Lobby. They felt that ending the war without "victory" was bad enough, but in so doing it had "undermined the prestige of the United Nations and of the United States." To members of the lobby the armistice demonstrated American "unreadiness to pay the price" of the policy which they demanded.

⁸¹ Thomas R. Phillips [Brigadier General (Ret.)], "Our Point of No Return," The Reporter, XII (February 24, 1955), 18.

⁸² Ibid.

The agreement provided for prisoner exchange; freezing of existing military fronts as the demarcation line; and the establishment of a demilitarized zone four kilometers wide separating the Communist and United Nations forces. Troop and equipment rotation was permitted on a limited scale, but logistic conditions were to remain static. A Military Armistice Commission of ten members, five representing each side, was charged with enforcing the agreement. After prisoner exchange a political conference would meet to discuss the future status of Korea and related problems.⁸³

Despite the grave disappointment which Judd surely felt over the Korean Armistice, he was obliged to make at least a token effort to defend the President he had worked so hard to elect. It was Eisenhower's withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits which "brought the fighting to a close," Judd would assert.⁸⁴ Judd, however, just prior to the signing of the armistice argued that the peace talks were a "ruse" to buy "time" and an "opportunity for the Communists to rebuild their shattered strength." Any armistice, Judd declared, "which did not reunite Korea, disarm the North Koreans, and require withdrawal of Chinese Com-

⁸³ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 65.

⁸⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, April 18, 1955.

munist forces, could not give Korea security or bring peace." Lesser accomplishments in Korea, Judd asserted, would strengthen the Communist position in Asia and weaken that of Korea, the United States, and the entire free world.⁸⁵ Later Judd was to assert that the "Korean War" could not be called a "failure," even though it did not do "what many of us wanted," because without that "operation all Korea would have been gone, long ago."⁸⁶

Judd's denunciation of President Eisenhower's action in Korea is clearly illustrated by the number and charges of syndicated columnist articles which he read into the Congressional Record. Contrary to the fact that Eisenhower campaigned on the promise of making a personal visit to Korea and of bringing the Korean conflict to a close, the Asia-Firsters were in essence critical of all talk of ending the war, and rather shocked that the new President would consider anything short of total victory over the Communists in Asia. Without doubt Eisenhower was never thoroughly convinced that the Korean War was not the wrong war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place. His handling and ending the war apparently sprang from his lack of con-

⁸⁵ Minneapolis Star, July 1, 1953.

⁸⁶ U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st. Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 5, 6861.

viction that there had to be a "showdown" with Communist China and Russia. If Korea was the right war, at the right place, at the right time, then he settled for "too little." Eisenhower had tasted well the futility and frustrations of war prior to his elevation to the presidency. This, combined with the Korean settlement and the reaction thereto, helped to stop him from seriously considering intervention in Indochina at a later date.

Edgar Mowrer, a conservative syndicated columnist of the Asia-Firster faction, who mouthed the sentiments of Judd and was yet unwilling to cite or condemn the Eisenhower Administration by name, asserted in regard to the armistice settlement: "Those in high places who have meekly yielded to defeatists at home and abroad will have to accept full responsibility for their decisions." Thus, if the armistice turned out badly, Mowrer continued, "they will have no valid excuse."⁸⁷ Constantine Brown, in true Asia-First form, asserted that the signing of an armistice in Korea "is the last sop the present administration is willing to offer our Western allies." He voiced the explanation: "Administration leaders explain that, in the face of the determined stand of Great Britain and France to sign a truce, it would

⁸⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st. Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 12, A3645.

have been difficult for this Government to do otherwise without the London and Paris governments getting in trouble with their own people."⁸⁸ It is interesting to note, however, that the same Administration which Judd had asserted so often during the campaign would appease the Reds no longer, now according to Brown, would be guilty of not one more "concession."

Brown further assured his loyal followers that the European powers were convinced that "our declaration that Korea must be unified in accordance with the Western concept of free elections is not just another official statement to appease President Syngman Rhee." European powers have been fully convinced, he continued, that the United States Government intends to carry out this pledge, "regardless of what opposition may develop at the political conference to be held 90 days after the signature of the armistice." Brown spoke with conviction as he declared that the Administration would not "hesitate to accept the challenge of the Reds in Asia even if we have to meet the enemy without the support of Great Britain, the Commonwealth, and France." In such an event, Brown continued: "General Eisenhower knows...this country has at this moment the power to annihilate them with comparatively fewer losses than an appease-

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. A4929.

ment policy would cost." He failed to explain himself on this point, but the preventive war theory was still present in the minds of the Asia-Firsters as the only alternative to world peace. Brown concluded his remarks with the assurance that the Eisenhower Administration did not "shudder at the prospect of a challenge from the Reds, whom they regard as Colossi with clay feet."⁸⁹

In contrast, Walter Lippmann found the Korean armistice a reasonable and honorable arrangement.⁹⁰ Columnists who expounded the China bloc line, however, could echo the Knowland dictum that the armistice was at best "slightly dishonorable." The armistice did, however, serve to intensify the determination of the China clique and the new isolationists against the admittance of Red China to the United Nations.

It was the growing suspicion among many Congressmen that America's participation in the United Nations had tied the President's hands in obtaining a "better" settlement from the Korean negotiations.⁹¹ Although Judd appears to have remained totally silent in 1953 and 1954 on the so-

⁸⁹Ibid., p. A4930.

⁹⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 12, A4793. Read into the Record by Clyde R. Hoey, Democrat of North Carolina.

⁹¹Donald C. Blaisdell, American Democracy Under Pressure (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1957), p. 22.

called Bricker Amendment debate, he was willing to work with the strong supporters of the proposed amendment to gain his own objectives in the field of foreign affairs. Many of the sub-agencies which the new isolationists feared were the very ones which Judd had supported for years. Nearly a decade before Judd had toured the country seeking to place the Government on record as favoring a new international organization for the maintenance of peace.⁹² What America must do, Judd declared in 1944, "when the war is over is join with the world in hoisting a standard of freedom and honesty that 85 per cent of the world's people will follow."⁹³ The United States, however, under a Republican Administration would make no renunciations in Asia out of regard for the "timidity" of European allies, Judd would declare. He would readily admit that the United States had a need for these allies, but not more than they needed the United States; perhaps indeed the need was a great deal less on the part of the United States.⁹⁴

Contrary to the belief held by many of America's allies, not only Asia-Firsters but a vast majority of the

⁹²Minneapolis Star-Journal, October 26, 1945.

⁹³Minneapolis Star-Journal, March 31, 1944.

⁹⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 11, A3551.

American population saw Red China emerging from the Korean War as a new and potent force in the world balance of power, waiting for the proper moment to throw herself against Formosa and Southeast Asia. With the Korean deadlock broken, the Eisenhower Administration attempted to move ahead on other fronts, notably expenditures. Substantial cutbacks were achieved, as promised in the Republican platform of 1952, in conventional war appropriations. Although the Eisenhower Administration refused to formulate actual policy on the basis demanded by the new isolationists and the China bloc, the "new look" or "new direction" of defense concentrated on "instant" and "massive" retaliation, presumably with nuclear weapons, against aggression of the Communist forces, a policy which would eliminate the need of a large standing military force. Since "Korean type" wars were not included in the Administration's military program, reserve forces, rather than standing forces, would serve the country's needs and at the same time save tax payers money. To both the Asia-Firsters and the new isolationists, the United States required nothing more than air-atomic-sea power to achieve total victory in East Asia over the Chinese Communists.⁹⁵

John Foster Dulles announced and vaguely outlined the

⁹⁵ Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 124.

Administration's economy program to obtain "more security" for "less money," to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on January 12, 1954. The Secretary of State informed the Council that henceforth the United States would "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." This reliance upon strategic air power was expected to appeal to the American public for several reasons. Indeed "massive retaliation" sounded more dynamic than the time-worn Truman term of "containment," and it made possible a reduction of over-all military expenditures. Massive retaliation rejected the concept of limited war, or "half war," and "reasserted the old American doctrine of either abstaining or fighting an all-out-war."⁹⁶ Judd's response to Dulles' statement was that the American people truly appreciate "the forthright and unequivocal way in which Secretary of State Dulles has amplified and spelled out in sharp detail the strong, positive, and sound foreign policy President Eisenhower and his new administration are developing to meet the urgent needs of our time."⁹⁷

Indeed, the doctrine delighted all factions on the

⁹⁶Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 103.

⁹⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, XCIX, Part 10, A2068.

right of the political spectrum. This policy of massive retaliation reflected Dulles' and Asia-Firsters' own strong conviction that the only effective way of stopping further aggression was to give the enemy an advanced warning that if he committed such aggression, he would be subject to such overwhelming retaliatory blows that his possible gains would be far outweighed by the punishment he would receive.⁹⁸

The Dulles doctrine supposedly provided for a clear line drawn around the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. Thus the Russians and Chinese could cross this line only at the risk of total war with the United States. The fear of total destruction by the American Strategic Air Command was expected to deter the Russians and Chinese from committing any new "Koreas." Unlike the Truman Administration, the Eisenhower Administration proposed to fight no more local ground wars.

The doctrine, whether or not it accomplished its intended purpose, is still subject to heated debate. The Indochina war provided ample opportunity for demonstrating the doctrine of the Administration which held "the mandate for change." The President, however, refused to accept full responsibility for making the theory operative in Vietnam, because Democratic leaders would not give him the "blank

⁹⁸Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 104.

check" which the Administration desired. By mid-1954, after the fall of Dienbienphu, the Eisenhower Administration made no additional overt gesture to stay the course of this Asian problem, except establish and increase in size the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group which took over the training of South Vietnamese troops as the French forces left. The doctrine of massive retaliation, however, produced a domestic battle which resulted in corrections, clarifications, counterassertions, and restatements, resulting in further confounded confusion which virtually nullified the original declaration.⁹⁹

Judd held the view that the United States should be prepared to carry out massive retaliation against Red China if necessary, and proceeded to advise the Eisenhower Administration to that end. The United States should be prepared to act, he asserted, regardless of the position of American allies, although the threat of massive retaliation in itself would be sufficient to deter Communist aggression in Asia. But if the threat failed, Judd would assert in answering questions, the "country would face an awful decision--whether to let those countries go...or to go in with our men in

⁹⁹ Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons And Limited War," The Reporter, XI (November 18, 1954), 20. Dienbienphu fell on May 7, 1954. This was the first time in the Indochina War that a French stronghold had been conquered by direct attack.

a Korean-type war, or an all-out retaliation." His own inclination he would say, "was against the Korea-type war."¹⁰⁰ Thus, after the fall of Dienbienphu, Judd announced that all the gains the United States had made on the European continent were in jeopardy by American losses to the Communists in Asia.¹⁰¹

As chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Judd made a 30,000 mile trip through Asia in late 1953. Upon his return he announced that he would make a full and detailed report of his trip to the President, and that he was recommending to Secretary Dulles that the United States sign a new defensive pact with friendly Asiatic nations to assure them that they were "full partners" in America's fight against communism."¹⁰² Dulles, despite his refusal to sign the Geneva Declaration of July 21, 1954, which without a doubt would have been condemned by the China bloc as making concessions to the Communists, did bring about the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, commonly known as the Manila Pact. Signatories of the treaty of September 8, 1954, included Great Britain, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, Australia,

¹⁰⁰ Minneapolis Star, April 12, 1954.

¹⁰¹ New York Times, June 18, 1954, p. 3.

¹⁰² Minneapolis Tribune, December 25, 1953.

and the United States. The treaty area included, in addition to the signatory nations, the areas of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The creation of SEATO, which took only three days to negotiate, was followed by the Pacific Charter. Here, the Western nations, in a document inspired by the Atlantic Charter, affirmed their willingness to help the Asiatic nations retain full independence.¹⁰³

Judd reacted to these formal agreements by expressing his approval of the direction of the Eisenhower Administration in the field of foreign relations. He described the Administration's direction as "good," and reported that he was "more encouraged for real unity and strength among the free nations of the world than at any time since the end of the war." This has come about, Judd declared, "because of a basic change in this nation's foreign relation's approach." The Republicans, Judd continued, regard "the world as one strategic unit, instead of making everything secondary to the North Atlantic countries." The Republicans, Judd would tell his audiences, recognized Communist gains anywhere as dangerous as in Europe--"something Dean Acheson...wouldn't recognize."¹⁰⁴

Although Judd hailed SEATO as a "triumph," it became

¹⁰³ Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 374.

¹⁰⁴ Minneapolis Star, October 16, 1954.

a reality only after part of Indochina was lost, the European Defense Community was drafted, and the gulf between the United States and Britain widened. Judd's "NATO" for Asia left much to be desired when compared with its European counterpart. NATO came into being because the nations most concerned were convinced that defense and prosperity for Europe was a common venture. At Manila there was no such common belief. The nations involved in SEATO, it appears, could not readily identify the "common" enemy. The American delegation finally had to add a paragraph stating its own "understanding" that the treaty had to do with stopping aggression by Communists."¹⁰⁵

Perhaps this weak treaty came about only after threats of American withdrawal from the United Nations if Red China were admitted. The United States prevented the seating of Red Chinese delegates, not by the veto, which the Asia-Firsters advocated, if necessary, but by political-economic

¹⁰⁵ SEATO, unlike NATO alliance, which it resembled, did not possess a unified command or joint force. The principal force behind the alliance was American sea and air power. An armed attack on any of the SEATO members was not considered "an attack against...all," as set forth in NATO. Each of the eight nations merely agreed that an attack on any of the nations involved would "endanger its own peace and safety." The trouble evolving from the treaty was that there was produced an illusion that America had a "NATO" in Asia which it did not. Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 145.

persuasion and influence.¹⁰⁶ Most other governments apparently concluded that the central issue of "Formosa vs. Peking" was too important to be disposed of through voting technicalities on a report of the credentials committee of the United Nations.¹⁰⁷ Judd's own talk of the United States withdrawing from the United Nations, without doubt, was but his own device to exert pressure on the Administration to provide more aid and protection for Asia. Throughout 1954 Judd urged on and demanded from the Administration greater encouragement and assistance "to the Free Chinese on Formosa" because the survival of the "whole free world" was at stake in Asia.¹⁰⁸ Judd's reputation and his objectives were circulated widely enough to warrant condemnation "as a war monger" from a Russian delegate to the United Nations.¹⁰⁹

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which Judd served as chairman during 1953 and 1954, had to withstand tremendous pressure from those who demanded that the United States withdraw from the United Nations if Communist China

¹⁰⁶ More than a few of the sixty United Nations countries recognized or supported recognition of Red China. The Chinese Communists, however, refused recognition to several Western countries.

¹⁰⁷ New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ Minneapolis Star, March 27, 1954.

¹⁰⁹ New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 6.

were admitted. Judd was willing, along with Kit Clardy, Michigan Republican, to sponsor a resolution demanding American withdrawal if Red China were seated.¹¹⁰ He declared that personally he would "rather suspend the U. N. than make it a league of gangsters, murderers, thugs, kidnapers and completely lawless people."¹¹¹ He, however, "opposed any action that would tip off what this country intends to do if Red China was admitted." Judd could sponsor such a resolution because he sincerely felt that the "Chinese Reds would not win a United Nations seat."¹¹² Judd's assurance came from the President's pledge that he would impress upon foreign governments the feeling of Congress and would caution them that if they forced the issue in the United Nations that he would not be able to answer for the reaction in the United States.¹¹³

Opposition to admittance of Red China to the United Nations had crystallized prior to Judd's resolution, which never got out of committee. The main pressure group influencing Congress and the Administration, in behalf of "free" China, was the Committee of One Million (Against the

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Minneapolis Star, July 10, 1954.

¹¹² Ibid.; New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 6.

¹¹³ Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 215.

Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.) The committee came into existence only weeks after the Korean Armistice was signed. The conception of the committee, originally the Committee For One Million, originated with Nicholas de Rochefort, a Russian-born university lecturer. Judd, when contacted about the committee, immediately embraced the idea and set to work to make the organization a reality. The Committee For One Million succeeded during the first ten months of its existence in enlisting more than a million signatures on petitions to President Eisenhower to oppose Communist China's admission to the United Nations. With this objective accomplished, the committee suspended its activities; however, the following year it was reactivated as the Committee of One Million. Since that time it has not only opposed admission of Communist China to the United Nations but also has opposed extending diplomatic recognition and all other moves which might build the power or prestige of the Peking regime.¹¹⁴ Judd actively labored for the committee as it continued as a very powerful and influential pressure group. Likewise, he continued to occupy a key position in policy making. The objective of the Committee of One Million in influencing the

¹¹⁴A. T. Steele, The American People And China (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 120-21.

Administration and Congress sought to have each individual commit himself in black and white to a "hard" position on Red China.¹¹⁵

The activities of the China bloc to bind the President occasioned considerable strain between the President and members of his own Republican majority in Congress. Eisenhower often spoke of the endless battle of "congressional encroachment" on the Executive branch of the Government as members of his own party attempted to assert the initiative in foreign affairs. Not infrequently did members of the China bloc or new isolationists attempt to subjugate the President to their own will by threats of withholding funds, or attaching riders, or amendments, to the President's domestic or foreign programs and commitments. On numerous occasions Judd compelled the President to take notice of the power and prestige which he had amassed in the House. On one occasion Judd sought to prevent the President from

¹¹⁵ The letterhead of the Committee of One Million for several years carried the names of five senators: Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut; Peter H. Dominick, Republican of Colorado; Paul H. Douglas, Democrat of Illinois; Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa; William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin; and other well-known personages as Charles Edison, Walter H. Judd, and Congressman Thomas E. Morgan, Democrat of Pennsylvania. There were prominent liberals who lent their names to the committee's goal during the interim period following the Korean Armistice. They, however, soon found themselves increasingly uncomfortable with the organization's policies, and many eventually withdrew.

obligating any mutual-security funds until the European governments ratified the treaty which would set up a European Defense Community, including West Germany. The President called Judd and informed him of his disgust at this Republican action. "It was an insult," the President told Judd, "for a Republican President to face such a restrictive policy when the Congress had not forced it on his Democratic predecessor." Judd defended his stand, the President related, but "he agreed to work for a compromise."¹¹⁶ Judd, nevertheless, was willing to employ every tactic at his command to force his own China case upon the Administration.¹¹⁷

The President refused to go all the way with Judd and the China bloc in reestablishing Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland. He, however, assured Judd and his allies that the United States would be ever mindful of Chiang's welfare and that Formosa would never fall to the Red Chinese while he was President of the United States. On December 2, 1954, the Eisenhower Administration concluded a defense agreement with the government controlling Formosa, designa-

¹¹⁶ Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 215.

¹¹⁷ For interesting observations on Judd see: "The Ladejinsky Case" under "The Reporter Notes," The Reporter, XII (January 13, 1955), 4; Minneapolis Tribune, October 6, 1955. Judd was one of Ladejinsky's strongest supporters.

ting it "the Republic of China." This, without doubt, Judd found most reassuring as the United Nations Charter provides, by name, that "the Republic of China" shall be one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The treaty provided for the defense of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and other such "territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." The treaty as such did not cover all Nationalist-held islands off the coast of China. It, however, required the United States and Nationalist China to maintain and develop "jointly by self-help and mutual aid" their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversion directed against them "from without."¹¹⁸ The new treaty provided no tangible benefits which the Nationalist Chinese did not already have on Formosa, by action of the Truman Administration. Both political parties in the United States were fully committed to defend Formosa. The treaty, therefore, did provide a new justification to keep the Seventh Fleet patrolling the China Seas, to execute the same function which Truman had ordered in 1950.

By late 1954, without doubt, Judd, Knowland, the Asia-Firsters, and the new isolationists, realized as well as

¹¹⁸ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 73.

did Chiang Kai-shek and members of the Eisenhower Executive family, that Chiang Kai-shek was not going anywhere without Presidential consent. The President's experience with congressional leaders of the new isolationist and China bloc varieties, and the failure of some of his programs in Congress at the hands of a Republican majority, apparently convinced the President that he must exert stronger leadership. Apparently it was here that Eisenhower learned that in the democratic process the relationship between the Executive and Congress depends often upon an uneasy coalition of factions, always capable of inflicting great harm on the Administration. The President curried the favor of the new isolationist coalition, but they remained rebellious at the President's leadership in foreign affairs. The persistent determination of the new isolationist coalition to seize and maintain the initiative in formulating foreign policy, thus subjugating the President to their will, remained strong throughout the two years that the Republicans controlled Congress. The President could afford to give Chiang Kai-shek a protective treaty, but conquering the mainland constituted too high a price for returning the "rebellious" ones to the Republican fold.

Without doubt the Chinese Nationalists wanted the treaty as long-term insurance not only against Communist in-

vasion, but also against recognition of Red China.¹¹⁹ The treaty reassured Chiang Kai-shek on the defense of Formosa, but he was in no position to force the United States to codify its policy in treaty form. However, Judd, Knowland, and the entire China bloc coalition wanted the same assurance, and they had the political power to compel it.¹²⁰ The treaty did commit the United States, when approved by the Senate, formally to recognize Formosa and the Pescadores Islands as a part of the Republic of China, a recognition which the United States had successfully avoided for nearly ten years. This was welcome assurance to Judd and the entire China bloc that the United States fully recognized Chiang Kai-shek's claim to Formosa.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Harlan Cleveland, "Troubled Waters: The Formosa Strait," The Reporter, XII (January 13, 1955), 9.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 10; Minneapolis Tribune, February 4, 1953. The United States navy was absolutely essential for any real offensive against the Chinese mainland. Major General William C. Chase, chief of the United States military assistance advisory group on Formosa, reported that Chiang's forces could not be ready for any attack before early 1954 even if the new Administration gave top priority to the Nationalists' needs on Formosa. Even then the United States navy would be needed for preparatory bombardment and to supply Chiang's troops.

¹²¹ The disposition of Formosa had served as a point of disagreement between the Taft Republicans, the old isolationists, and the Asia-Firsters at an earlier day. Taft, contrary to the main stream of Republican thought on Formosa, on January 11, 1950, expressed his opinion that if at the peace conference with Japan it was decided that Formosa "should be set up as an independent republic" then the Uni-

The Mutual Defense Treaty with Chiang's government, as approved by the Senate on February 9, 1955, literally bypassed the United Nations in providing defense for Formosa. The new isolationists had no regrets in regard to the United Nations; however, Judd felt that the backing of American friends in the United Nations, added to America's own well-known determination not to let Formosa be taken over, should deter any invasion if any advanced warning could deter it and defeat it if the Red Chinese were so irrational as to ignore the collective warning. The treaty as written was a blue print for going it alone on the part of the United States in Asia. But the Eisenhower Administration amply demonstrated that it wanted a neutralized Formosa, not an Asia-Firster "liberation" adventure on the mainland.

The treaty, however, presented a possible block for aid from American allies through the United Nations if war had developed in the Straits of Formosa. The treaty did hobble American freedom in Asia; however, the Secretary of State felt that its value outweighed the restrictions placed on the United States. But the question was still asked:

ted States had "the means to force the Nationalists' surrender of Formosa." Robert A. Taft, "'Hang On' To Formosa: Hold Until Peace Treaty With Japan Is Signed," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVI (February 1, 1950), 237. Taft, however, before his death chose to think and speak of Formosa as Chiang's private property. By 1954 the Republican Party was in full accord on the future of Formosa.

Why was such a treaty negotiated? Critics of the treaty charged that the Eisenhower Administration needed "a treaty with the fire-eating wing of the Republican Party."¹²² And it was a concession to the new isolationists and Asia-Firsters, perhaps the best that could be offered short of "liberation."

The Eisenhower Administration demonstrated, less than two weeks previous to negotiating the Mutual Defense Treaty, that it did not intend, any more than had the Truman Administration, to be drawn into a war with Red China, despite the demands of Judd, Knowland, and the entire China bloc. On November 22, 1954, a Red Chinese military tribunal sentenced eleven United States airmen and two American Army employees to long prison terms as spies. These men had been captured in two groups when their planes were shot down during the Korean conflict. The State Department sent a strong protest and the Defense Department cabled that the charges were "utterly false." The President reacted by declaring that the United States would do everything "humanly possible within means" to obtain their release. Knowland, the Senate majority leader, however, urged a United States blockade of

¹²²Cleveland, "Troubled Waters: The Formosa Straits," p. 10.

Red China until the Americans were released.¹²³ Perhaps Knowland was only recalling the Administration's threat of the previous year. The Asia-Firsters still regarded Eisenhower's "strong talk" of a blockade as contributing to the end of fighting in Korea.

Secretary of State Dulles, however, on November 29, 1954, informed a Chicago audience that a United States blockade of Communist China would be an act of war and that imprisonment of the thirteen Americans was "a challenge to us...to find ways, consistent with peace, to sustain international rights and justice." He further declared that the United States was obligated to settle disputes within the framework of the United Nations "in such a manner that international peace is not endangered." On December 1, 1954, however, the Secretary of State reported that a blockade was "certainly a possibility" if all peaceful efforts to obtain the release of the Americans failed.¹²⁴

Despite Dulles' "possiblity" of employing a blockade against Red China and the great threat of massive retaliation, the Red Chinese seized in August of 1954 the small offshore island of Ichang, some 210 miles north of Formosa.

¹²³ Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Far East Policy, pp. 70-71.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

The Chinese Communists appeared prepared to invade the nearby Tachen Islands, more important than Ichiang and located some 200 miles north of Formosa. Military strategists viewed this move as posing an imminent threat to the Nationalist stronghold on Formosa. Communist China had repeatedly declared its intention of taking Formosa and adjoining territories. The activities of January 18, 1955, prompted the President to petition Congress on January 24, 1955, for explicit authority to use American armed forces to protect Formosa, the adjoining Pescadores Islands, and "related positions and territories." It was essential to United States security, the President asserted, for Formosa to "remain in friendly hands." While "authority for some of the actions which might be required" was clearly his as Commander in Chief, the President declared, Congress should "make clear the unified and serious intentions" of the nation "to fight if necessary." Congressional approval of the proposed resolution, Eisenhower said, would "clarify present policy" and help prevent the Communist forces from "misjudging American firm purpose and national unity."¹²⁵

Both the President and his Secretary of State, however,

¹²⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, CI, Part 1, 660; Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964; A Review of Government And Politics in the Postwar Years (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), p. 114.

failed to clarify exactly their intentions regarding Quemoy, Matsu and other offshore islands, located little more than one hundred miles from Formosa. The Red Chinese had, in September, 1954, opened up heavy artillery fire on Quemoy. The President did warn that the United States must "be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military action."¹²⁶ The message, however, only implied that the President with his newly acquired congressional support would commit American forces to repulse an invasion of Quemoy, which was still under Chinese Communist bombardment. The President, nevertheless, apparently wished to convey to Peking that he had full support of Congress to take any action that he deemed necessary. Surely Judd greeted the President's request with some reservation as it did not include the "liberation" of the mainland from the Communists which he and the China bloc desired. Judd, however, supported the measure as "a belated effort to prevent war, not to make it."¹²⁷ Judd did not judge it necessary for the President to come to Congress for this authority, but he

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ U.S., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1st Sess., 1955.

thought it wise that he did so, because it made the American position "stronger before those who threaten war and before the world." The appearance of the "united front" which the President requested, Judd felt, was more likely to prevent war than to bring it about.¹²⁸

The President's proposal met with near overwhelming Republican support. A few Democrats, however, viewed the offshore islands--excluding Formosa--as clearly belonging to mainland China, and the question of their disposition as falling outside of legitimate United States security interests. These Democrats feared that Chiang Kai-shek, in an effort to regain the mainland, would use this "fatal ambiguity" over the offshore islands to maneuver the United States into a war with the mainland Communists.

Perhaps Judd and the China bloc secretly held hope that the activities would lead to the "liberation" which they long desired. Despite their misgivings the Democratic leaders in Congress complied with the President's request.¹²⁹ The resulting legislation¹³⁰ authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States for protecting

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 672.

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 641, 818, 821, 920, 991, 993; Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, p. 114.

¹³⁰ 69 Stat. 7.

the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area. The ambiguity of the resolution cannot be denied, and perhaps secretly some Republicans supported it for the very reason some Democrats feared it--indeed, the President had received a pre-dated blank check from the newly elected Democratic Congress.

Perhaps the Democrats' most distressing default as active agents of bipartisanship was their failure to obtain a clarification of what they were called upon to authorize. Throughout the congressional debate there was an underlying confusion whether the new policy constituted retrenchment or advance on United States commitments to the Nationalist Chinese, whether it was an ultimatum to the Chinese Reds or a partial withdrawal leading ultimately to the neutralization of Formosa under a United Nations trusteeship. The individual most responsible for the swift action on the Administration's request was Senator Walter George, Democrat of Georgia, the new Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, a Judd nominee, had flown to Georgia, prior to the convening of Congress, to confer with George on the Formosa Mutual Defense Treaty. George in defending the resolution before the Senate could emphasize the assurance which he received from the President: the President

alone would make the decisions going beyond the immediate defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. "It means that no admiral here and no line officer off the coast of China, in the Formosa Straits, or elsewhere will start [a war]," George said. Such Presidential assurance was needed to win several Democrats to support the resolution. There was much anxiety among several Democrats as to whether Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the President would decide when American security in Asia was in jeopardy.¹³¹

To Judd and the China bloc, however, America's security was in jeopardy as long as Red China remained a reality. Judd accepted the resolution with less enthusiasm than might be expected: "the most encouraging thing I see in the whole picture is the awareness of the nature of the Communist menace which the members of Congress are demonstrating overwhelmingly."¹³² Judd did, however, assert that he was greatly encouraged about the chances of peace in Asia because the Eisenhower Administration was "alert to the key role played by Asia in the fight against communism," and

¹³¹Douglas Cater, "Foreign Policy: Default of the Democrats," The Reporter, XII (March 10, 1955), 23; U.S., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, CI, Part 1, 819.

¹³²U.S., Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, CI, Part 8, 10468.

because the United States had a global policy for the first time."¹³³ Even though the Eisenhower Administration was not willing to "break Red China," which Judd asserted was the "only lasting solution to the Communist problem in Southeast Asia,"¹³⁴ he was willing to declare that it "is clear" that the Eisenhower Administration "realizes the nature of communism and will not again take words as substitutes for deeds."¹³⁵

Judd was always most reluctant to criticize openly the Eisenhower Administration. Still Judd's speaking implied that even a Republican Administration did not fully understand the communist adversary. Perhaps recalling his days with the Price Committee, Judd felt that the American populace was not active enough in their own defense, when he declared that "the generals try to build strength and unity while soft-headed civilians try to woo their enemies with appeasement."¹³⁶ Surely, Judd realized that Eisenhower's foreign policy constituted in no greater sense a "global foreign policy" than had the Truman foreign policy, that

¹³³ Minneapolis Star, February 19, 1955.

¹³⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1954.

¹³⁵ Minneapolis Star, February 19, 1955.

¹³⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, October 29, 1952.

"liberation" was nothing more than masked containment.¹³⁷ Evaluating the Eisenhower years, Judd could declare that Eisenhower's policy of "containing communism" was "sound in concept" and was founded largely under bipartisan agreements. But to Judd the American people did not give the needed "solid support" for the policy executed by the Eisenhower Administration, nor for the policies of the Republican Congress of 1953-1954, as formulated by the China bloc.¹³⁸ Judd, however, rather than indict the Eisenhower Administration, or question the "soundness" of his own policies, could castigate the American people for the "national sickness" in believing that Russia could be diverted from its plan of world conquest by concessions.¹³⁹ In short, neither the President nor the American people clearly understood America's invincibility.

Judd, apparently, continued to believe in the policy of "liberation" through stern political and military action. The voice of America, however, was the more moderate voice of President Eisenhower--and Judd did not like it. The cold war was to continue, but the President was determined that it was not to go Dr. Judd's way.

¹³⁷ For a critical evaluation of the Eisenhower foreign policy see Brodie's article, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War," 16-21.

¹³⁸ Minneapolis Star, January 11, 1961.

¹³⁹ Minneapolis Tribune, October 7, 1961.

CHAPTER VII

EPILOGUE

A review of Judd's Congressional career will reveal that accomplishments were slight if judged on the basis of legislation proposed. Perhaps his most significant role in Congress can be found on the House floor or behind the scenes in his vigorous oratorical ability and his persistent activities to obtain passage of legislation which he deemed important to the security of the country. Judd was a crusader rather than an innovator. His real contributions can perhaps be judged through his ability to dramatize issues and to lead those Congressmen who looked to him for advice and counsel as a great expert on all Asian matters. It was this ability to dramatize issues that was to establish Judd as a spokesman for the Republican Party, particularly on questions relating to the Pacific area. He soon emerged as one of the most prominent figures in the "China bloc," a group of pro-Chiang critics of the Truman Administration foreign policy after World War II. More perhaps than any other man, Judd helped to build up a tremendous following for Chiang in the United

States.¹

This same talent accounts for the rapid surge in Judd's popularity as a public speaker. He became one of the most widely-known Congressmen outside his own district and one of the most sought after speakers not only at partisan functions, but for gatherings as diversified as national and state education, dental, and medical groups, commencement exercises,

¹The Washington Post, on November 29, 1964, noted how death, retirement, and loss of interest took their toll of the original stalwarts of the China Lobby: "'Of the people most prominently identified with the 'China Lobby,' Senators McCarran and McCarthy, as well as Senator Styles Bridges (R.-N.H.) are dead. Senators William F. Knowland (R.-Calif.) and William E. Jenner (R.-Ind.) are obscurely out of office. Of the military members, General Claire Chennault and Patrick J. Hurley are dead; General Albert C. Wedemeyer and Admiral Arthur W. Radford are retired. Of the civilian officials, Ambassador William C. Bullitt, Pennsylvania Governor George A. Earle and Walter Robertson, Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, are long retired. Of the private citizens, Alfred Kohlberg, the importer of Chinese lace handkerchiefs who headed the American China Policy Association, is dead; Henry R. Luce, Publisher of Time, Inc., now takes a less active role in his organization; his wife, Clare Boothe Luce, recently did a public turnabout on United States-China policy; William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester (N.H.) Union-Leader, has lost voice in his own state, and author Freda Utley, the frequent congressional witness, is now introducing herself at Washington cocktail parties.

"The one member of the 'China Lobby' still active, former Representative Walter H. Judd (R.-Minn.), a one-time missionary doctor in China, now speaks for the 'Committee of One Million,' a group which one American official guardedly called 'a term rather than a reality.'" A. T. Steele, The American People And China (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 239.

college and university seminars, or for the National Convention of the DAR.

Judd's platform style and subject matter seldom failed to arouse pungent reaction from both critic and admirer. Perhaps Judd's "supreme moment" in his public speaking career came on July 25, 1960, when he delivered the Republican National Convention keynote address in Chicago. A reporter for the Minneapolis Star commented: "His poise, his rhetoric, his familiarity with his subject, his pauses, his natural gestures shoved him to oratorical heights which may not be surpassed at this convention or any other for a long, long time."² In contrast, and with less charity for Judd as a person than for his oratorical ability, Theodore White reported: "The keynote address was made by Congressman Walter H. Judd: since Rockefeller, who loves people, had not wished to make it, the Republican National Committee had chosen Judd, who is a master at arousing hate; and Judd made the rafters roar and the benches shake" as he skillfully utilized the "old fashioned Minnesota Populist knack of heating the political blood,"³ to lift his Republican brethren to share with him the delight of the sounds of stern, harsh,

² Minneapolis Star, July 26, 1960.

³ Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), p. 206.

demanding words.

Judd's style and personality do not promote objectivity from either friend or critic. His repetitious ninety minute speeches seem always to mesmerize his followers, who apparently want only to be told, and then told again, never tiring of being told, that the United States and the Republicans are good and that the Communists and the Democrats are not. Judd has mastered the technique of rousing passions where thought might better serve. Whether familiar with subject matter or not--a source of considerable debate--Judd is always ready to express himself freely, in seemingly well-rehearsed and frequently stated phrases which are often meaningless cliches, delivered with gatling-gun speed. There is, however, a sincere, earnest, positive, but still defensive and self-righteous air about every sentence he utters in public--perhaps these are traits of the "martyr complex." He eagerly and vocally offers to "sacrifice" himself for the cause of the moment. When confronted with the possibility that he might lose in the new Fifth District of Minneapolis in 1962, Judd replied in usual form: "I've been fighting for losing causes all my life. I won't back down just because of that."⁴ Judd apparently took great pride in asserting that he never "asked for a vote" in his politi-

⁴Minneapolis Star, April 7, 1962.

cal career. After losing the election in 1962 to Donald M. Fraser, Judd attacked his victorious opponent in odious terms. This prompted from Fraser an assessment of Judd's attacks which may be the most apt description of Judd's approach to individuals or groups who differed with him politically: "[Judd's] inability to accept or comprehend that individuals might prefer a point different from his own, no matter how sincerely held, is almost unbelievable."⁵ With the passage of time Judd appears to have taken as a personal affront any opposition to his policies. By the early 1960's, many constituents of the Fifth District began to see in Judd the "apotheosis of narrow thinking, the dividing line between rationalism and extremism."⁶

Judd's partisanship was notorious. Excess has always characterized his busy schedule, whether as a super-charged Republican campaigner, regardless of the tint of his Republican brethren, or in his almost evangelistic determination to assist China. Just as Judd's evangelistic heritage led him to the foreign mission field, this same drive propelled him throughout his congressional career. As an over-confident moralist Judd was for the most part unable to bend, to see how right or wrong might appear from the opponent's

⁵ Minneapolis Tribune, December 22, 1962.

⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, March 10, 1966.

position. His criterion was one of absolute right and wrong. Thus, Judd as a political moralizer possessed an advantage over many of his opponents who argued policies on more rational grounds; he could simply draw a line that excluded some possibilities as immoral.

There are those critics who view Judd as one of the most adroit of chameleonic politicians; there are those supporters who see in him a great man of boundless knowledge, whose integrity is above reproach; and then there are those persons who view him as an honest but misguided soul. A whole host of political labels have been associated or attached to Judd, varying from the "left" of a "new liberal" to his own description of himself as a "progressive conservative," or to the "reactionary right." Judd has often spoken of himself as "really a Jeffersonian Democrat at heart," and asserts that the only way he can "fight for the Jeffersonian principles is through the Republican Party."⁷ A close observation of Judd's speaking and voting in the House will readily reveal evidence for the development of those varied political labels.

His congressional career, however, if viewed with restraint, reveals why he retained a semblance of respectability among nearly all political factions. Serving as a pro-

⁷Minneapolis Tribune, August 25, 1960.

minent representative of a bipartisan foreign policy, he remained a severe critic of the China policy of the Democrats. Yet he found himself not always satisfied with many Republican maneuvers in Asia. Judd apparently felt that some of the sting could be removed by heaping additional blame on the Democratic Party. On one occasion Representative Wayne Hays, a Democrat of Ohio, admonished Judd for one of his speeches by asking why similar programs, if suggested by a Democrat, became "a Democratic give-away" and if suggested by a Republican became "statemanship."⁸ Judd made no reply.

Always eager to accept the challenge to defend those things he held dear, Judd would readily lend his name and voice, on his terms alone, to those groups who like himself felt that the United States was on the verge of, if not already irrevocably committed to, an error or irremediable proportions. It was the responsibility of the "enlightened few" to carry forth the historic perspective of the national interest. Judd was first and foremost an American patriot who viewed his country as the only hope for the redemption of mankind. Seemingly, Judd held that the sole solution for the great perplexing international problems rested with the force of Christianity as dictated by the United States.

⁸ Ibid.

Only when America redeemed the world would universal fellowship and service abide with resulting peace and harmony. Despite the lofty origin of his motivation, however, his ethical convictions often turned out to serve his own more earthbound interest--but he always denied by his actions and words that there were any weaknesses on his own part. Judd, often lacking in a sense of relativity, adapted his arguments to the times very neatly. The guideline for his speaking and voting in the House perhaps can best be summed up in his own words: "a Congressman should be guided, in his voting, less by what the voters of his district want him to do than by what he thinks he ought to do."⁹

⁹Stanley High, "Wanted: More Men Like Judd," Reader's Digest, L (May, 1947), 118: As condensed from The Missionary Herald, April, 1947.

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